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On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered four terrorist attacks on its soil by a group 
later identified as Al-Qaeda. The attacks, the worst in US history, resulted in immense 
destruction and loss of life. For the United States, and for a number of countries around the 
world, 9/11 constituted a major historical turning point which prompted a series of 
responses aimed at countering terrorism. For Pakistan, the pragmatic decision to join the US-
led military campaign in Afghanistan immediately transformed the nation into a front-line 
state in the ‘war on terror’ being waged on its western border. In the years that followed, 
Pakistan experienced an escalation in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four 
of its provinces and in the tribal areas. The rise in religious extremism and violence made 
Pakistan progressively less safe for its many citizens. Moreover, amidst media reports of 
ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, western audiences increasingly viewed 
Pakistan, and Islam, as synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism. 
 
Within the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, a new type of discourse began 
to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan. For President Musharraf, the formation 
of a cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and 
hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this would allow effective 
revenue extraction, which could be reinvested in much-needed social and economic 
development. This in turn would result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society, and 
reverse negative world opinion of Pakistan. Following this Gramscian assumption, after 
9/11 President Musharraf attempted to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for 
Pakistan by promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam. By 2006, 
he had established the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism. Three years later, in 
2009, President Zardari reconstituted the council and renamed it the National Sufi Council. 
With its ostensible message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism was 
posited by both administrations as the first and foremost symbol of national identity for 
Pakistan, as well as a global panacea to terrorism. 
 
In order to understand contemporary politics, and Islam, in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis 
employed Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-
political analysis. The main aim was to analyse and interpret government discourse on the 
subject of Sufism over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11 to demonstrate the 
ways in which Sufism was officially invoked and promoted. A further aim was to analyse 
and interpret the discourse of other political actors on the subject of Sufism during the same 
period to demonstrate the ways in which the official construction of Sufism was reproduced 
and resisted. Those narratives were then situated within the wider historical socio-political 
context. This approach was intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the 
persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national identity, and of belonging, 
for Pakistani society despite the many theological differences that exist amongst the Muslims 
of Pakistan. It was also intended to reveal the complex and competing identity narratives 
 
 vi 
which continue to hinder government efforts to create a single cohesive and shared national 
identity for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that, whilst Islam has been the ultimate source of identity and 
legitimacy for Pakistan since before its creation in 1947, the many complex and competing 
interpretations of Islam that exist in the nation continue to divide it. Most crucially, the 
inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a 
significant impact on the nation’s ability to establish a coherent ideology upon which to base 
a viable political system. Official attempts to construct a national identity through the lens of 
Sufism after 9/11 were a continuation of a wider, largely incomplete, and problematic 
struggle to build national unity in Pakistan. Ultimately, however, the turn to Sufism served 
to further complicate the issue rather than resolve it. 
 
KEY WORDS:  Cultural hegemony, critical discourse analysis, history, identity politics, 











1.1 The struggle to define a nation 
 
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks on its 
soil. A group later identified as Al-Qaeda hijacked four planes: two were flown into the 
World Trade Centre in New York, one was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington County, 
Virginia, and a fourth crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. That major event triggered a 
series of responses, not only from the United States, but also from many countries around 
the world including Pakistan, aimed at countering terrorism. For Pakistan, the pragmatic 
decision to join the US-led military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan proved to be a significant turning point in its history. Pakistan was instantly 
transformed into a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’.1 It also became a victim of terrorism, 
and one of the most negatively viewed countries in the world. This proved a catalyst for the 
new political discourse that began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan after 
9/11. 
 
From that point onward, the Government of Pakistan attempted to redefine the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism.2 With its ostensible message of 
philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism was posited as inclusive, peaceful, 
tolerant and, most crucially, a panacea to terrorism. That simplistic rhetoric, however, 
masked the reality, which is that not only do complex and competing identity narratives 
exist in Pakistan, but also that Sufism, like Islam, is itself a heterogeneous tradition. 
Subsequently, a space was created in which old and unresolved debates concerning Islam in 
Pakistan and the role it should play in the state and society were reignited. Whilst Islam has 
long been the ultimate source of identity for Muslims in Pakistan, their inability to form a 
consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a significant impact on the 
nation's ability to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political 
system. This is a phenomenon the nation has been struggling with since before its inception 
and which was exacerbated by the events of 9/11. The turn to Sufism, however, served to 
further complicate the issue rather than resolve it.  
  
This thesis seeks to understand contemporary politics, particularly the use of Islam as a 
source of national identity, political legitimacy, and popular mobilisation, in Pakistan after 
9/11. First, this research analyses the political discourse of President Musharraf (r. 1999-
2008) and his successor President Asif Ali Zardari (r. 2008-2011) on the subject of Sufism, 
over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11. This will demonstrate the ways in 
                                                            
1 US President George W. Bush first used the term ‘war on terror’ in a televised address to a joint session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001. See, ‘Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation’, The Washington Post, 20 
September 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html, (accessed 12 December 2013). 
2 For a discussion of the principal scholarly definitions of the terms ‘Sufism’ and ‘Sufi’, how they have been used in 
recent academic literature, and how those terms are used, see section 1.2 in this chapter. 
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which Sufism was officially invoked and promoted by the government. Second, this research 
analyses the political discourse of other political actors on the subject of Sufism during the 
same period. This will demonstrate the ways in which the state-sanctioned construction of 
Sufism was reproduced and resisted. This two-fold approach allows a more nuanced 
understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national 
identity, and of belonging, for the Muslims of Pakistan despite the many theological 
differences that exist amongst them. It also reveals the complex and competing identity 
narratives that continue to hinder government efforts to create a single cohesive and shared 
national identity for Pakistan. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section contextualises the research 
historically by outlining the difficulties faced by the Government of Pakistan in defining the 
nation of Pakistan since its creation in 1947. It includes a discussion of the contested 
relationship between Islam and the state of Pakistan, and the heterogeneous Islamic 
traditions within Pakistani society. The second section situates the research in the 
contemporary socio-political context. It includes an overview of the negative consequences 
of the decision to join the US-led ‘war on terror’ in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It 
also includes a discussion of the official response, which was the construction of an 
enlightened and moderate identity based on the ethical and peace-building aspects found 
within Islam, the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006, and 
the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009. This chapter then provides a review 
of the literature on four key analytical themes: interpretations of Sufism, the arrival of Sufis 
in the Indian subcontinent, Sufism and the state in Pakistan, and the integrative aspects of 
the Sufi tradition. Following on from this is a discussion of the research methodology and 
theoretical framework. This chapter concludes with brief summary of subsequent chapters. 
1.1.1 An Islamic state or a Muslim nation? 
 
On August 14, 1947, Pakistan was brought into existence by the powerful yet paradoxical 
imaginings of Muslim nationalist leaders, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875-1948) of the 
All-India Muslim League (AIML). The leaders of the Pakistan Movement, requiring 
representative support to realise their vision for a separate Muslim homeland, based their 
territorial demand for ‘Pakistan’ on a non-territorial ideology known as the two-nation 
theory.3 The construction of a Muslim nation and a Muslim national identity were crucial in 
creating mass appeal and support for a separate political and spiritual homeland for India's 
largest minority community. This ideology privileged a monolithic homogeneous religious 
national identity (Islam) above the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological 
                                                            
3 The territorial demand for 'Pakistan' was based on a non-territorial ideology known as the ‘two-nation theory’. 
Widely attributed to the nineteenth-century reformist figure Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), the two-nation theory 
was based on the supposition that South Asian Muslims constituted a separate nation due to their common 
religious affiliation (Islam). In keeping with the two-nation theory, the political discourse of leaders of the Pakistan 
Movement, which consisted primarily of religious rhetoric such as 'Islam in danger', positioned a positive Muslim 
‘Self’ in opposition to a negative Hindu ‘Other’. This discursive strategy culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 
1947. For a more detailed discussion of the Pakistan Movement, see Chapter Two, section 2.4.3. 
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differences that existed amongst the Muslims of India.4 Historically, South Asian Muslims 
have never been a monolithic homogeneous group united under a single consciousness. 
Culturally and socially, South Asian Muslims have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, 
and class interests. Religiously, Islam is a diverse tradition with various schisms having 
occurred since its inception. Despite the heterogeneous traditions within the Muslim 
community, Jinnah's Pakistan would be established on the basis of: one nation (Pakistan), 
one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu).5 
 
The problem of Muslim disunity in Pakistan was of particular importance when the question 
of the relationship between Islam and the state was raised. The Pakistan Movement, and the 
Muslim opposition to it, provides a particularly useful case study of identity discourses. At 
one end of the vast religio-political spectrum were nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Muslim nationalist leaders, such as Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, who envisaged Pakistan as a unified and broadly secular democratic Muslim 
nation, rather than an Islamic state. These nationalist leaders acknowledged the importance 
of Islam in the identity of the state and in the private lives of Muslims. However, they aimed 
ultimately for the separation of the state from religious institutions. They also believed that 
all citizens were entitled to equal rights and privileges regardless of religious belief, and that 
citizens should ultimately determine how their nation should be governed. At the other end 
of the religio-political spectrum were nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians such as 
Maulana Syed Abu a’la Maududi and Syed Husain Ahmad Madani who were initially 
opposed to the creation of Pakistan.6 Once Pakistan had been achieved, however, many of 
these ulama (religious scholars) moved to Pakistan and began to demand a stronger role for 
Islam in the state and in society. These Muslims envisaged Pakistan as an Islamic state, 
based on the inerrancy of divine revelation. They believed that, in order for Pakistan to act in 
accordance with the principles of Islam, sovereignty must rest with God, not with its 
citizens. Moreover, the state of Pakistan, and its laws, must be based on the revealed sources 
(Qur’an and Sunnah) as interpreted by eminent ulama and mujtahids (interpreters of religious 
law). 
 
On August 11, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave his first address to the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan, three days before the formal transfer of power from the British 
Government to the soon-to-be independent nation of Pakistan. In that address, Jinnah 
pragmatically declared that citizenship would be the unifying principle for Pakistan, all 
                                                            
4 For an overview of the heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society, see Section 1.1.2. For a detailed 
discussion of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent 
and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its creation, see Chapter Two. 
5 C. Jaffrelot. Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation. Manohar, New Delhi, 2002, p. 9. 
6 In 1941, Maulana Syed Abu a’la Maududi founded an Islamic movement, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), in opposition to 
the Pakistan Movement led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Maududi, along with other conservative ulama, argued that 
the founding of Pakistan as a territorial nation would be contradictory to the idea of a universal Islamic 
brotherhood (ummah). Maududi also argued that Pakistan, established and administered as a sovereign and 
democratic nation under Jinnah's leadership, would be un-Islamic. Conservative ulama, with their focus on Islam 
based on a more narrow interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, argued that Jinnah and other leaders of the 
AIML were western-educated, unconcerned with true Islamic principles, and therefore could not represent the best 
interests of Muslims. Once Pakistan had been achieved, however, Maududi moved to Pakistan and agitated for a 
stronger role for Islam in the state and society. 
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citizens would have equal rights and privileges regardless of religious belief, and religion 
had no place in public life.  
 
[E]very one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what 
relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste, or 
creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges, 
and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. […] You 
are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques 
or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to 
any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the 
state.7  
 
That statement reignited unresolved debates concerning the role Islam should play in the 
newly formed state of Pakistan. Indisputably, a monolithic homogeneous Islam provided an 
important source of identity and legitimacy for the Pakistan Movement and helped make 
Pakistan a territorial reality in 1947. However, the complex and competing interpretations of 
Islam that existed in the subcontinent had the potential to divide the new nation, inasmuch 
as Islam had to unify it. Once Pakistan was created, rather than act as a unifying force, Islam 
instead became a topic of contestation.  
 
In order to unravel the complex realities that surround the still-unresolved question 
concerning the place of Islam in the state, and to establish a broad conceptual framework, 
this thesis draws primarily on the work of Samina Yasmeen and John Esposito.8 Yasmeen 
argues that, despite the many differences in belief and practice that exist amongst the 
Muslims of Pakistan, the ideological struggle over Islam in the political arena has taken two 
broad directions: 'orthodox' and 'liberal'.9 At one end of the spectrum are ‘orthodox’ 
Muslims, who believe in the primacy of ‘divine will’ and advocate an Islamic identity for 
Pakistan based on ‘absolutist’ or strict interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah. At the same 
time, Yasmeen admits that some ‘orthodox’ Muslims acknowledge the importance of 
‘human will’ in providing a ‘time-relevant’ interpretation of the sacred sources.10 At the other 
end of the spectrum are ‘liberal’ Muslims, who believe in the primacy of ‘human will’ in 
interpreting the sacred sources and advocate a Muslim identity for Pakistan. At the same 
time, Yasmeen admits that some ‘liberal’ Muslims acknowledge the importance of ‘societal’ 
Islam in determining the place of Islam in the state or political sphere.11 Similarly, John 
                                                            
7 ‘Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan’, Government of Pakistan, 11 August 1947, 
http://202.83.164.29/quaid/speech03.htm, (accessed 26 August 2011). 
8 This thesis seeks to understand contemporary politics and, specifically, the use of Islam as a source of national 
identity, political legitimacy, and popular mobilisation, in Pakistan after 9/11. Following Samina Yasmeen, who 
makes an important distinction between 'state Islam' and 'societal Islam', the focus of this thesis is primarily the use 
of Islam in the political sphere. The terms ‘conservative’ and ‘orthodox’ are used to distinguish groups that 
subscribe to the notion of 'divine will' and tend to want a stronger role for Islam in the state and in society (Islamic 
state). The terms ‘liberal’ and ‘moderate’ are used to distinguish groups that subscribe to the notion of 'human will' 
and tend, on the whole, to want less of a role for Islam in the state and its relevant structures (Muslim nation). These 
categories, however, are neither fixed nor immutable. Political parties in Pakistan have a tendency to move along 
the religio-political spectrum, or reorient their religio-political rhetoric, depending on political and societal 
exigencies. See, S. Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan and the Struggle for 'Real' Islam’, in S. Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed (eds.), Islam 
and Political Legitimacy, Routledge, London, 2003; and S. Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan, militancy and identity: parallel 
struggles’. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67 (2), 2013, pp. 157-175. 
9 Yasmeen, 2003. 
10 Yasmeen, 2003. 
11 Yasmeen, 2003. 
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Esposito argues that the diverse ideological approaches to Islam in the political sphere range 
from ‘religious’ to ‘secular’ or from 'devout' to 'nonobservant'.12  
 
For conservative religious leaders, fixated on the past, tradition is not so much a 
source of inspiration and direction as a literal map to be followed in all its 
details. This blueprint for Muslim society, contained in the traditional (classical) 
legal manuals, is not seen as a time-bound response to a specific sociohistorical 
period, a conditioned product hammered out by jurists in light of Islamic 
principles and values, but rather as a final, comprehensive guide.13 
 
Both Yasmeen and Esposito agree that there are a multitude of interpretations and 
approaches between the two ends of the spectrum. 
1.1.2 Heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society  
 
Muslims in Pakistan identify themselves in different ways depending on regional, linguistic, 
ethnic, historical, and religious determinants. According to government census data, the 
total population of Pakistan, as at December 2011, was 178,245,823.14 More than ninety-six per 
cent of those identified themselves as Muslim, making Pakistan the nation with the third-
largest number of Muslims in the world after Indonesia and India.15 The census data, 
however, did not separate the category of 'Muslim' into the many groups and sub-groups 
that exist in Pakistan. Recent data from the CIA World Factbook suggests that 
approximately eighty-five to ninety per cent of the Muslim population in Pakistan are Sunni, 
and ten to fifteen per cent are Shi’a.16 These two main groups can be further broken down 
into numerous sub-groups. The Heritage Foundation classifies Sunni Muslims in Pakistan 
into three main sub-groups: Barelvi, Deobandi, and Ahle-Hadith (people of the Hadith).17 
While exact figures are not available, it is thought that the population of Pakistan comprises: 
sixty per cent Barelvi, fifteen per cent Deobandi, five per cent Ahle-Hadith, fifteen per cent 
Shi’a, and five per cent other (Ahmadi, Ismaili, Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, and Parsi).18 
Amongst all of these religious groups and sub-groups are wide-ranging differences in belief 
and practice. 
 
                                                            
12 Esposito identifies three ‘religiously oriented’ positions: conservatives, Islamic activists, and Islamic modernists. 
For a detailed discussion of the various methods and interpretations of each of these groups, see, J.L. Esposito, 
Islam: The Straight Path, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 256-261. 
13 Esposito, 2011, p. 252. 
14 ‘Census Data’, Population Census Organisation: Government of Pakistan, 1998, 
http://www.census.gov.pk/index.php, (accessed 29 December 2011). 
15 ‘The Global Religious Landscape: Muslims’, Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-muslim, (accessed 20 December 2013). 
16 ‘CIA World Factbook: Pakistan’. Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/pk.html, (accessed 28 May 2011). 
17 L. Curtis and H.A.H. Mullick, Reviving Pakistan's Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism, The Heritage Foundation, 
Washington, 2009. 
18 A. Mir, ‘Just who is not a Kafir?’, Outlook India, 19 July 2010, http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Just-Who-Is-




Figure 1: Religious groups in Pakistan19 
 
While Sufis can be found within Sunni and Shi’a Islam, in Pakistan the majority of Sufis 
associate themselves with the Sunni Barelvi tradition. The Barelvi movement originated 
contemporaneously with the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements in the north of the 
Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth century, in the wake of Islamic revival and reform, the 
political ascendency of the British, and the decline of Muslim political power. Each of these 
movements offered South Asian Muslims different ways of being Muslim in a changing 
environment. The Barelvi movement, unlike the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements, was 
distinctive in its resistance to the revival and reform currents of the period. In particular, 
Barelvis were in favour of preserving the unique forms of Islamic belief and practice that 
had developed over time in the subcontinent. Thus, Barelvis continue to place great 
importance on the many popular traditions associated with Sufism in the subcontinent 
including the intercession of saints, saint worship, the annual urs celebrations (death 
anniversaries of Sufi saints), and qawwali (Sufi devotional music).  
 
At the same time, many Barelvis hold the Prophet Muhammad in particularly great esteem 
as they consider him to be, in a metaphysical sense, an emanation of the ‘light’ (noor) of God 
and the first Sufi or friend of God (wali) to have become a perfected being (al-Insan al-Kamil). 
Consequently, Barelvi Muslims are often referred to as ashiq-e-rasul or lovers of the Prophet 
Muhammad. However, alongside the reverence and profound love Barelvi Muslims have for 
the Prophet Muhammad is a fervent compulsion to protect his reputation. This has resulted 
in Barelvi activism and, at times, violence against any moves that are seen to threaten the 
sanctity of the Prophet. Recent examples include Barelvi responses to the Danish cartoon 
controversy (2005), the Blasphemy law controversy (2011), and the assassination of 
                                                            
19 Outlook India, 19 July 2010, (accessed 15 March 2011). 
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Governor Salman Taseer (2011). These fervent responses spring from their deeply held 
commitment to protect the sanctity of the Prophet Muhammad. A number of Barelvis 
supported the creation of a unified and broadly secular democratic Muslim nation in the 
spirit of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Muslim nationalist leaders Syed Ahmed Khan, 
Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In 1949 the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan 
(JUP) was formed to represent Barelvi political interests in Pakistan. More recently, Barelvi 
groups have attempted to persuade the government to implement a more Islamic system of 
governance in line with what they call the System of the Prophet (Nizam-e-Mustafa). The 
Nizam-e-Mustafa movement first appeared in Pakistan in the 1970s and aimed at establishing 
an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan, an Islamic constitution, and Islamic laws 
(Shari’a). 
 
Conversely, the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements encouraged profound religious and 
social reform in the subcontinent. They attributed the political misfortunes of South Asian 
Muslims to the degeneration of Islam in the eighteenth century. In response, these reform 
movements aimed at effecting Muslim socio-religious uplift. They asserted that to achieve 
this required strict adherence to the Shari’a, based on a more narrow interpretation of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, and the purification of Islam of any elements considered not in 
conformity with the Shari’a.20 Deobandis began the task of ridding Islam of so-called ‘un-
Islamic’ elements such as the intercession of Sufi saints, saint worship, and the annual urs 
celebrations, which are much beloved by Barelvi Muslims. This was despite the fact that 
Shah Wali-Ullah (1702-1762) was himself an exponent of the Naqshbandi Sufi tradition. 
According to Deobandi tradition, the Prophet Muhammad is to be regarded strictly as a 
human being (bashar), albeit a perfect human being (al-Insan al-Kamil). Thus, Deobandi 
Muslims tend to be of the opinion that the Barelvi elevation of the Prophet to divine status as 
the light (noor) of God deviates from the concept of monotheism or tawhid (Oneness of God 
or monotheism) in Islam. Barelvi Muslims refute this and assert, to the contrary, that 
followers of the Deoband tradition do not show proper veneration of the Prophet 
Muhammad. While both the Barelvi and Deoband traditions follow the Hanafi school of 
thought, and accept Sufism, the noor-bashar doctrinal difference has been a perennial and 
problematic point of difference between the two traditions, spreading into the political 
domain. Unlike the Barelvis, Deobandis fervently opposed the creation of Pakistan because, 
in the spirit of conservative nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians, they were 
committed to the primacy of Islam in the state and society. They believed the western-
educated leaders of the Pakistan Movement would be unconcerned with ‘true’ Islamic 
principles and, therefore, could not represent the best interests of South Asian Muslims. In 
Pakistan today, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) represents the political interests of 
Deobandis, while the Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (JA) represents the political interests of the Ahle-
Hadith. 
                                                            
20 While many Deobandis advocate adherence to the Shari’a and to Sufism, they oppose Sufi traditions considered to 
be not in conformity with the Shari’a. Unlike adherents of the Deoband school of thought, followers of the Ahle-
Hadith tradition advocate strict adherence to their narrow interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith, reject the 
authority of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and are opposed to Sufism. The terms Ahle-Hadith, Wahhabi, 
and Salafi are often used interchangeably and pejoratively in Pakistan. 
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1.1.3 The consequences of joining the ‘war on terror’ 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a significant turning point for the United States, as well 
as for a number of countries around the world, including Pakistan. Its geopolitical 
importance, and its relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, made Pakistan an important 
coalition partner in the ‘war on terror’. Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi 
Arabia had been the only countries to recognise the authority of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
between 1996 and 2001. The UAE and Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with the Taliban 
shortly after 9/11, but Pakistan initially refused.21 Pakistan made the pragmatic decision to 
join the US-led military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, on its 
western border, on September 14, 2001. For Pakistan, the decision immediately transformed 
the nation into a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’. In the years that followed, it had 
serious political repercussions. Pakistan experienced a dramatic rise in religious extremism 
and religious and ethnic sectarian conflict. Pakistan also became a victim of terrorism. In its 
2001 Annual Report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stated: 
 
[T]he events of September 2001 and the war against terrorism again made the 
gun the pre-eminent instrument of determining human affairs and pushed 
human rights and basic needs lower in the table of priorities, especially in 
countries still struggling to establish democracy and rule of justice.22 
 
As discussed, the failure to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable 
political system is a phenomenon Pakistan has been struggling with since its creation. 
Decades of political instability, together with heightened religious and sectarian conflict and 
violence, particularly after 9/11, have compounded the problem. In 2011 the BBC reported 
that 35,000 people had died as a result of terrorist bombings in Pakistan between 2001 and 
2011.23 A 2003 United Nations Human Development Report blamed the fragile law and order 
situation in Pakistan for exacerbating economic deprivation, particularly among poorer 
households.24 This was supported in 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which 
stated that sixty per cent of people in Pakistan live on less that US$2 per day.25 The CIA 
World Factbook described Pakistan as 'an impoverished and underdeveloped country'.26 The 
poor law and order situation in Pakistan had an adverse affect on foreign and local 
investment, which contributed to a reduction in productivity, growth, and employment, and 
a rise in poverty. It also limited the government's capacity to reinvest in healthcare, 
education, and infrastructure development. 
 
                                                            
21 For a more detailed discussion of Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the Afghan Taliban, see Chapter Three. 
22 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2001, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
Lahore, 2002. 
23 O. Bennett-Jones, ‘Pakistan: A failed state or a clever gambler?’, BBC News Online, 7 May 2011, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13318673, (accessed 8 May 2011). 
24 A. Hussain, Pakistan National Human Development Report: Poverty, Growth and Governance, Oxford University Press, 
Karachi, 2003. 
25 ‘Making Sense of Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Pakistan/index.html#/making-sense-of-pakistan, (accessed 21 December 
2011). 
26 Central Intelligence Agency, (accessed 28 May 2011). 
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In the last decade, not only did religious and communal tolerance become increasingly 
fragile in Pakistan, but the country also experienced rising negative perceptions 
internationally. In 2011, the BBC World Service Country Rating Poll found that negative 
perceptions of Pakistan had risen. According to the survey, Pakistan was the second most 
negatively viewed country in the world, placing it between Iran and Korea, which ranked 
first and third respectively.27 
 
The worsening in views of Pakistan is particularly apparent in some key 
Western countries. Negative views of Pakistan jumped from 44 to 68 per cent in 
the United Kingdom, 58 to 75 per cent in the USA, [and] 54 to 74 per cent in 
Australia.28 
 
The Government of Pakistan's failure to overcome its problems of terrorism, internal 
disunity, and violence, implement effective governance, and achieve economic growth and 
development, exacerbated negative world opinion. Western audiences, viewing media 
reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, together with the nation’s 
political instability, and the dependence on aid to prop up the economy, tended to see 
Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, and regressive. 
1.1.4 Redefining the nation through a discourse on Sufism 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had a significant impact on the Muslim community, not only in 
the United States but across the world. Islam faced intense scrutiny and public attention, 
with many Muslims fearful of intimidation and reprisals. In this context, a number of leaders 
sought to make a distinction between terrorists and non-violent Muslims, and promote 
Islam as a religion of peace. For example, during a visit to the Islamic Centre of Washington 
only days after 9/11, President George Bush said: 
 
These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the 
Islamic faith. And it's important for my fellow Americans to understand that. 
The English translation is not as eloquent as the original Arabic, but let me 
quote from the Koran, itself: In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end 
of those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up 
to ridicule. The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam 
is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They 
represent evil and war.29 
 
After 9/11, the United States developed a number of strategies aimed at countering 
terrorism. In February 2003, President George Bush released the “National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism”.30 The report outlined the nature of the terrorist threat against the 
                                                            
27 ‘BBC Country Rating Poll reveals positive views of Brazil on the rise in 2011’, BBC Press Office, 7 March 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2011/03_march/07/brazil.shtml, (accessed 27 
September 2011). 
28 BBC Press Office, 7 March 2011, (accessed 27 September 2011). 
29 G. W. Bush, ‘Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C.’, The White House, 17 September 
2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html, (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
30 US Department of State, ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’, 14 February 2003, US Department of State 
Archives, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf, 
(accessed 12 September 2015). 
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United States, and its goals and objectives to defeat terrorists and terrorist organisations. The 
US undertook to work with, and support, moderate Muslims and modern governments in 
the Muslim world. Notably, one of the objectives outlined in the report was to ‘win the war 
of ideas’: 
 
Together with the international community, we will wage a war of ideas to 
make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate, to ensure that the 
conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in 
any nation, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit 
in areas most at risk, and to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of 
those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.31 
 
That same year, Cheryl Benard of the RAND Corporation wrote a report entitled “Civil 
Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies”.32 The report was aimed at 
understanding the ideological struggles within Islam; identifying appropriate partners; and 
setting goals for development and democratisation. Benard identified four main ideological 
positions within Islam: fundamentalists; traditionalists; modernists; and secularists.33 Benard 
made four policy recommendations: support the modernists first; support the traditionalists 
against the fundamentalists; confront and oppose the fundamentalists; and selectively 
support secularists.34 Sufis were included in the ‘modernist’ grouping and were, therefore, 
considered a suitable partner against extremism. As the following extract demonstrates, 
emphasis was placed on the intellectual and cultural aspects within the Sufi tradition, 
specifically poetry, music, and philosophy. 
 
Sufism represents an open, intellectual interpretation of Islam. Sufi influence 
over school curricula, norms, and cultural life should be strongly encouraged in 
countries that have a Sufi tradition, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Through its 
poetry, music, and philosophy, Sufism has a strong bridge role outside of 
religious affiliations.35 
 
In 2007, Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwarts, and Peter Sickle of the RAND 
Corporation wrote another report entitled “Building Moderate Muslim Networks”. 
Following on from its earlier report of 2003, RAND further developed its strategy for 
constructing partnerships with moderate Muslim networks and institutions. Rabasa et al. 
identified three potential partners in the fight against extremism: secularists; liberal 
Muslims; and moderate traditionalists, which included Sufis. 
 
Immediately relevant to this study is the fact that Salafis and Wahhabis are 
relentless enemies of traditionalists and Sufis. Whenever radical Islamist 
                                                            
31 US Department of State Archives, (accessed 12 September 2015), pp. 23-4. 
32 The RAND Corporation describes itself as ‘a research organization that develops solutions to public policy 
challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous’. 
Its research is funded by US government agencies (including the US Secretary of Defence, the US Air Force, the US 
Army, and the US Department of Health and Human Services); non-US governments, agencies, and ministries 
(from Australia, Canada, Europe, and the United Kingdom); international organisations (including the United 
Nations World Food Programme and the World Bank); US state and local governments; colleges and universities; 
foundations; industry; professional associations; and other nonprofit organisations. See, RAND Corporation, 
http://www.rand.org, (accessed 11 September 2015). 
33 C. Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies, RAND Corporation, California, 2003, p. x. 
34 Benard, 2003, pp. xi-xii. 
35 Benard, 2003, p. 46. 
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movements have gained power they have sought to suppress the practice of 
traditionalist and Sufi Islam. Because of their victimization by Salafis and 
Wahhabis, traditionalists and Sufis are natural allies of the West to the extent 
that common ground can be found with them.36 
 
However, the report also noted that, whilst Sufis are generally considered to be moderate 
and tolerant, some Sufis have ‘radical tendencies’ and have supported ‘militant groups’, 
whilst others are ‘militantly moderate’.37 
 
The National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (2006) and the National Sufi Council 
(2009) were both formed within this context. President Pervez Musharraf of the Pakistan 
Muslim League (Quaid) (PML-Q) announced the formation of the National Council for the 
Promotion of Sufism (NCPS) in 2006.38 Less than three years later the Government of 
Pakistan, under the leadership of President Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP), announced its decision to reconstitute the Sufi Advisory Council and rename it the 
National Sufi Council (NSC).39 The main aim of the Sufi councils was to: 
 
bring forth the soft image of Islam through spreading the Sufi message of love, 
tolerance and universal brotherhood across the world and amongst the masses 
of the area by holding meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences of 
ulama, researchers, teachers, students, and intellectuals of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries.40 
 
President Musharraf and President Zardari appear to have been influenced by the 
ideological currents flowing from the United States in this period. Both governments placed 
emphasis on promoting the intellectual and cultural aspects within the Sufi tradition. In 
order to achieve the aims set out in the terms of reference, the Sufi councils worked 
primarily with the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), and 
the Ministry of Education, Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL). They actively promoted 
renowned Sufi saints such as Mast Tawakali (Balochistan), Data Sahib (Punjab), Lal Shahbaz 
Qalandar (Sindh), Rukn-e-Alam (Sindh), Madhu Lal (Punjab), Bari Imam (Islamabad), Sultan 
Bahu (Punjab), Rehman Baba (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), Bullah Shah (Punjab), Abdul Latif 
Bhittai (Sindh), Waris Shah (Punjab), Sachel Sarmast (Sindh), and Mian Muhammad Bakhsh 
                                                            
36 Rabasa et al., 2007, p. 73. 
37 Rabasa, A., Benard, C., Schwartz, L.H., and Sickle, P. Building Moderate Muslim Networks. RAND Corporation, 
California, 2007, p. 73. 
38 Members of the NCPS included: Pervez Musharraf (president of Pakistan); Chaudhury Shujaat Hussain (member 
of the PML-Q and prime minister of Pakistan); Mian Yousaf Salahuddin (maternal grandson of Muhammad Iqbal); 
Mushahid Hussain Syed (member of the PML-Q and secretary-general PML-Q); Hameed Haroon (journalist and 
chief executive officer of the Dawn Group of Newspapers, and promoter of art and culture); Abbas Srafraz; Jam 
Muhammad Yousaf (member of PML-Q and chief minister of Balochistan); and Naeem Tahir (actor, director, and 
chief executive and director general of Pakistan National Council of the Arts).  See, ‘Council formed to promote 
Sufism’, Daily Times, 22 September 2006, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C09%5C22%5Cstory_22-9-2006_pg7_18, (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
39 Members of the NSC included: Haji Muhammad Tayyab (member of Jamiat Ulema Pakistan and president of the 
Nizam-e-Mustafa party); Sahibzada Sajidur Rahman; Maulana Syed Charagh-ud-din Shah (chairman of Tehreek-e-
Ittehad Ummat Pakistan); Dr Ghazanfar Mehdi (Doctorate in Sufism and founder of literary, social, and religious 
organisations); Dr Hafiz Muhammad Tufail (Islamabad); Iranmullah Jan (director general Ministry of Religious 
Affairs); Abdul Ahad Haqqani (deputy director R&S, Ministry of Religious Affairs); and Sajidur Rahman.  See, 
‘Notification: Reconstitution of the Sufi Advisory Council’, Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1 
June 2009, http://www.mora.gov.pk, (accessed 14 August 2010). 
40 Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010). 
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(Kashmir). Through their poetry, these poet-saints and philosophers conveyed Islam to the 
masses in a way not previously seen in the subcontinent. 
 
Political leaders in Pakistan were once again relying on the familiar construction of a Muslim 
national identity to unify a disparate nation. However, this time the official focus was on 
Sufism and its message of 'love', 'tolerance', and 'universal brotherhood'.41 The turn to Sufism 
was an attempt to bring about national cohesion, and improve the nation's tarnished image 
abroad, without neglecting Islam. From that point onward a new space was created in which 
a multitude of voices reignited old and unresolved debates concerning Islam and the role it 
should play in the state and society. Discourse on Sufism became an important subject of 
debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, 
and reconcile religious difference. Consequently, numerous and rival groups in Pakistan, 
including successive governments, politicians, policy advisors, scholars, religious and 
community leaders, and the media, all made their varying appeals on the basis of Islam to 
support or criticise Sufi doctrine. Each provided historical, socio-cultural, religious, and 
moral claims to support their assorted positions, and each relied upon the construction of a 
positive ‘us’-presentation and a negative ‘Other’-presentation in their assertion of power and 
identity. 
 
The Musharraf and Zardari governments were supported in their endeavours to construct 
an enlightened and moderate identity through the lens of Sufism. Proponents included Sufi 
pirs and their devotees, sajjada nashins, moderate mainstream political parties, Sufi religio-
political parties (including Barelvi groups), civil society organisations, and arts and 
educational organisations. For the most part, these groups tend to view Islam, with both its 
inner (Sufi) and outer (Shari’a) aspects, as an important holistic guiding philosophy for 
Pakistani society. They also see Sufism as an essential part of the nation's heritage and 
culture, which is reflected in the region's poetry, music (qawwali), art, architecture, and film. 
English-language newspapers in Pakistan played a very important role in reproducing this 
new political consciousness and extending it to a wider audience.42 However, some groups in 
Pakistan want less of a role for Islam in the state. These groups feel that Islam, including 
Sufism, should remain in the private sphere. These groups argue that the politicisation of 
Sufism will increase religious hostility and violence in Pakistan, rather than counter it. 
 
The most critical opponents of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan 
came from within the minority Sunni Deoband43 and Ahle-Hadith44 traditions. Unlike the 
                                                            
41 See, Daily Times, 22 September 2006, (accessed 23 September 2011); and Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010). 
42 In 2010, the Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL) announced it would be setting up the International Sufi Council 
(ISC) to spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and highlight the soft image of 
Pakistan. Members of the ISC came from Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, India, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Italy, the Czech Republic, and 
Tajikistan. See, ‘Sufi council presidents nominated’, The News, 28 May 2011, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=49452&Cat=5&dt=5/28/2011, (accessed 24 June 2011). 
43 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 'aims to transform Pakistan into a 
Sunni state, primarily through violent means [and] is part of the broader Deoband movement'. See, ‘Pakistan 
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Barelvis, who consider Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition and an essential 
feature of Pakistan’s heritage and culture, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith 
traditions vehemently oppose certain aspects of Barelvi Sufi belief and tradition. In 
particular, they consider Barelvis un-Islamic or kafir in their veneration of Sufi saints and 
shrines, for their participation in urs ceremonies, and for dancing and playing music at 
shrines. Such long-standing theological differences have resulted in hostility and, at times, 
violence. The Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) in Islamabad, for example, reported a 
gradual rise in the number of attacks on Sufi shrines since 2005.45 The increased rise in 
targeted attacks on Sufi shrines is one physical example of the way in which the official 
construction of a Sufi identity was contested in Pakistan. At the same time, each of these 
groups engaged in their own discursive construction of who is, and who is not, a Muslim. 
1.2 Background to the complex relationship between Sufism and the state 
 
An investigation into Sufism in South Asia yields a vast array of scholarly writings from 
disciplines as varied as history, politics, religious studies, anthropology, sociology, as well as 
studies in poetry and literature. Within these disciplines, scholars have explored themes 
such as the use of religion for colonial domination and legitimacy during the British period 
in India, the use of religion for national integration, personal political advantage, and 
religious legitimacy in the post-independence period, and the important role of Sufi pirs in 
the political history of pre- and post-independence Pakistan. There is also much scholarly 
literature on the moral, peace-building, and integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition in the 
Indian subcontinent. 
 
What follows is a review of the current literature on the subject of Sufism in order to provide 
an understanding of the complex relationship between Sufism and the state in Pakistan. This 
section is divided into four parts. The first part provides an overview of the principal 
scholarly definitions of the terms ‘Sufism’ and ‘Sufi’ and how they have been used in recent 
academic literature. It concludes with a discussion of how those terms are used in this thesis. 
Alongside the myriad of different interpretations and understandings of Sufism exist a 
considerable collection of scholarly writings on the topic of Sufism. The second part 
provides a brief history of Sufism in South Asia, beginning with the arrival of Sufis in the 
twelfth century. The third part provides a historical overview of the ways in which religion 
has been implicated in affairs of state. The review of the literature in this section is restricted 
to the immediate pre- and post- independence period in South Asia. The final part looks at 
the ways in which aspects of the Sufi tradition in South Asia have been presented as 
integrative, moral, and peace building in the literature. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Assessment 2011’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan, 
(accessed 28 December 2011). 
44 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba is part of the Wahhabi movement. 
This group is proscribed in Pakistan, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations. See, 
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), (accessed 28 December 2011). 
45 ‘Attacks on Sufi Shrines’, Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), 25 May 2011, http://san-
pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=195, (accessed 14 September 2011). 
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1.2.1 Interpretations of Sufism 
 
In his book entitled Sufi Orders in Islam, J. Spencer Trimingham begins his historical account 
of Sufism through the etymology of the Arabic word 'Suf'.46 The term is commonly thought to 
refer to the woollen clothing worn by Muslim ascetics known as 'Sufis’ in the early days of 
Islam. From that starting point, the literature reveals that the terms ‘Sufism’ and ‘Sufi’ have 
been interpreted in different ways and have been given different meanings. In fact, the 
differing ways that scholars have described ‘Sufism’ and ‘Sufi’ have made it particularly 
difficult to acquire a definitive understanding of the terms. Sufism has been described 
variously as mystical,47 spiritual,48 inner,49 humanist,50 esoteric,51 and popular Islam,52 concerned 
with matters of the soul, and conveyed by spiritual masters (pir, shaikh, murshid) to their 
disciples (murid). Sufism has also been contrasted with outer,53 legalistic,54 purist,55 and 
orthodox Islam,56 derived from the word of God (Qur’an), the example of the Prophet 
(Sunnah), and the consensus of the community (ijmah), put forward in the Shari’a, and 
conveyed to the Muslim community by religious scholars. This presents something of a false 
dichotomy, however, because Sufism is also derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
Nevertheless, some Sufis have been accused of not paying proper attention to the Sunnah or 
of disregarding it completely. This perceived neglect of Islamic scriptures has brought 
criticism from some ulama, as well as from Sufis and non-Sufis, and has caused contestation 
and division over correct forms of belief and practice.57 
 
After 9/11, the Government of Pakistan attempted to distance Sufism from a more narrowly 
conceived legalist Islam. The first four aims of the NCPS, and its successor the NSC, provide 
a clear example of the government’s preferred version of Islamic piety.58 Sufism was placed 
in direct contrast to more narrow interpretations of the sacred scriptures (Qur’an, Sunnah, 
and Hadith) and the sacred laws (Shari’a). This dichotomy is explored further by examining 
the aspects of the Sufi heritage that were discursively invoked and disseminated by the 
                                                            
46 J.S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971. 
47 See, A.T. Embree, Sources of Indian Tradition, Volume One: From the Beginning to 1800, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1988; N. Green, ‘Making Sense of ‘Sufism’ in the Indian Subcontinent: A Survey of Trends’. Religion 
Compass, 2 (6), 2008, pp. 1044-1061; R. Hassan, ‘Religion, Society, and the State in Pakistan: Pirs and Politics’. Asian 
Survey, 27 (5), 1987, pp. 552-565; I. Talbot, Pakistan: a modern history, C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., London, 2009; and O. 
Verkaaik, ‘Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan’. International Review of Social History, 49 
(S12), 2004, pp. 65-86. 
48 See, S. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sindh, 1843-1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992; P. Heck, ‘Mysticism as Morality’. Journal of Religious Ethics, 34 (2), 2006, pp. 253-286; C. Liebeskind, Piety on its 
knees: three Sufi traditions in South Asia in modern times, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; and O. Verkaaik, 2004, 
pp. 65-86. 
49 Heck, 2006. 
50 See, Talbot, 2009; and P. Heelas, ‘Transpersonal Pakistan’. The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 32(2), 
2013, pp. 98-110. 
51 See, Embree, 1988; and M. Hassanali, ‘Sufi Influence on Pakistani Politics and Culture’. Pakistaniaat: A Journal of 
Pakistan Studies, 2 (1), 2010, pp. 23-45. 
52 See, Hassan, 1987; and Talbot, 2009. 
53 See, Embree, 1988; and Heck, 2006. 
54 Heck, 2006. 
55 See, Hassan, 1987. 
56 See, Embree, 1988; and Talbot, 2009. 
57 See, E. Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World, Curzon 
Press, London, 1999. 
58 Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010). 
 
 15 
government, what was ignored, and the ways in which this process was reproduced and 
resisted by other political actors, political recipients, and the media in Pakistan. 
 
In his informative article entitled "Making Sense of Sufism in the Indian Subcontinent", Nile 
Green notes that the definition coined by Cambridge scholar A.J. Arberry in 1950 is still 
widely used by academics today. Arberry defined Sufism as 'the name given to the 
mysticism of Islam'.59 While the word ‘mysticism’ does appear frequently in scholarly 
writings on Sufism, Green argues that the term is itself problematic due to the fact it is both a 
theological and ideological category which does not adequately explain the living Sufi 
tradition. Equally, Julia Day Howell and Martin van Bruinessen write that it is simplistic to 
liken Sufism to mysticism because Sufism cannot easily be regarded as a consistent or 
cohesive tradition. Rather, Sufism includes various practices and social norms.60 Indeed, the 
literature on Sufism shows that variation in Sufi tradition occurs both over time and as a 
result of local social, religious, and political circumstances making it difficult to acquire a 
definitive understanding of Sufism.  
 
Notably, however, it appears to be the goal of drawing nearer to the divine, upon which 
scholars tend to be of the same opinion, and which draws the layperson closer to a more 
definitive understanding of Sufism. Scholars tend widely to agree that Sufis are searching 
for a greater encounter with the divine. Ainslie Thomas Embree, for example, writes that 
whilst for many Muslims life was: 
 
bounded by the Shari'a and by the round of mosque, pilgrimage, fasting, alms-
giving, and ritual prayer [others] craved for a more emotional religion, one in 
which God appeared as a loving, succoring [sic] friend rather than as an 
abstract definition of undifferentiated unity, incomprehensible in His essence, 
inscrutable and arbitrary in His decrees'.61  
 
Similarly, Sarah Ansari refers to Sufism as the ‘Islamic spiritual tradition’.62 She writes that 
Sufis seek 'to gain knowledge of God in their hearts', thereby placing more importance on 
spiritual intimacy than legal obligations.63 Following on from this, Paul Heck writes of the 
'inner' (batin) and 'outer' (zahir) aspects of Islam. According to Heck, the inner aspect of Islam 
is concerned with achieving a greater awareness of God, whilst the outer aspect is concerned 
with the adherence to Islamic legal obligations and norms.64 Many Muslims, and especially 
Sufis, distinguish between the batin and zahir aspects of Islam. John Voll and Kazuo Ohtsuka 
refer to the innermost aspect of Islam as 'ihsan'. They write that 'ihsan is a deepened 
understanding and perception that [...] allows you to worship God as if you see him'.65 Voll 
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and Ohtsuka argue that ihsan is generally manifested through Sufi tradition and belief, 
whilst the categories of 'islam' and 'imam' are manifested through 'correct activity' and 
'correct understanding' respectively within Islamic tradition.66 Notably, most scholars seem 
to agree that the legal (Shari’a) and the Sufi traditions within Islam are neither in conflict, 
nor at variance, but that both ultimately lead to God. 
 
For the purpose of this research, Sufism is regarded as: 
 
those tendencies in Islam which aim at direct communion between God and 
man. It is a sphere of spiritual experience which runs parallel to the main 
stream of Islamic consciousness deriving from prophetic revelation and 
comprehended within the Shari'a and theology.67 
 
A Sufi, therefore, is regarded as anyone who is searching for a greater encounter with the 
divine. In particular, a Sufi stresses 'inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over 
action, spiritual development over legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social 
interaction'.68 This is a deliberately wide definition because of the difficulty in discerning just 
who is, and who is not, a Sufi. As Voll and Ohtsuka point out, Sufis are not confined to one 
Islamic tradition or school of law, so can be Sunni or Shi’a.69 Sufis are not restricted by age or 
gender.70 In fact, Werbner argues that Sufi orders 'not only welcome women supplicants, 
initiates and adepts, but historically, there have been quite prominent Sufi women saints or 
shaykhs and some have shrines'.71 Nor are Sufis fixed to any single geographic location, so can 
be found wherever there are Muslims. Neither are Sufis restricted by social stratification, so 
can be found at all socio-economic levels within the social hierarchy. Some Sufis are attached 
to a Sufi tariqah (order), whilst others have no particular affiliation. While some Sufis are not 
adverse to establishing links with rulers in the subcontinent, or being rulers themselves, 
others prefer to remain aloof from centres of power.72 
1.2.2 The arrival of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent 
 
Sufis arrived in the Indian subcontinent almost contemporaneously with the Delhi Sultanate. 
Three Sufi orders were prominent at this time: the Chistiyya, the Suhrawardiyya, and the 
Firdausiyya. These orders gradually spread across the subcontinent, building shrines and 
retreats. The Chistiyya became popular in the north of the subcontinent (Delhi), the 
Suhrawardiyya in the north-west (Sindh), and the Firdausiyya in the north-east (Bihar). Sufi 
saints played an important role in the dissemination of Islam during the Sultanate period, 
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popularising Sufism in the Indian context through hagiographical texts and narratives, 
shrines and retreats, charismatic religious leaders or pirs and their hereditary successors 
(sajjada nashins), and through the emphasis on one’s personal relationship with God. 
Muhammad Hassanali writes that what began as an esoteric tradition, known only to a 
small number of individuals seeking to draw nearer to God, gradually became accessible to 
a greater number of people through popular, easy to learn, practices such as dhikr 
(remembrance), sama (listening), music, and poetry.73 The popularity of Sufi saints, with their 
poetry written in the local vernacular, attracted both Hindus and Muslims alike. Through 
their musical poetry or qawwali, Sufi saints were able to convey Islam to the masses in a way 
not previously seen in the subcontinent. Notably, Sufi saints tended to be more successful in 
the dissemination of Islamic belief in the subcontinent than other religious leaders. This may 
have been due to the fact that some of the trends in Sufism, such as devotion, piety, 
asceticism, and tolerance, found resonance in local traditions and were not wholly 
unfamiliar in the Indian context. 
 
Trimingham writes that between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries a more organised 
Sufism became apparent in the Indian subcontinent, which began to take account of Islam 
and its legalist traditions.74 Embree asserts this was because some Muslim theologians were 
fearful that Sufis, with their emphasis on achieving a personal relationship with the divine, 
would deny the authority of the Shari’a. He writes that Sufism was a 'potentially disruptive 
force emphasizing a direct personal relation between the individual and his God and 
tending to ignore, if not to denigrate, the rules of conduct and the credal [sic] formulations of 
the orthodox'.75 According to Embree, it was of particular importance to the success of 
Muslim military expansion into the Indian subcontinent at this time that Islam present a 
cohesive tradition to the majority non-Muslim indigenous population. Al-Ghazali (1058-
1111) reconciled the Sufi tradition with orthodox Islam by placing importance on man's 
ability to emulate the qualities of God. This avoided, for the time being at least, a rupture 
between Islamic theologians on the subject of the batin and zahir aspects of Islam.76  
 
Trimingham goes on to argue that the increased organisation of Sufism in the Indian 
subcontinent led to a decline in the Sufi tradition. He writes that ‘through the cult-mysticism 
of the orders the individual freedom of the mystic was fettered and subjected to conformity 
and collective experience'.77 In addition, some Sufi orders were highly criticised for their 
veneration of Sufi pirs as next in importance to God. Trimingham also identifies the 
existence of some features of the Sufi tradition which still exist in Pakistan today, such as the 
importance of Sufi pirs as the foremost spiritual authority, institutionalised and hierarchical 
Sufi orders, the importance placed on dhikr, and the rise of the cult of the saints.78 Similarly, 
Voll and Ohtsuka write that, whilst some Muslims fervently supported shrine culture, other 
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Muslims criticised it as bidah (innovation).79 In fact, there has long been a level of tension 
between the Islam of the ulama and the Islam of Sufis, although the boundaries were fluid 
and some ulama were themselves Sufis. 
 
In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there appears to have been a level of harmony 
between the Muslim and Hindu communities in the Indian subcontinent. This could be 
attributed to the success of Sufi pirs in disseminating Islamic belief to the local population, as 
well as to the writings of Al-Ghazali and Ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240). Notably, in his article 
entitled “Transpersonal Pakistan”, Paul Heelas writes of the important influence of Ibn al-
Arabi's theory of wahdat al-wujud (Unity of Being). He argues that ‘rather than unity 
belonging to the Godhead, over-and-above this world, everything belongs to the unity of the 
“all”. Human life is bound up with the sacred’.80 Similarly, Annemarie Schimmel, in her book 
entitled Islam in India and Pakistan, writes that wahdat al-wujud 'was unceasingly repeated by 
the poets, who claimed that there is no difference between Turk and Hindu, between ar-
Rahman and Ram’.81 In fact, many Muslims consider Arabi's wahdat al-wujud to be the most 
profound understanding of tawhid (Oneness of God). 
 
During the sixteenth century there was a reaction to what have been regarded as the 
syncretistic religious tendencies of some Mughal rulers, Akbar (r. 1556-1605) in particular, 
and of some Sufi orders. The most prominent reformist writings on Islam and the Muslim 
community in this period can be attributed to Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (1563-1624) who, 
according to Embree, argued 'from within mystic experience itself against the pantheism of 
Ibn ‘Arabi [and] recalled Muslims to a fresh realization of the religious value of traditional 
observance'.82 Similarly, Schimmel attributes Sirhind with responsibility for popularising the 
strict Naqshbandiyya order of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent. She writes that this order 
was heavily critical of music, dance, and Arabi's theory of wahdat al-Wujud. What is more, 
Schimmel connects this order with the sixteenth-century revivalist movement that aimed at 
reversing the previous 'rapprochement' enabled by Sufism and its supporters.83 
 
In the eighteenth century there was a second Naqshbandiyya reaction in the Indian 
subcontinent.84 Building on the sixteenth-century writings of Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, 
Islamic scholar Shah Wali-Ullah aimed at reversing the perceived spiritual and political 
degeneration of Muslims in India, unifying the Muslim community, and reviving Muslim 
rule and education in response to increasing British political and economic power. Wali-
Ullah also aimed at purifying Islam of any non-Islamic elements it might have acquired 
through contact with the indigenous population. He was particularly critical of what he 
considered the superstitions associated with the tombs of saints. Elizabeth Sirriyeh, in her 
article entitled "Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the 
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Modern World", writes that Wali-Ullah was 'disturbed by the popular regard for wonder-
working Sufis, admiration for their ecstatic poetry to the neglect of the Qur'an and Sunna 
and obsession with the visitation of tombs for purposes other than the pursuit of spiritual 
progress'.85 Accordingly, Wali-Ullah emphasised the concept of ijtihad, or the role of 
independent interpretation in legal decisions. Ijtihad was considered the means by which the 
Shari’a could be understood in order to meet new social conditions without neglecting 
Islam. The topic of reform and revival with regard to Sufism, which began in the sixteenth 
century, is still relevant in Pakistan today and is reflected in the political discourse of the 
Government of Pakistan. 
1.2.3 Sufism and the state in Pakistan 
 
The current government practice of defining the ideology of the state, and claiming a source 
of Islamic legitimacy, has precedents in the Indian subcontinent. During the colonial period 
(1600-1947), British rulers recognised the important position of Sufi pirs in society and 
attempted to co-opt and control them for political and ideological purposes. Indeed, the 
period of British rule in the subcontinent had, and arguably still has, a profound impact on 
the privileged position and role of Sufi pirs in Muslim society. In this regard, Ansari 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between indigenous elites (pirs and 
zamindars) and the ruling British colonial power.86 While her focus is primarily on the 
province of Sindh in the pre-independence period, Ansari nevertheless provides an 
important understanding of politics and religion in Pakistan. She also presents important 
insights into the ways in which pirs became firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure 
of the countryside, which in turn has important ramifications for Pakistan today.  
 
According to Ansari, the British relied upon local elites to help maintain and provide 
legitimacy for colonial rule, primarily owing to limited finances and manpower. Recognising 
the important role pirs had in local Muslim society, the British endeavoured to control them 
by granting or denying land rights and positions of prestige within the hierarchical colonial 
system.87 Similarly, Ian Talbot in his comprehensive history of Pakistan agrees that the 
British, like the Muslim rulers before them, were a minority people attempting to establish 
and expand their rule over a majority Hindu population. As a result, the British relied 
heavily on local intermediaries to consolidate their rule. Talbot argues that the practice of 
indirect rule through local intermediaries, such as Sufi pirs and landlords for example, 
ensured a privileged position for the latter, whilst enabling the British to pursue the 
commercialisation of agriculture and the gradual introduction of political enfranchisement 
and devolution.88 At the same time, Riaz Hassan emphasises the deep spiritual and social 
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influence Sufi shrines wielded over devotees, stressing that this did not go unnoticed by the 
ruling elite who recognised the political, religious, and economic importance of the shrines.89 
 
The practice of granting land was not just unique to the British in India, but was also 
customary for the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire.90 According to Hassan, spiritual 
leaders 'were granted substantial jagirs by the state not only to obtain their cooperation in 
maintaining political and social stability, but also to use their influence and power over their 
disciples to provide military recruits for the state at short notice'.91 This system continued 
under British rule, with pirs receiving official patronage by way of land grants and honours 
in return for their loyalty and support. Equally, Arthur Buehler writes that by: 
 
using an elaborate system of prestige, the British kept the rural landowners 
(often Sufis) at least passively supporting the colonial system. [...] Pirs did not 
upset the colonial status quo and the British did not disturb the local 
equilibrium of the rural landowner.92  
 
The social, political, and economic position of pirs during this period was further 
strengthened by the implementation of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900, which 
deemed pirs 'landed gentry'.93 Ansari points out, however, that this relationship was not one-
sided but that pirs took advantage of the privileged relationship in order to acquire land 
rights and to ensure saintly succession.94 It is important to note that, as intermediaries 
between the rulers and the ruled, the pirs were often caught between competing tendencies. 
Because pirs were reliant upon donations from the local population they tended to be 
influenced by local rather than British considerations. Similarly, local and national 
movements, such as the Hur rebellions in Sindh (beginning in the 1890s), the Khilafat 
Movement (1919-1924), and the Indian Nationalist Movement (1920-22; 1942-3), increasingly 
challenged and revealed the complexities in the relationship between the pirs and their 
devotees, and between the pirs and the British.  
 
Within the context of the Indian Nationalist Movement, pirs played a key role in attracting 
votes for the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement in opposition to the British in 
India. David Gilmartin explores this in depth in his article entitled "Religious leadership and 
the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab". He notes that, whilst much was written about the 
Deoband ulama who widely resisted the formation of Pakistan, little has been written to 
further our knowledge of what lay behind the widespread religious support for Pakistan in 
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the years leading up to independence.95 In order to understand this phenomenon, Gilmartin 
uses the province of Punjab, an area considered of prime importance in the movement for 
Pakistan, as well as a region of Sufis, as a case study. He begins by looking at the 
development and nature of religious leadership in the Punjab, with particular emphasis on 
the role of Sufi missionaries in the dissemination of Islam during the Delhi Sultanate period. 
He then explores the relationship between religious and political authority during the period 
of Mughal and British rule, and the impact this had on the association between religious 
leadership and the Pakistan Movement. Within this context, it is important to note the 
widespread religious influence of the sajjada nashins in rural Punjab who were closely 
connected to local political structures. This connection, in Punjab as in Sindh, 'produced a 
considerable unity of political and economic interests between the religious and the secular 
leaders of rural society'.96 
  
It is thus evident that, during the period of British rule, a patron-client relationship was 
formalised between the British and the landowning class, including Sufi pirs. This point is 
supported by Buehler who writes, 'the British became the formal patrons of the landowning 
(zamindar) class, protecting and legitimizing the Punjabi system of hierarchy and mediation. 
In this fashion, many members of Sufi families became rural administrators, honorary 
magistrates, and district board members'.97 This patron-client relationship has continued in 
the post-independence period. 
 
Since 1947, the pirs of Sindh have continued to flourish. Like other great 
landowners, they have survived attempts at land reform with their estates 
intact. They have become leading politicians at provincial and national levels, 
often with members of the same extended family strategically positioned in 
political terms to ensure that it does well whatever the nature of the 
administration'.98  
 
Many individuals belonging to Sufi orders can be found within the centres of power in 
contemporary Pakistan. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, for example, was born into a 
prominent pir family of the Qadiriyya order. His eldest son is connected by marriage to 
Hazrat Pir Syed Mardan Shah II, a prominent religious and political leader of the Sufi Hur 
community in Sindh.99 Critically, Talbot argues that British policy and practice towards Sufi 
pirs is the source of continuing social inequality in Pakistan today. He writes that 'although 
Pakistan emerged as a state with a new identity, its political culture and characteristics were 
profoundly influenced by historical inheritances from the colonial era'.100 President Musharraf 
supported this theory, saying that Pakistan had inherited a society that was feudal, 
patriarchal, and ruled by a small group of autocratic elite.101 
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The ways in which the state and religious institutions have interacted in the post-
independence period up to 1988 are most fully captured by Katherine Ewing in her article 
entitled "The politics of Sufism: Redefining the saints of Pakistan". Ewing explores 
government policies towards Sufi shrines, with particular emphasis on the military and 
civilian administrations of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (r. 1958-1969), Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto (r. 1971-1977), and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (r. 1977-1988).102 Notably, Ewing 
demonstrates that state-sanctioned Sufism after 9/11 is not an isolated phenomenon in the 
recent political history of Pakistan. Rather, she shows that there have been ongoing attempts 
by leaders, albeit to varying degrees, to construct national identity and claim political 
legitimacy through a discourse on Sufism. She also shows that there have also been ongoing 
attempts by leaders to redefine and control Sufism and its symbols (saints and shrines) in 
ways consistent with their particular socio-political vision. 
 
In Pakistan, a prominent and recurring theme is the reliance on Islam as a source of political 
legitimacy. Both Muhammad Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aimed at shaping Pakistan 
into a modern secular nation state, although Bhutto's Pakistan would have socialist leanings. 
Ewing argues that, despite their largely secular agendas, both Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto felt 
the need to link their governments to Islam in order to claim legitimacy. However, neither 
wanted to share political control with the ulama. Instead, they linked their administrations to 
Islam by way of the Sufi tradition.  
 
The secular governments of Ayub Khan and Bhutto chose to identify 
themselves with the doctrine of Sufism in order to create for themselves a link 
with religious authority. The Sufi was the symbol these secularists chose to 
represent their position and to legitimate their position as leaders of a Muslim 
democracy.103 
 
Conversely, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq aimed at transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state. 
He established laws that prescribed Islamic punishments for crimes, established Shari'a 
courts, banned the sale of alcohol and gambling, encouraged the use of Urdu over English in 
the government sphere, enforced traditional dress in educational institutions, and 
strengthened regulations governing religious institutions.104 Indeed, his ten-year rule marked 
a period of increased religiosity in Pakistan. For that reason, Ewing argues that Zia-ul-Haq 
'felt less need to identify [his] government with Sufism'.105 
 
Another recurring theme is the need to negotiate politics that is strongly influenced by the 
traditional relationship between the hereditary pirs and the elite land-owning classes, both of 
which are firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside. Ewing argues 
that Muhammad Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq all 
attempted to reduce the political power of Sufi pirs by enforcing greater control over shrines. 
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Despite their differing policies and political ambitions, 'through the vehicle of a newly 
founded Department of Auqaf, these leaders maintained a policy towards the shrines that 
was consistent with their ideologies and goals'.106 Buehler also makes this point. He writes 
that post-independence governments in Pakistan, in line with their political policies, directly 
and/or indirectly assumed control over Sufi shrines'.107 Each of these leaders did so by 
strengthening the regulations governing religious institutions. Ayub Khan implemented the 
West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance (1959), which was later replaced with the West 
Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance (1961). Ali Bhutto implemented the Auqaf (Federal 
Control) Act (1976). Zia-ul-Haq maintained the regulations governing religious institutions 
that were introduced by his predecessors.108 
 
At the same time, Muhammad Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq 
all tried to reduce the political power of the pirs by diminishing their religious role and 
authority. These leaders did so by attempting to redefine the symbols of Sufism (saints and 
shrines).109 Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto both placed emphasis on the role of the early saints as 
important social reformers. They also reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare, 
which is still the practice in Pakistan today.110 Ewing observes that 'the goal was to make the 
shrines centers of more general social welfare by building hospitals, schools, and other 
facilities for poor and rural people'.111 In doing so, and in an attempt to establish a link 
between Sufism and their own socio-political objectives, both governments undermined the 
traditional role of the pirs as social reformers. Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto also built research 
centres and libraries at popular shrines. Buehler observes that the government gradually 
took greater responsibility for the upkeep of shrines, transforming them into schools, 
hospitals, and libraries.112 In doing so, the government undermined the traditional role of the 
pirs as hereditary custodians and benefactors of the shrine. 
 
Interestingly, Ewing notes that Zia-ul-Haq's policies towards the saints and their shrines 
were not a major departure from those of the previous administrations, despite his 
Islamisation project. In fact, he continued many of the auqaf policies of his predecessors in 
an attempt to reduce the political influence of the pir.113 He also attempted to diminish the 
religious role and authority of the pirs. Zia-ul-Haq placed emphasis on the role of the early 
saints in the widespread conversion of the population through pious belief and behaviour. 
He also:  
 
attempted to minimize the distinction between Sufism and shari'at. In defining 
Sufism and the significance of the saints, Zia's administration has emphasized 
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the idea that the original saints were themselves 'ulama, trained religious 
scholars who followed the shari'at.114 
 
In summary, Ewing, Hassan, and Buehler have identified the profound ways in which 
Sufism has been drawn upon, co-opted, and controlled by the government. They agree that 
the traditional relationship between the hereditary pirs and the elite land-owning classes is 
deeply entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside.115 The pir-zamindar 
relationship, together with ongoing attempts to define the state in terms of Islam, not to 
mention attempts by some ulama to break the dominant connection between the state and 
the representatives of Sufi Islam and promote their own purist brand of Islam, has had an 
impact on the government's ability to govern the country. Successive post-independence 
governments in Pakistan have all attempted to reduce the influence of ulama and pir-
zamindar by increasing government control of Sufi shrines, and by linking the administration 
to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition. 
1.2.4 Integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition 
 
A number of scholars have presented aspects of the Sufi tradition in the Indian subcontinent 
as integrative, moral, and peace building in the literature. This helps provide one possible 
explanation for the formation of the Sufi councils after 9/11. However, it is important to note 
that, at times, aspects of the Sufi tradition have been drawn upon within Pakistani society 
and politics with divisive results. Some scholarly writings, as well as popular commentary in 
Pakistan and abroad, have supported the Government of Pakistan’s claims that Sufism can 
assist in achieving religious and communal harmony in Pakistan and curb religious 
extremism. However, it is problematic to view peace as exclusive to Sufism.116 It is also 
problematic to argue the converse, which is to view a more narrowly conceived legalist 
Islam as combative and lacking in peaceable tendencies. 
 
Scholars from varied disciplines have characterised Sufism as open and inclusive,117 
egalitarian and tolerant,118 altruistic,119 a counter to inequality, social conflict, injustice, and 
violence,120 and active in the moral formation of Muslim society.121 Heelas, for example, writes 
that Sufi saints ‘cultivate sentiments of compassion, consideration, mercy; cultivate 
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awareness of humankindness, the sheer value of life, the values of equality or mutuality’.122 
Pina Werbner uses the annual Sufi pilgrimage to Ghamkol Sharif to demonstrate what she 
considers the 'open' and 'inclusive' aspects of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order in the North 
West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.123 Similarly, Robert Rozehnal uses the example of 
the shrine of Hazrat Baba Farid ud-din Mas'ud Ganjshakkar to demonstrate what he 
considers to be the egalitarian and tolerant aspects of the Chishtiyya Sufi order.124 Following 
on from this, Heck explores the role of Sufism in what he refers to as the 'moral formation' of 
Muslim society. He writes that ‘Sufism has played an integral role in the moral life of 
Muslim society [...] seeking ethical meaning in Shari’a beyond a simple implementation of its 
legal rulings'.125 Thus, Heck believes that Sufism could make a valuable contribution to 
current debates surrounding the legal and ethical principles of Islam. Equally, Sufis and Sufi 
shrines as important sources of 'moral authority' are explored in an interesting collection of 
essays written by noted scholars Simon Digby, Francis Robinson, Katherine Ewing, Richard 
Eaton, David Gilmartin, and Barbara Metcalf. These scholars deal with the practice of adab 
(proper conduct, etiquette, moral behaviour), which they argue is most fully observed in 
Sufism. 
 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is how the Sufi tradition might enable citizens of 
diverse orientations to interact peaceably. Equally important are the ways in which the 
tradition might help form a unified community in Pakistan. In this regard, Werbner notes 
that, although post-colonial governments have emphasised building national unity, the 
reality is that many such nations are linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse. This 
diversity creates difficulties for states in the process of nation building. This is true of 
Pakistan which is, arguably, still in the process of nation building or, as Werbner puts it: 
 
creating spaces of public civility and a widely shared civic culture, the sense 
that the nation cares for all its citizens and that citizens extend moral 
obligations beyond their immediate family, tribe, village or ethnic group to the 
imagined community of the nation.126 
 
The nation-building process in Pakistan is also hampered by temporal problems such as a 
weak economy and lack of development, the subversion of law and order by various groups, 
and the presence of corruption and nepotism within government and civic institutions.127 In 
this regard, Rozehnal argues that political and economic instability, corruption, a heavily 
politicised military, drugs, violence, gun smuggling, and the rise of extremist groups 
contribute to Pakistan's volatility.128 In the wake of 9/11, the religious discourse in Pakistan, 
and specifically the discourse on Sufism, became increasingly politicised and mediated in 
the public arena. Numerous and rival groups including politicians, bureaucrats, secular 
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nationalists, Islamists, ulama, and pirs all made references to Sufism in order to support or 
criticise some version of Islamic doctrine. As Rozehnal observes, ‘in today's Pakistan, Sufism 
remains an emotive, multi-valent and highly contested symbol - a lightening rod in the 
contestation over Islamic identity, authority and authenticity'.129 
 
Within this unstable and frequently violent context, Werbner, focussing on elite women, 
argues that it has become increasingly difficult for groups to move and interact safely in 
society. Despite these challenges, Werbner identifies many arenas in which Pakistani citizens 
of diverse orientations can interact peaceably.130 Some examples include private schools, 
universities, government departments, hospitals, weddings, cricket matches, public 
transport, and Sufi shrines and urs ceremonies.131 Werbner considers these arenas places of 
'public civility' where people are able to interact across gender, class, and ethnic divisions. 
Moreover, she reasons that these arenas are important to the nation-building process due to 
their inclusive nature. 
 
In connecting people and spaces across the whole of Pakistan, rich and poor, 
men and women, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis and Muhajirs, Sufi orders 
thus reach out beyond the local to create the performative and embodied 
experience of moral relations between strangers, arguably the essential pre-
condition and grounds of nationhood, without explicitly articulating ideologies 
of nationalism or of a global ummah.132  
  
Similarly, Heck argues that, despite challenges from authoritarian governments and 
fundamentalist groups that attempt to link the moral ideology of the state to the Qur’an and 
the Shari’a, Sufi groups have played an active role in upholding 'civil society'. He writes that 
Sufism, 'while far from incorruptible [has] offered a soundly Islamic alternative to the 
Islamism in power'.133 Heck asserts that if modern Sufism is to countermand the influence of 
Islamists it will need to be progressive in its perspective, retain its spiritual vision, and 
remain faithful to Islamic law, but absent of negative aspects such as its former hierarchical 
inflexibility and its superstitions. 
1.3 Understanding contemporary politics and Islam through discourse analysis 
 
In order to understand contemporary politics and Islam in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis 
employs Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-
political and historical analysis. What follows in this section is a detailed discussion of CDA, 
focussing primarily on the scholarly works of Phil Graham, Rudolf De Cillia, Norman 
Fairclough, and Teun van Dijk.134 The principal assumption of these CDA scholars is that 
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discourse and power are not only linked, but that power or social struggles are reflected in 
discourse. That assumption is particularly relevant for this thesis, which seeks to reveal the 
complex and competing identity narratives within Pakistani society and situate them within 
the wider contemporaneous and historical socio-political context. This section concludes 
with a note on sources. 
1.3.1 Theoretical framework and a method for analysis 
 
CDA is a widely used method for critically analysing discourse (spoken and written). This 
qualitative social science method can be used to analyse any written, verbal, and visual 
communication such as text, documentaries and films, and pictures. The objective of CDA 
scholars is to identify, describe, and compare key themes within the text in order to explain a 
particular social or political idea, situation, or problem. The fundamental premise of these 
scholars is that discourse can be critically analysed within specific socio-political and 
historical contexts to reveal the discursive strategies of dominance and control by those in 
power. This thesis follows Teun van Dijk’s definition of CDA as ‘a type of discourse 
analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political 
context’.135  
 
There have been a number of different approaches in CDA, drawing from disciplines in the 
social sciences and the humanities, and from the writings of social theorists. As discussed, 
this thesis draws upon the works of Phil Graham, Rudolf De Cillia, Norman Fairclough, and 
Teun van Dijk. These scholars aim at determining the links between the discourse or text, 
discursive practices or social norms, and the socio-political context in the reproduction of 
power and ideology. De Cillia and Graham extend this to include a further level of analysis, 
the historical context. In combination, these approaches provide a particularly useful 
foundation upon which to study the reproduction of, and resistance to, power and ideology 
in Pakistan. 
 
Fairclough’s extensive work on CDA provides a valuable foundation for understanding 
CDA as a social science method.136 In addition, the Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) 
approach taken by van Dijk offers helpful insights for the analysis of the combined topics of 
politics, ideology, and discourse. For van Dijk, ‘most kinds of CDA will ask questions about 
the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social 
dominance’.137 In his article entitled "What is Political Discourse Analysis", van Dijk argues 
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that in the social sciences the areas of politics, ideology, and discourse are inextricably 
linked. 
 
PDA is about political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise. In the spirit 
of contemporary approaches in CDA this would mean that critical-political 
discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political power, 
power abuse, or domination through political discourse, including the various 
forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive 
dominance.138 
 
Particularly important to this thesis is what De Cillia and Graham refer to as the Discourse-
Historical approach.139 In his article entitled "The Discursive Construction of National 
Identities", which draws on Benedict Anderson's notion of an 'imagined community', De 
Cillia investigates the construction of nation and national identity using Austria as a case 
study. De Cillia not only analyses discourse within a contemporaneous context, which is 
similar to the approach taken by van Dijk, but takes into consideration the historical 
background as well. According to De Cillia, the Discourse-Historical approach 'attempts to 
integrate all available information on the historical background and the original sources in 
which discursive 'events' are embedded'.140 This approach allows a more complete analysis of 
the discursive reproduction of, and resistance to, political dominance in Pakistan, as well as 
the historical processes that influence and delimit the discourse, the discursive practice, and 
the social and political context. 
 
As discussed above, this thesis focuses on two pivotal themes: a) the discursive construction 
of a national Sufi identity in the political discourse of the Government of Pakistan, and b) the 
ways in which the discursive construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by political actors, political recipients, and the media. In order to 
critically analyse these themes in more depth, this thesis takes a two-fold approach. The first 
part of the analysis investigates the relationships between: a) the discourse, b) the discursive 
practice, c) the social and political context, and d) the historical context. The first three foci of 
this approach derive from Fairclough who argues that an analysis at this level will reveal 
‘how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of 
power [and] how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a 
factor securing power and hegemony’.141 The fourth focus of this approach derives from De 
Cillia who argues that the inclusion of historical background information will allow a more 
complete analysis by situating the phenomenon in a wider context.142 These aspects, and how 
they are applied, are discussed in more detail below. 
 
a) Discourse. The term discourse (spoken and written) is used to denote a record of 
communication, event, fact, or belief. Examples of discourse in the political arena 
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include parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government regulations and legislation, 
propaganda, political advertising, speeches, media interviews, and ballots. Two 
theoretical assumptions are made about discourse as a category. The first theoretical 
assumption, which draws on Fairclough, is that discourse is a form of ‘social practice’ or 
a ‘mode of action’.143 Discourse is used by political actors to exercise power and assert 
ideologies. Discourse is also used by political actors to resist power and dominant 
ideologies. The second theoretical assumption, which also draws on Fairclough, is that 
discourse is always ‘socially and historically situated’.144 Using these two theoretical 
assumptions as an underlying principle, this thesis critically analyses the discourse of 
government officials, other political actors, political recipients, and the print media in 
Pakistan in order to reveal the key themes and strategies used in the construction of 
national identity in the ten years following 9/11. A critical analysis at this level will 
reveal the tensions between the discourse of these political actors and the socio-political 
and historical context. 
 
b) Discursive practice. The term discursive practice, which is sourced from Fairclough, is 
used to denote the process involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of 
the discourse or text.145 Discursive practice refers to the social norms and conventions that 
regulate how people behave within society and how they receive, interpret, and produce 
specific communications. Examples of discursive practice in the political arena include 
governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, and voting. A critical analysis of 
discursive practice at this level will reveal the social norms and mental models that 
influenced the ways in which political discourse was produced, interpreted, and acted 
upon in the construction of national identity in Pakistan in the ten years that followed 
9/11. 
 
c) Social and political context. The social and political context is the specific setting in 
which the discourse of political actors takes place. Drawing on Fairclough, this includes 
the 'context of situation', the 'institutional context', and the 'wider societal context'.146 
Examples include parliamentary sessions, cabinet meetings, election campaigns, rallies, 
demonstrations, and protests. Because the assertion of power and the promotion of 
ideology takes place in particular socio-political contexts, an analysis at this level will 
reveal the factors that influenced and delimited the discourse, and the discursive 
practice, of political actors in the construction of nation and national identity in Pakistan 
in the ten years following 9/11. 
 
d) Historical context. The historical context refers to the temporal background in which the 
discourse, discursive practice, and socio-political context is situated. Drawing on De 
Cillia, this thesis contends that discourse, as a form of social action, is a dynamic process; 
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it is determined by discursive practice, and is influenced and bound by the socio-
political and historical context.147 The historical background is particularly relevant 
because it enables a more complete analysis of 'very recent situations with an eye to how 
elements from the past are woven into sources of dominance, resistance and or 
opposition and how the emergent promises new social forms that may still be 
recuperated and contained'.148 An analysis at this level will reveal the historical processes 
that influenced and delimited the discourse and discursive practices of political actors in 
Pakistan in the ten years that followed 9/11. 
 
The second part of the analysis draws primarily upon the Discourse-Historical approach of 
Graham. In his article entitled “A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical 
Analysis of George W. Bush’s Declaration of War on Terror”, Graham argues that 
throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies to successfully 
persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater good, such 
as risking their lives at war, and that these strategies are particularly apparent in societies 
that have experienced a profound crisis of political legitimacy.149 In the case of Pakistan, the 
largely unpopular decision to join the US-led ‘war on terror’ undeniably heralded a deep 
crisis in the nation’s political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Pakistan was 
transformed into a key ally of the United States, and a front-line state in the war, but it also 
became a victim of terrorism and one of the most negatively viewed countries in the world.  
 
This thesis employs a converse form of Graham’s ‘call to arms’ approach to critically analyse 
the discourse of political actors in Pakistan after 9/11. It contends that, in the climate of 
extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, political leaders in Pakistan relied upon four generic 
strategies, not to encourage people to go to war, but rather to encourage them to form a 
unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. In addition, 
Graham’s fundamental premise is extrapolated to include not only exhortations that 
persuade people to behave in a particular way, or to accede to an appeal, but also 
exhortations that attempt to convince people to accept certain beliefs or attitudes. Graham’s 
four generic strategies, and how they are applied, are discussed in more detail below. 
 
An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The first strategy is what Graham refers to as ‘an appeal to a legitimate power source that is 
external to the orator and which is presented as inherently good’.150 According to Graham, 
this strategy is used by political actors in discourse to positively invoke the ‘ultimate moral 
force within the societal order of the discourse of the day’.151 These moral forces might also be 
adequately termed ‘ideologies’. That is, a set of fundamental beliefs that reflect the collective 
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social, political, cultural, or religious beliefs of a group or community. For many CDA 
scholars, ideologies, politics, and discourse are inextricably linked. Definitively, van Dijk 
describes political ideologies as ‘the basic belief systems that underlie and organize the 
shared social representations of groups and their members’.152 He deems ideologies political 
when they: a) are used by political actors, and b) function within the political domain.153 
 
This thesis contends that, after 9/11, political leaders in Pakistan relied upon discourses of 
peace to encourage people to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress 
socially and economically. This assertion can be effectively linked to Gramsci’s hegemony 
paradigm, whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies or cultural norms 
within society in their political discourse in order to establish ideological control over that 
society by means of acquiescence rather than physical force. Pakistan is used as a case study 
to reveal the dominant ideologies relied upon by political actors, within a particular socio-
political and historical context, in order to reproduce their own political power or 
domination. Critically, however, Graham notes that ‘the socio-historical consequences of 
investing legitimate political power in a source external to the actual locus of power is 
bound to present people with a contradiction between their lived experience and the orders 
of discourse in which they are embedded’.154 An analysis of the ways in which political actors 
resisted the dominant ideology will expose contestations over identity and political power in 
Pakistani society. 
 
An appeal to history 
 
The second strategy is what Graham refers to as ‘an appeal to the historical importance of 
the culture in which the discourse is situated’.155 This strategy also features in the writings of 
De Cillia, who refers to it as ‘the construction of a collective political history’.156 According to 
both Graham and De Cillia, political actors use this strategy in their discourse to positively 
invoke a shared historical consciousness. For Graham, an essential element of persuasive 
political discourse is the close association between the exhortations of political actors and the 
shared historical consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. He argues that ‘for 
an audience to understand what the orator is persuading them to do, it must be linked to 
popular perceptions of what has previously occurred within their social system’.157 
Additionally, for De Cillia, the appeal to a shared historical consciousness is an important 
part of the process of national identity formation.158  
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Both of these assumptions can effectively be linked to the ‘imagined community’ paradigm.159 
In this model, Anderson asserts that a nation is an ‘imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.160 The fundamental premise of this 
concept is that communities imagine themselves as members of a wider community or 
nation because they cannot know each other on a face-to-face level. According to Anderson, 
a crucial element of this official ‘imagining’ was the role of ‘print-capitalism’. The printing 
press, together with the dissemination of printed literature, and the development of rapid 
forms of communication, gave rise to new or imagined communities that developed specific 
national formations and new ways of thinking about themselves. De Cillia has identified a 
number of topics that are relied upon by political actors to invoke a shared historical 
consciousness. These include ‘myths of genesis and origin, mythical figures, political 
triumphs, times of flourishing and prosperity, decline, defeat, and crisis’.161 Using Pakistan as 
a case study, an analysis at this level will reveal the dominant myths relied upon by political 
actors, within a particular socio-political and historical context, to encourage the people of 
Pakistan to interact peaceably and progress socially and economically. 
 
The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
The third strategy is what Graham refers to as ‘the construction of a thoroughly evil Other’.162 
The construction of a negative ‘Other’ is closely tied to the legitimising ideology. This 
demonisation strategy is a recurrent feature in the writings of many CDA scholars. For 
example, van Dijk has identified a number of ways discourse can be critically analysed in 
order to reveal discursive strategies of dominance and control of those in power on the one 
hand, and those of the marginalised on the other. These methods are mainly concerned with 
the positive presentation of ‘Self’ and the negative presentation of ‘Other’. Teun van Dijk 
argues that, because ideologies are often polarised, competing or divergent ideological 
positions or categories (of the 'in-groups' and the 'out-groups') become apparent in political 
discourse. In order to uncover discursive strategies of polarisation, van Dijk employed a 
method called the 'ideological square' which: a) emphasises Our good things, b) emphasises 
Their bad things, c) de-emphasises Our bad things, and d) de-emphasises Their good 
things.163 In this method, good things are attributed to the speaker's own 'in-group' and bad 
things are attributed to out-groups or the speaker's opponents and rivals. 
 
Similarly, De Cillia argues that three theoretical assumptions are crucial to understanding 
the process of national identity construction. First, in keeping with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
‘Habitus’ paradigm, social practices or social imaginings become self-evident or universal 
within communities over time.164 Within these social imaginings are stereotypical attitudes of 
in-groups and of out-groups. Second, in-groups have a tendency to be inclusive of members 
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of their own group and exclude members of out-groups. Thus, the ideological construction 
of nation, and of national identity, always coincides with the construction of difference. In 
keeping with van Dijk, difference is discursively constructed by way of a polarising strategy 
of positive ‘us’-presentation and negative ‘Other’-presentation. Third, nations are always 
made up of groups or communities that identify themselves in different ways. According to 
De Cillia 'there is no such thing as the one and only national identity [...] but, rather, that 
different identities are discursively constructed according to context [...], the situational 
setting of the discursive act and the topic being discussed'.165 Using Pakistan as a case study, 
an analysis at this level will reveal the ways in which the various political actors attempted 
to construct political sameness and difference to encourage people to interact peaceably and 
progress socially and economically. 
 
An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
The fourth strategy is what Graham refers to as ‘an appeal for unification behind the 
legitimating external power source’.166 This strategy also features in the writings of De Cillia, 
who refers to it as ‘the discursive construction of a collective present and future’.167 The 
construction of a collective present and future is closely tied to the legitimising ideology. 
According to Graham, in order to convince people to unite behind the legitimising ideology, 
political actors present various incentives in their political discourse. Such rewards (or 
penalties) might be economic, spiritual, or political and include topics such as retribution, 
feudal and mercantile rewards, or political utopia.168 Using Pakistan as a case study, an 
analysis at this level will reveal the dominant motivating factors that are relied upon to 
encourage people to interact peaceably and progress socially and economically. 
1.3.2 Source material 
 
One aim of this thesis was to document, analyse, and interpret attempts by the Government 
of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 
9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in which the state-sanctioned construction 
of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted by political actors, political 
recipients, and the media. Subsequently, material was collected from three main sources: the 
Government of Pakistan, other political actors and recipients, and the media. What follows 
in this section is a more detailed summary of these sources and how they were used in the 
thesis. 
 
The Government of Pakistan 
 
                                                            
165 De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 154. 
166 Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201. 
167 De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 158. 
168 Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201. 
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The Government of Pakistan was the fundamental starting point for the investigation into 
the construction of an official national identity through the lens of Sufism. Data collection 
focussed specifically on the discourse of President Pervez Musharraf and President Asif Ali 
Zardari, as well as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan Academy of 
Letters (PAL), and the Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), between 2001 and 
2011. Official government sources included parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government 
regulations and legislation, propaganda, political advertising, speeches, media interviews, 
and ballots. 
 
Other political actors and political recipients 
 
The categories ‘political actors’ and ‘political recipients’ include politicians, political parties, 
the public, pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, cultural and religious groups, 
and demonstrators and protestors to name only a few. In Pakistan, these groups and 
organisations are both numerous and diverse. There are more than ninety political parties in 
Pakistan. Coalition governments are a regular occurrence, as are frequent shifts in political 
alliances in the quest to gain access to the centres of power. Pakistan is also home to 
numerous civil society organisations. In 2001, the Aga Khan Foundation (Pakistan) reported 
that there were between ten and twelve thousand registered, and up to sixty thousand non-
registered, non-governmental organisations in Pakistan. There were also an estimated eight 
thousand trade unions.169 In order to narrow these two categories, a review of Pakistani 
newspaper articles was conducted to uncover the relevant political actors and political 
recipients. The search parameters were limited to the discursive use of Sufism between 2001 
and 2011. 
 
Supporters of the official discourse comprise Sufi pirs and their devotees, sajjada nashins, 
political parties, Sufi religio-political parties (including Barelvi groups), civil society 
organisations, and arts and educational organisations. These groups tend, on the whole, to 
want less of a role for Islam in the state. They are particularly opposed to some of the 
penalties that can be enforced under Shari’a law, as well as some of the laws that affect 
minority groups such as the blasphemy laws. These groups tend to view Islam, with both its 
inner (Sufi) and outer (Shari’a) aspects, as an important holistic guiding philosophy for 
Pakistani society. They also see Sufism as an essential part of the nation's heritage and 
culture, which is reflected in the region's poetry, qawwali, art, architecture, and film. Such 
mediums are widely used by these groups and were collected for analysis together with 
propaganda, political advertising, speeches, and media interviews. This source material 
demonstrates the political and social agenda of these groups, their ideology, their opinions 
towards the official discourse, and their opinions towards the detractors. 
 
                                                            
169 A.S.R. Baig, ‘Civil Society in Pakistan: A preliminary report on the CIVICUS Index on civil society project in 
Pakistan’. CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 1. Issue 11, 2001, p. 1. 
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Detractors of the official construction of Sufism comprise ulama, religio-political parties, 
religious groups (including Deoband and Ahle-Hadith groups), and militant organisations 
wanting a stronger role for Islam in the Pakistani state and society. These groups, with their 
focus on so-called ‘true’ Islamic principles based on the sacred sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) 
and the sacred laws (Shari’a), tend to reject elements of Sufi belief and practice, such as the 
veneration of Sufi saints and shrines, urs celebrations, and music and dancing at shrines. 
They aim to rid Islam of what they consider to be ‘un-Islamic’ practices. While religio-
political parties have not been widely successful in the political arena, some groups are very 
well organised and exert considerable street power to influence public opinion and political 
policy. Data collection centred on the discourse of these groups and included propaganda, 
political advertising, speeches, and media interviews. This source material demonstrates the 





Finally, the third arena for an investigation into the construction of a national identity 
through the lens of Sufism was the print media. As a primary source, newspapers perform 
an invaluable role in helping to build an understanding of a particular phenomenon within a 
specific socio-political and historic context. Newspaper articles and editorials provide useful 
facts about events, issues, and key people. Data comprised of newspaper articles and 
editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers including The Daily 
Times, Dawn, The Friday Times, Frontier Post, The News, Newsweek Pakistan, and Pakistan 
Observer on the subject of Sufism between 2001 and 2011. First, English-language 
newspapers were selected because English is regarded as the official language of Pakistan 
and the 'lingua franca of Pakistani elite and most government ministries'.170 Second, and most 
crucially, English-language newspapers were an important vehicle in the dissemination of 
the official discourse to an elite domestic audience, who might be regarded as having 
cultural and political influence, and an international audience, particularly the United 
States.171 The Dawn Group of Newspapers, for example, describes itself as the 'most widely 
circulated English newspaper of Pakistan', with a readership that is 'educated', 'affluent', and 
'influential'. It claims that the on-line edition reaches an international audience and has ten 
million page views per month, with forty seven per cent of visitors from USA and twelve 
per cent from the UK.172 An analysis at this level provides information relating to 
contemporary issues, the social and political context, the actions and statements of the 
                                                            
170 In Pakistan the constitution is written in English, and English is used within the civil, legal, and military 
bureaucracy. By extension, proficiency in the English language is a prerequisite for obtaining admission into higher 
education and employment in both the public and private sector in Pakistan. See, Central Intelligence Agency, 
(accessed 28 May 2011). 
171 Only forty-nine per cent of the population of Pakistan over the age of 15 years can read and write: thirty-seven per 
cent of men and sixty-four per cent of women cannot read and write. See, Central Intelligence Agency, (accessed 28 
May 2011). There are 72 living languages in Pakistan. See, P.M. Lewis, ‘Pakistan’, Ethnologue, Languages of the World, 
http://www.ethnologue.com/country/PK, (accessed 7 October 2011). Pakistani languages with the most number 
of speakers, by percentage of the population, are Punjabi (48%), Sindhi (12%), Urdu (8%), and Pashtu (8%) 
respectively. See, Central Intelligence Agency, (accessed 28 May 2011). Based on these figures, newspapers cannot be 
considered a mass medium in Pakistan and are mainly aimed at educated urban readers. 
172 ‘Advertise with Dawn’, Dawn, http://dawn.com/advertise-dawn, (accessed 7 October 2011). 
 
 36 
government, other political actors, and political recipients, the point of view of the media, 
and the political and social agenda of the media. 
1.4 Chapter overview 
 
As discussed, the events of 9/11 constituted a major historical turning point which triggered 
a series of occurrences aimed at the transformation of existing social, economic, and political 
conditions in Pakistan. Within this context, the Government of Pakistan attempted to unify 
the diverse people of Pakistan under a single national identity by drawing on the ethical and 
peace-building aspects found within Islam. In order to contextualise this struggle to build 
national unity, Chapter Two provides a historical overview of some of the dominant trends 
that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in Pakistan. The historical narrative begins 
with the arrival of the first Muslims to the subcontinent, the spread of Islam as a religion, a 
culture, and as a political force, the rise of a Muslim consciousness based on religion, the 
creation of Pakistan in 1947, and on-going attempts by Muslim politicians to embed Islam 
more firmly in the state and society in independent Pakistan. Chapter Three critically 
analyses the early political discourse of President Musharraf between 2001 and 2004. It 
investigates how the government attempted to urge the nation to support the decision to 
join the ‘war on terror’, persuade the nation to support the domestic campaign against 
extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent and socio-economic uplift after 9/11. It also 
considers the ultimate moral forces that President Musharraf chose to privilege in his 
struggle to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the historical narratives he chose to 
invoke in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness, how he attempted to re-
imagine society through the ideological construction of a national identity, and the 
dominant motivating factors he relied upon to convince the nation to form a peaceable 
unified community. Finally, the chapter examines the ways the social, political, and 
historical background influenced and delimited government discourse. Taking a similar 
approach, Chapter Four critically analyses the political discourse of President Musharraf 
during the latter half of his nine-year political tenure, 2005 to 2008. It examines the 
expansion of state-sanctioned discourses of moderation, the reproduction of those 
discourses in national English-language newspapers in Pakistan, and the formation of the 
National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006. It also examines the main oppositional 
discourses, as well as the various domestic and international debates and agitation 
concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. Finally, this chapter charts the decline 
of President Musharraf, which came in the wake of a number of domestic and international 
challenges that weakened his political legitimacy and authority. Chapter Five critically 
analyses the political discourse of the new civilian administration of President Zardari 
between 2008 and 2011. It shows how President Zardari attempted to redefine the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan in a period of increased religious conservatism. It also considers the 
ultimate moral forces that President Zardari chose to privilege in his struggle to redefine the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the historical narratives he chose to invoke in an attempt to 
create a shared historical consciousness, how he attempted to re-imagine society through the 
ideological construction of a national identity, and the dominant motivating factors he relied 
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upon to convince the nation to form a unified community. This chapter examines the 
reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009, the reproduction of official discourses in 
national English-language newspapers in Pakistan, and the main oppositional discourses. 
Finally, the chapter examines the ways the social, political, and historical background 
influenced and delimited government discourse. Chapter Six restates the theoretical and 
methodological approach taken in this study, discusses the empirical findings of each of the 
chapters, the implications of the findings, the limitations of the research, and makes 
recommendations for further work.  
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The inability of Muslims in Pakistan to establish a coherent and cohesive national identity 
upon which to base a viable political system is a phenomenon the nation has been struggling 
with since its creation. This is partly due to the fact that, historically, South Asian Muslims 
have never been a monolithic homogenous group united under a single consciousness. 
Culturally and socially, South Asian Muslims have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, 
and class interests. Religiously, Islam is itself a diverse tradition with various schisms having 
occurred since its inception. Once Pakistan was created in 1947, rather than act as a unifying 
force in the new nation, Islam instead became a topic of contestation, in which questions 
concerning the place of Islam, and the role it should play in the state and society, became 
pervasive and highly divisive.  
 
The attempt by the Government of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 was, arguably, a continuation of this wider, 
problematic, and largely incomplete struggle to build national unity. An exploration of the 
latest attempt by the government to define the official identity of Pakistan in terms of Islam 
after 9/11 would be incomplete without, first, a discussion of the antecedents of Islam in the 
subcontinent.173 What follows in this chapter is a historical overview of some of the dominant 
trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in Pakistan. The historical narrative 
focuses primarily on early Muslim settlement and growth in South Asia, the rise of a Muslim 
consciousness based on religion which led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and on-going 
attempts by Muslim leaders to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society. This 
chapter is arranged chronologically, beginning with the arrival of the first Muslims to the 
subcontinent, the spread of Islam as a religion, a culture, and as a political force, the rise of a 
Muslim consciousness based on religion, and the creation of Pakistan.174  
2.2 Initial encounters 
2.2.1 Islam in early South Asia, AD 711 – 996  
 
                                                            
173 The geographical scope of this thesis is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The terms 'Pakistan' and the 'Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan' have been used interchangeably to refer to Pakistan after the nation was created in 1947. 
Equally, the term 'India' has been used to refer to that nation after it achieved independence from British rule in 
1947. The terms 'South Asia', 'the Indian subcontinent', and 'the subcontinent' have been used interchangeably to 
refer to the region comprising of Pakistan (East and West) and India in the period up to 1947. The term 'India' has 
also been used when referencing historians who use the term to refer to the region in the pre- and post-
independence period. 
174 For general histories of South Asia that have proven most useful in providing contextual background for this 
chapter, see, A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, Rupa, New Delhi, 1967; J. Keay, India: A History, 
HarperCollins, London, 2000; A. Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Penguin Books, London, 2011; B. Metcalf, Islam in 
South Asia in Practice, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2009; F. Robinson, Islam and Muslim History in South 
Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000; and F. Robinson, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
 
 39 
In the eighth century a group of people, who will be collectively referred to as Muslims, 
arrived in the Indian subcontinent. Historians generally date the first Muslim political 
presence in the subcontinent at 711, when the armies of Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered 
Sindh (in present-day Pakistan).175 These Muslims were of Arabian origin. Qasim was born in 
Saudi Arabia in 695 and served as a General in the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), which was 
established shortly after the death of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the 
prophet Muhammad and the first Shi’a imam (religious scholar or leader). At its greatest 
extent, the Umayyad Caliphate included Spain, southern France, North Africa, Arabia, 
central Asia, and parts of what is now Pakistan in its vast empire.176 
 
In the north-west of the Indian subcontinent these Arab Muslims first came as adventurers. 
They travelled across Central Asia into Afghanistan, through the Bolan Pass, and finally 
settled in Sindh where they eventually became rulers. The main priority of the Muslims of 
the Umayyad Caliphate was military and political expansion. The Arab forces under 
Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered Sindh and from there attempted further incursions into 
the subcontinent. These incursions, however, were successfully resisted by local regional 
powers, the Pratiharas and the Rashtrakutas, who were dominant in the north and north-
west of the subcontinent.177 As a result, Islam’s political expansion was restricted in the north-
west of the subcontinent primarily to the desert coastal regions of Sindh. This in turn limited 
Muslim settlement and, consequently, the spread of Islam as a religion in this period. 
 
By the time Muhammad ibn Qasim’s forces had conquered Sindh it had been a mere one 
hundred years since Islam was first revealed by the angel Jibreel to the prophet Muhammad 
(610) whilst he was meditating in a cave on Mount Hira (in present-day Saudi Arabia). At 
that time, Islam as a religion was still in its infancy and the Muslims in the subcontinent, as 
elsewhere, were guardians of a relatively new religion. 
 
Islam, in 711, was still a religion composed of a few basic assertions about the 
oneness of God, the mission of the Prophet, the terrors of the Last Judgement, 
and the need to perform the five daily ritual prayers, to go on the pilgrimage 
(hajj) to Mecca, and to give alms (zakat) to the poor.178 
 
Not only were early Muslims in the Indian subcontinent custodians of a new religion but, 
finding themselves a long way from Islam’s heartland in Arabia, they had relative freedom 
to interpret and practice Islam as they understood it at the time. This contributed to the 
unique development of South Asian Islam. 
 
                                                            
175 Embree, 1988. For further discussions on Islam in early and medieval India that have proven most useful in 
writing this and the following two sections, see, R.M. Eaton, India’s Islamic Traditions, 711-1750, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2006; I. Habib, The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 1, c. 1200-1750, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1982; J. Malik, Islam in South Asia, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 2008; Schimmel, 1982; and S.F. Dale, 
‘Conversion to Islam in Kerala’ in Religion in South Asia, G. A. Oddie (ed.), Curzon Press, New Delhi, 1991. 
176 For a controversial revisionist study that calls into question the accuracy of sources upon which the early history 
of Islam is based, and whether the conquering Arabs were in fact Muslim, see, T. Holland, In the Shadow of the 
Sword: The Battle for Global Empire and the end of the Ancient World, Little, Brown Book Group, London, 2012. 
177 R. Thapar, A history of India: Volume One, Penguin Books, London, 1990. 
178 Thapar, 1990, p. 384. 
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The focus of these Muslim rulers, however, was military and political expansion rather than 
religious dissemination and conversion. On the whole, they tended to avoid attempts to 
convert the local population en mass to Islam. Consequently, Muslims in the subcontinent 
during this period remained a minority in relation to the indigenous population. Moreover, 
these early Muslim rulers, like their co-religionists who followed in later centuries, faced the 
difficult question of how a minority might successfully rule a majority non-Muslim 
population. Political expediency, therefore, depended on rulers maintaining favourable and 
stable relations with the local population. As a result, policy tended towards avoidance of 
any direct interference in the religious beliefs of the local population. Non-Muslims, 
comprising predominantly of Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists, were for the most part 
permitted to continue to practice their religion as before, without undue interference.  
 
Meanwhile, in the south of the subcontinent Arab Muslims arrived as merchants and 
traders. They sailed across the Arabian Sea and settled in port cities along the south-western 
coast (in present-day Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Kerala).179 The experience of these Muslims 
was somewhat different to their co-religionists in the north of the subcontinent, yet there 
were certain similarities. From a very early period, pre-Islamic Arab traders had long made 
use of the monsoon winds to facilitate their sea crossings from Arabia, via the Arabian Sea, 
to the south-western coast of India in search of spices and items to trade. The later Muslim 
Arab traders were able to utilise existing social structures put in place by their non-Muslim 
predecessors as a foundation for their own settlement and expansion. Owing to this long 
history of contact with the peoples along the south-western coastal regions of the 
subcontinent, Muslim Arab traders were more easily accepted into the local communities 
they encountered. 
 
Like their co-religionists in the north, when Muslim Arab traders began settling in the port 
cities along the south-western shores of the subcontinent Islam was a new religion and these 
traders had relative freedom to interpret and practice it in their own way. Unlike their co-
religionists in the north, however, the Arab traders were more concerned with trade than the 
acquisition of political power or territorial expansion. Economic ambition, and the fact that 
these Muslims were few in number and thus reliant upon favourable and secure relations 
with the local population to achieve their aims, meant that they too avoided direct attempts 
at religious conversion in this period. There was, however, some conversion to Islam from 
within the local population. Local women, the wives and companions of Muslim Arab 
traders, converted to Islam and their offspring were brought up Muslim. There was also 
some conversion amongst the local Hindu population.180 Nevertheless, conversion in this 
region was a gradual process and was influenced by local specificities. It was also made 
possible to a certain extent by the geographic isolation of these communities. The coastal 
regions were largely cut-off from the rest of the subcontinent by the Western Ghats, a 
                                                            
179 Thapar, 1990, p. 384. 
180 Thapar, 1990, p. 384. For further discussions on conversion to Islam in South Asia, see, Malik, 2008; and P. Hardy, 
’Modern European and Muslim Explanations of Conversion to Islam in South Asia: A Preliminary Survey of the 
Literature’. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 2, 1977, pp. 177-206. 
 
 41 
mountain range that stretches from Kanyakumari at the southern tip of the subcontinent to 
Gujarat in the north. These factors limited the spread of Islam as a religion along the south-
western coast and its hinterland. These factors also enabled the Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations living alongside one another to develop their own distinct regional culture, 
resulting in a level of fluidity and blending of socio-religious traditions that, over time, 
contributed to the linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of South Asian 
Muslims. 
 
Muslims who made the Indian subcontinent their permanent home during this period lived 
and grew up alongside a predominantly non-Muslim population. As a consequence, Islamic 
thought and tradition was regularly subject to reflection, redefinition, and adaptation. 
Muslims learned to accommodate local customs and conventions, and even imparted some 
of their own traditions to the local community. Importantly, these early encounters between 
Muslims and non-Muslims began the process of a centuries-long blending of cultures, to 
various degrees, and laid the foundations for a cultural fusion that was to characterise later 
Indo-Muslim periods in the subcontinent. 
2.3 Towards ethnic, social, religious, and political diversity 
2.3.1 Islam in early medieval South Asia, AD 997 – 1206  
 
The raids of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (971-1030) into the Indian subcontinent, at the end of 
the tenth century, and those of Sultan Muhammad of Ghor (1150-1206), in the late twelfth 
century, marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Islam in South Asia. The 
presence of a new group of Muslims from Central and West Asia began be felt in the 
subcontinent.181 This particular encounter was to last more than five centuries and, at its 
greatest extent, would include much of the territory that makes up India and Pakistan today.  
 
As in the early period, the particular nature of the Muslim presence, together with local 
specificities, uniquely impacted Islamic belief and practice, and the spread of Islam, over the 
next five hundred years. The medieval period was a period of regionalism in South Asia, 
characterised by various competing regional dynasties. Religion too was localised in this 
period. This resulted in a continuation of the intermingling of cultures that led to new and 
unique innovations in art, architecture, and language. It also contributed to the linguistic, 
cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslim population. Historian Peter 
Robb, however, contends that ‘Islam wore both inclusive and iconoclastic faces’ in this 
period.182 He states that some groups, such as the Sufis for example, worked towards 
religious and cultural pluralism in the subcontinent, whereas other Muslim scholars 
identified Islam as distinct and separate from indigenous beliefs and worked towards 
establishing a singular authoritative tradition based on the Qur'an and the Hadith.183  
                                                            
181 Embree, 1988. 
182 P. Robb, A history of India , Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, p. 73.  




The first of the Turko-Afghan Sultans to arrive from Central and West Asia was Mahmud of 
Ghazni. Mahmud was born in present-day Afghanistan and was the son of a Turkish 
nobleman. Sultan Ghazni ruled over the Ghaznavid Empire from its centre in Ghazni 
(Afghanistan) between 997 and 1030.184 Mahmud began his campaigns into the subcontinent 
at the end of the tenth century and, over a period of more than thirty years, the regions of 
Sindh, the Punjab, parts of north India, and Gujarat came under his influence. This laid the 
foundations for the establishment of a new set of Muslim rulers in the subcontinent and 
signalled the beginning of a very different type of encounter with the local population. 
 
Historian Romila Thapar argues that Mahmud of Ghazni's initial forays into the 
subcontinent were motivated not by an ambition to expand his political territory, or to 
conduct trade, but by an intense desire for wealth stirred by the legendary stories he had 
heard of the riches to be found there. 
 
[T]emples were depositories of vast quantities of wealth, in cash, golden 
images, and jewellery - the donations of the pious - and these made them 
natural targets for a non-Hindu searching for wealth in northern India.185 
 
Mahmud‘s most widely renowned exploit was the plunder and destruction of the temple at 
Somnath in 1025, one of the subcontinent's most revered places of worship. The temple is 
located on the shores of the Arabian Sea, on the west coast of the subcontinent, near present-
day Gujarat. It is held sacred by Hindus as the abode of one of the twelve jyotir-lingas of 
Shiva, where the divine is represented materially, usually in the form of a stone object. In the 
early eleventh century this temple was reputed to contain vast stores of gold, silver, and 
precious jewels, as well as five hundred dancing girls.186 
 
The plunder and destruction of the temple at Somnath earned Mahmud the reputation as a 
fearsome zealot and iconoclast. However, he was also a keen patron of the arts and sciences. 
One of Mahmud's beneficiaries was Abu Rayhan Biruni (Al-Biruni), a noted Central Asian 
Islamic scholar who chronicled the Sultan's campaigns in the Indian subcontinent. Al-
Biruni's most famous work, the Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind (Enquiry into India), provides an 
interesting account of Indian society as he saw it. 
 
[The Hindus] totally differ from us in religion, as we believe in nothing in 
which they believe, and vice versa. [...] All their fanaticism is directed against 
those who do not belong to them - against all foreigners. They call them mleccha, 
i.e., impure, and forbid having any connection with them, be it by intermarriage 
or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, 
because thereby, they think, they would be polluted. [...] This, too, renders any 
connection with them quite impossible and constitutes the widest gulf between 
us and them.187 
 
                                                            
184 Embree, 1988. 
185 Thapar, 1990, p. 232.  
186 Thapar, 1990, p. 232. 
187 Embree, 1988, p. 437. 
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Al-Biruni’s account suggests a tendency towards separatism in relations between Muslims 
and Hindus in the subcontinent. He believed that the main obstacle to harmonious relations 
between them was the Hindu practice of segregation.188 The caste system was ubiquitous in 
the subcontinent, governing all aspects of social behaviour. Al-Biruni’s account also suggests 
that the Muslim community in this period was united under a homogeneous religious 
consciousness against a Hindu ‘Other’. This, however, is doubtful due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the Muslim presence in the subcontinent and the corresponding complexity of 
identity associations. Moreover, later sources reveal that social stratification, based on 
ethnicity as well as on occupation and status, was characteristic of the Muslim community in 
the subcontinent.189 
 
Al-Biruni was one of many eminent scholars who produced intellectual works whilst 
receiving royal patronage from the court of Mahmud of Ghazni. He wrote a number of 
scientific, mathematical, and philosophical works, as well as numerous works on the history, 
literature, philosophy, and culture of the Indian people. Al-Biruni also wrote on the subject 
of Sufism, comparing Sufi beliefs with those of the Hindus. Similarly, the Persian poet, Abu'l 
Qasim Firdausi, wrote his monumental poem the Shahnama (Book of Kings) whilst in 
Mahmud's court. Ali bin Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri, popularly known as Data Ganj 
Bakhsh or Data Sahib,190 wrote part of his most famous work, Kashf ul-Mahjub (Unveiling the 
Veiled), whilst residing in Lahore, the capital of the Ghaznavid Empire. It is considered the 
earliest Persian exegesis on Sufism.191 However, whilst Sufism began to appear in the north-
west of the subcontinent in the eleventh century, it did not become prominent for another 
two hundred years. 
 
Mahmud of Ghazni died five years after his raid on the temple of Somnath. Ghazni was 
succeeded by Sultan Muhammad Ghori, or Muhammad of Ghor, named after his birthplace 
in present-day Afghanistan. Unlike his predecessor, Muhammad Ghori was not primarily 
motivated by wealth or religious enthusiasm but by an ambition to extend his political 
control over the fertile regions of the Punjab and the Indus Valley. He gained suzerainty 
over the regions previously controlled by the Ghaznavid Empire: present-day Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and much of north India. By 1192, Muhammad Ghori had waged successful 
military campaigns across the plains of India and established Delhi as the seat of the Ghorid 
Empire.192  
 
                                                            
188 An ancient system, the caste system was first sited in the Rig Veda. It maintains that an ideal Hindu society be 
divided into four main occupational or status categories (varna): priests (brahman); warriors (kshatriya); traders 
(vaishya); and servants (shudra). A further group, which falls outside of the four-fold division of an ideal society, is 
the excluded or untouchable caste. Now referred to as dalits, people from this caste were engaged in occupations 
considered ritually impure. 
189 Thapar, 1990, p. 232. 
190 Data Sahib is one of Pakistan's most revered Sufi saints and his shrine, located in Lahore, is one of the nation's 
most important. On 1 July 2010, suicide bombers attacked the shrine as thousands gathered for weekly prayer, 
killing 45 people and injuring more than 175. See, Pak Institute of Peace Studies, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 
2011). 
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Muhammad Ghori was assassinated near the city of Jhelum, in northern Punjab, in 1206. His 
successor, Sultan Qutb-ud-din Aibak, a general and former slave soldier (mamluk), became 
the next ruler of Delhi. This period in the history of the Indian subcontinent is known widely 
as the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526). The Delhi Sultanate comprised of five dynasties: the 
Mamluk or Slave Dynasty, the Khilji Dynasty, the Tughlaq Dynasty, the Sayyid Dynasty, 
and the Lodi Dynasty. 
2.3.2 Islam during the Delhi Sultanate, AD 1206 – 1526  
 
In the thirteenth century, the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in the north of the Indian 
subcontinent saw the more permanent settlement of Muslims from Central and West Asia. 
The Delhi Sultanate comprised predominantly of Muslims of Turkish and Afghan origin. 
However, over time, Muslims from across Central and West Asia, including present-day 
Iraq and Iran, emigrated to South Asia in this period and made it their permanent home. As 
a result, there was an increase in the ethnic, social, religious, and political diversity of the 
Muslims of the subcontinent. In spite of the fact that these Muslims were bound by a 
common faith, they were by no means unified under a single consciousness.193 
 
Like their predecessors, the Delhi Sultans harboured imperial ambitions and, over the course 
of approximately three hundred years, attempted to consolidate their political and economic 
power across the length and breadth of the subcontinent. However, these new Muslim rulers 
also faced the difficult question of how a minority might successfully rule over a 
predominantly non-Muslim population. Political and economic expediency required that 
they too maintain favourable and stable relations with the local population. In order to 
realise their India-wide political ambitions, the Delhi Sultans relied upon the administrative 
systems already in place. The administrative system, which might largely be called feudal, 
was itself not wholly unfamiliar to the Delhi Sultans.194 The peasants cultivated the land and 
paid a portion of their produce to the landowners. The landowners were required to pay a 
portion of the revenue to the Sultan, as well as maintain an army for the Sultan’s disposal. 
Sultanate rule, therefore, could be said to constitute changes at the top level of the social 
structure, with little change at the lower levels. This system did not change greatly under the 
Delhi Sultans, even after they had firmly established their authority in the subcontinent. 
Moreover, whilst some Sultans made minor changes in economic organisation during their 
rule, for the most part, these changes were not maintained by their successors. 
 
The Sultanate reached its greatest extent under Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-51), a Delhi 
Sultan born in Multan in present-day Pakistan. During his rule the political power of the 
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Sultanate stretched across the north of the subcontinent, from the Punjab in the west to 
Bengal in the east.195 Notably, Sultanate political power tended to be weakest in the regions 
furthest away from its capital in Delhi. Nevertheless, the Delhi Sultanate was reasonably 
successful in establishing Muslim political power across the subcontinent. At the same time, 
however, there was much political variation and rivalry, and Muslim political power was in 
no way absolute. Nor were Muslims united under a single political consciousness in this 
period. 
 
The Delhi Sultans were not immune to internal power struggles. Successor disputes within 
dynastic families, for example, were a familiar feature of the Sultanate period and Sultans 
had to be watchful of family members cherishing independent ambitions. Similarly, the 
Sultans also faced threats from within their own administration and were, on occasion, 
obliged to make concessions to the mainly Turkish and Afghan nobility in order to secure 
loyalty and prevent the assertion of independent authority. These concessions, however, 
could not be counted upon to be solid or lasting. The Sultanate also faced political 
opposition from regional Muslim and non-Muslim ruling elites. Tughlaq’s failure to 
incorporate the south of the subcontinent into the Sultanate from his temporary base in 
Daulatabad, for example, resulted in the rise of a strong independent Muslim dynasty, the 
Bahmani Sultanate, which was dominant in the south for approximately two hundred 
years.196 The Delhi Sultans also faced political opposition from Muslim rulers outside of the 
subcontinent. The Mongol armies of Central Asia, for example, made a number of raids into 
the north-west of the subcontinent during this period and posed a constant threat to 
Sultanate power. This demonstrates the very fragmented and fragile nature of Muslim 
political power in the subcontinent. It also shows that, while the Muslims of the Indian 
subcontinent were joined by a common faith, they were divided by political ambition. 
 
The early phase of Sultanate rule occurred almost contemporaneously with the Mongol 
conquests of Asia. Over a period of more than one hundred years, the Mongols ruled over 
the largest empire in history, comprising eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Russia. 
Under the leadership of Genghis Khan, the Mongol armies carried out a number of 
campaigns into the subcontinent but were largely restricted to the regions west of the Indus, 
in present-day Sindh and the Punjab.197 Nevertheless, the Mongol conquests had an 
important impact on the specific development of Islam in the subcontinent during this 
period. During the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many 
Muslims fled from Central and West Asia to the Indian subcontinent to seek sanctuary from 
the Mongol armies. These Muslims came from Turkey, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. 
This added a completely new dimension to the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and 
philosophical composition of the Muslims of the subcontinent. However, their fusion into a 
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single homogeneous group of Muslims was largely resisted, particularly amongst the higher 
social strata. 
 
The court at Delhi in the early stages kept aloof from indigenous life in an 
attempt to preserve its dignity. It was kept in being by transfusions not of 
indigenous blood, but of immigrants from various parts of central and western 
Asia – Mongols, Afghans, Turks, Persians, and Arabs, and even by 
Abyssinians.198 
 
When the Sultanate introduced hereditary titles, Muslims with Turkish or Afghan ancestry 
relied upon extensive genealogies to prove descent to support their claims to nobility. In 
theory, the Qur’an conveys egalitarian principles to its community of believers. This, 
however, extends only to those in the sight of God as demonstrated in Sura 49, Verse 13 of 
the Qur’an: ‘Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (He Who is) the most 
righteous of you’.199 In practice, Muslims in the subcontinent were divided hierarchically on 
the basis of ethnicity. The ashraf or high-born classes comprised primarily of Muslims whose 
origins lay outside of the subcontinent. Whereas the ajlaf or low-born classes comprised of 
indigenous converts to Islam. These two categories were further divided by ethnicity, status, 
and occupation in a manner similar to that of the Hindu caste system, possibly due to the 
history of contact with the non-Muslim population. The practice of attempting to protect and 
assert a particular ethnic and social identity suggests that the Muslim community in the 
subcontinent was by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period and that 
ethnicity, rather than religion, was a more powerful rallying category. 
 
The history of contact between the Muslims and non-Muslims of the subcontinent was 
crucial to the unique development of Islam in South Asia. Muslims had always been a 
minority in the subcontinent. While many Muslims fled the Mongol campaigns in this 
period, South Asia was effectively cut off from Central and West Asia, and the number of 
Muslim émigrés moving into the subcontinent was relatively low. As Thapar notes, ‘Islam 
therefore had to rely increasingly on Hindu converts’.200 There were some conversions to 
Islam from amongst the local population. However, Muslims in South Asia remained few in 
number. Moreover, the Hindus and Buddhists who did convert to Islam tended to retain 
many of their existing social and religious habits, particularly amongst the lower social 
strata, and this further added to the ethnic, cultural, and religious composition of the 
Muslims in the subcontinent. 
 
Domestic ceremonies and rituals such as those connected with birth, marriage, 
and death became mingled. The converted Muslims were also heirs to long-
standing rituals practiced by the Hindus. New ceremonies which had come 
with Islam, and which were regarded as auspicious, crept into Hindu ritual.201 
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The Mongol campaigns in the Muslim heartlands of Central and West Asia also had an 
important impact on the political and religious organisation of the Delhi Sultanate. The 
Delhi Sultans were, officially at least, the political and ideological representatives of the 
Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). In practice, however, the authority of the Sultans in the 
subcontinent was absolute and subject only to the legal precepts of Islam. In 1258 the 
Mongol armies took Baghdad, the capital of the Islamic Caliphate, effectively isolating the 
Delhi Sultans from the leader of the Muslim ummah (universal Islamic brotherhood).202 On the 
one hand, this gave the Delhi Sultans more freedom to govern in a manner more suitable for 
local conditions without undue external interference. On the other hand, amongst those 
Muslim scholars seeking sanctuary from the Mongol armies were a number of ulama. The 
Islam these new émigrés brought with them was more developed and institutionalised than 
previously known in the subcontinent. Embree argues that in this period there was an overt 
conservatism in Islam, with more importance placed on the Qur’an, Sunnah, Hadith, and 
Shari’a. These sacred sources were increasingly relied upon to guide the Muslim community 
on appropriate relations between Muslims, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Embree explains the move towards a more conservative Islam in South Asia thus:  
 
To re-establish ties with the old, rather than to embrace the new, was a 
reasonable desire in men who had barely escaped with their lives and who now 
found themselves precariously situated in an armed camp in North India, open 
to attack from the Mongols in the northwest and from Hindus all around 
them.203 
 
While there was a level of conservatism within Islam not previously witnessed in the 
subcontinent, this tended to occur predominantly amongst the higher social strata and the 
ulama in an attempt to preserve their privileged socio-political and religious status. On the 
whole, Sultanate policy tended towards non-interference in the socio-religious and legal 
affairs of the local non-Muslim communities they ruled. This was due to the fact that the 
main priority of the Delhi Sultans was military and political expansion. Owing to the small 
number of Muslims in the Indian population, these rulers were obliged to rely on pre-
existing administrative systems, and on local non-Muslim personnel, to realise their military 
and political ambitions. Sustaining favourable and stable relations with the non-Muslim 
population was crucial to their objectives, and one important way of maintaining good 
relations with the non-Muslim population was to refrain from any overt interference in their 
socio-religious customs. 
 
Nevertheless, Sultanate political power rested wholly upon Islamic foundations and, in this, 
the Sultans were fundamentally guided by the ulama. The ulama who joined the Sultanate in 
this period were predominantly Sunni scholars from the Hanafi school of thought, which 
was the dominant jurisprudence (fiqh) of the Abbasid Caliphate.204 The Sultanate was, 
therefore, primarily Sunni. Islamic theology and laws were based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, 
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and Hadith. Emphasis was also placed on ijmah, the consensus of the community. The Delhi 
Sultans were obliged to respect Islamic law and Islamic institutions, and defer to the 
pronouncements of the ulama with regard to all religious and legal matters. This placed the 
ulama in a very important religious and political position. As protectors of the Islamic faith, 
it was their role to teach Muslims how to live according to Islam’s sacred sources and to 
enforce the Shari’a.  
  
While South Asian Muslims were joined by a common faith, in reality, Islamic belief and 
practice varied widely. Islam was by no means a unified tradition in South Asia in this 
period. Rather, it was made up of different legal and theological schools of thought. For 
example, the main schism within Islam occurred shortly after the death of the prophet 
Muhammad, during the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), and resulted in the creation of 
Islam’s two major traditions: Sunni and Shi’a Islam. Shi’a Islam first came to the 
subcontinent from Arabia in the ninth century. Over time, a number of different sub-groups 
arose from within Islam itself. The foremost difference between these groups was based on 
the question of who should be rightful successor to the prophet Muhammad and the leader 
of the Muslim ummah. Diversity amongst Muslims in this period prevented their coalescence 
into a homogeneous community under a single religious consciousness. 
 
The Delhi Sultanate considered the main threat to its predominantly Sunni-dominated 
political and ideological authority, as well as to the unity of the Muslim community in the 
subcontinent, to be Shi’a Islam. In this period a Shi’a sub-group, Ismailis, opposed the Sunni 
Abbasid Caliphate and aimed at replacing it with an Ismaili Caliphate. The group later split 
and the Qarmatians, an Ismaili sub-faction, was formed. Both the Ismaili and Qarmatians 
were initially situated in Sindh, where they were a powerful force. During the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries the Delhi Sultans attempted to actively suppress these and other non-
Sunni groups, which they considered to be a threat to their political and ideological 
authority.205 
 
The Ismaili and Qarmatian denial of the legitimacy of the sultanate, their 
egalitarian urges and their secret guild organizations caused the Delhi 
government as much alarm as their rejection of the orthodox caliphate, schools 
of law, and theology scandalized the Sunni ulama.206 
 
Another perceived threat to the political and ideological authority of the Delhi Sultanate, 
and to the unity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent, also came from within Islam 
in the form of Sufism. Sufism was prominent in Persia in the tenth century and by the 
eleventh century Sufis had begun arriving in South Asia from Persia, travelling through 
Sindh and the Punjab, and across the north of India. By the thirteenth century, Sufi Islam 
had become an influential force in the subcontinent. Three Sufi orders and their pirs were 
prominent at this time: Suhrawardiyya, Chishtiyya, and Firdausiyya. The Suhrawardiyya 
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were popular in Sindh, the Chishtiyya in Delhi, and the Firdausiyya in Bihar. These orders 
gradually spread across the subcontinent, building shrines and khanqahs (Sufi religious 
institution, retreat), and disseminating their message: how to reach the ultimate goal of 
drawing nearer to the divine.  
 
Initially, Sufism in South Asia drew primarily from the Persian Sufi tradition. However, over 
time, Sufism developed its own unique beliefs and practices that varied within the 
subcontinent and were profoundly influenced by the local context. Sufism, like Islam 
generally, was by no means a unified tradition. The Chishtiyya, for example, were deeply 
ascetic and austere, accepted non-Muslims into the order, and tended to distance themselves 
from temporal power. The Suhrawardiyya, on the other hand, only accepted Muslims into 
the order, and tended to be both affluent and involved in politics. The Suhrawardi tariqah 
was more overtly conservative in its rejection of the music and poetry that was much loved 
of the Chishti tariqah. Some Sufi orders absorbed customs that were widely practiced by 
Hindu converts to Islam and, as a result, were considered inclusive or syncretic. Conversely, 
religious scholars who were concerned lest non-Islamic elements be absorbed into Sufism 
were more exclusive in their religious observations. This diversity of belief and practice 
within Sufi Islam meant that Muslims were anything but a homogeneous community under 
a single religious consciousness. 
 
Notably, Sufi saints tended to be more successful in the dissemination of Islamic belief in the 
subcontinent than other religious leaders. This may have been due to the fact that some of 
the trends in Sufism, such as devotion, piety, asceticism, and tolerance, found resonance in 
local traditions and were not wholly unfamiliar in the Indian context. One of these local 
traditions was the Bakhti Movement, a devotional tradition that had its precursors in the 
Tamil devotional cults of the fourth-century BC. Like Sufism, the Bhakti tradition placed 
emphasis on the close relationship between the devotee and his or her God. Also like Sufism, 
'love' was a major feature of this relationship as demonstrated in this poem written by a 
Tamil poet-saint. 
 
When you see his face praise him with joy, 
worship him with joined palms bow before him, 
so that his feet touch your head, 
Holy and mighty will be his form 
rising to heaven, but his sterner face 
will be hidden, and he will show you 
the form of a young man, fragrant and beautiful 
and his words will be loving and gracious - 
Don't be afraid - I knew you were coming.207 
 
The popularity of these local poet-saints, with their poetry written in the local vernacular, 
attracted both Hindus and Muslims alike. Through their musical poetry or qawwali, Sufi 
saints were able to convey Islam to the masses in a way not previously seen in the 
subcontinent. As observed earlier, many of the Muslims in the subcontinent were converts 
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from Hinduism or Buddhism. In urban areas, Muslim converts to Islam were chiefly drawn 
from artisan and trader classes. In rural areas, converts to Islam were drawn primarily from 
cultivator classes.208 These converts tended to retain many of their existing socio-religious 
traditions, which resulted in a unique intermingling of Muslim and non-Muslim religious 
beliefs and practices, as well as serving to blur any pre-existing identity categories. 
 
While there was a certain amount of mutual influence and accommodation between the Sufi 
and Bhakti traditions in this period, there was also a level of suspicion and concern amongst 
the Delhi Sultans and the ulama. As discussed previously, the political and ideological 
authority of the Delhi Sultanate rested firmly upon Islamic foundations. These foundations 
were based on the sacred scriptures (Qur’an, Sunnah, and Hadith) and the sacred laws 
(Shari’a). Political and ideological authority and the perceived, if not real, unity of the 
Muslim community in the subcontinent were essential to Sultanate political success. Within 
this context, the ulama had a very important socio-political and religious position within the 
Sultanate, as the sole protectors of the Islamic faith. Fearful they might lose their privileged 
status, and fearful that Sufism was being too accommodating to local mores, the ulama 
became more conservative than previously witnessed. 
 
The Sufis in India dissociated themselves from the established centres of 
orthodoxy often as a protest against what they believed to be a 
misinterpretation of the Quran by the Ulema. They believed that the latter, by 
combining religious with political policy and cooperating with the Sultanate, 
were deviating from the original democratic and egalitarian principles of the 
Quran. The Ulema denounced the Sufis for their liberal ideas and the Sufis 
accused the Ulema of having succumbed to temporal temptations.209 
 
At the close of the Delhi Sultanate, the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent were culturally 
and ethnically diverse. They were made up of Muslims from Arabia, Afghanistan, Central 
Asia, and Turkey, as well as of local Hindu and Buddhist converts. There was little 
consistency in patterns of rule amongst the five short-lived dynasties that made up the Delhi 
Sultanate. The constant threat of local fragmentation and the rise of independent Muslim 
dynasties, particularly in the south of the subcontinent, suggest that Muslim political power 
under a single political consciousness was by no means a monolith. Nor was there any 
uniformity in Islam as a religion during this period. Muslims may have been joined by a 
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2.4 From diversity to nationalism 
2.4.1 Islam in Mughal South Asia, AD 1526 – 1858  
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, a new set of Muslim rulers entered the Indian subcontinent 
and made it their permanent home.210 These Central Asian Muslims traced their ethnic origins 
from the great Mongol emperor Genghis Khan (d. 1227) and the Turkic-Mongol founder of 
the Timurid Dynasty Timur Lang (d. 1405). This period in the history of Islam in South Asia 
signalled the continuation of Muslim rule and, at the same time, heralded the introduction of 
new Mongol, Turkish, and Persian elements into the cultural, administrative, and economic 
systems of the subcontinent. Like the Muslim rulers before them, the Mughal emperors 
shared a common faith with their fellow co-religionists and this provided a convenient 
platform from which to expand their political and ideological authority. However, the 
Muslim community in the subcontinent in this period, as in previous centuries, was by no 
means unified under a single consciousness. Politically, Muslim power was both fragmented 
and fragile. Socially and culturally, Muslims were separated by ethnic, caste, and class 
interests. Religiously, Islam was itself a diverse tradition with various schisms having 
occurred since its inception. Differences existed within the Islamic tradition, between 
Muslim émigrés and those indigenous Indians who had converted to Islam, between 
Muslims of different ethnic and linguistic groups, and between Muslims of divergent social 
status. 
 
The Mughal period in South Asian history is generally placed at 1526 when the first Mughal 
Emperor, Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur (r. 1526-30), defeated the last Delhi Sultan, 
Ibrahim Lodi, at the battle of Panipat in the Punjab.211 Like their predecessors, each of the 
Mughal emperors harboured imperial ambitions and over the course of approximately three 
hundred years attempted to consolidate their political and economic power across the length 
and breadth of the subcontinent. In this, the Mughal emperors were by far the most 
successful of the Muslim rulers. The Mughal empire reached its greatest extent under 
Emperor Abul Muzaffar Muhi ud-din Muhammad Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) and included 
much of what is now present-day Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal. As 
Johnson observes, ‘at the height of their power, the Mughals would lay claim to 3.2 million 
square kilometres of territory and command a population of between 100 and 150 million 
people’.212 While Aurangzeb is widely considered to be the last of the great Mughal emperors, 
the Mughal Empire continued up to 1858 when Emperor Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837-57) was 
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deposed by the British Raj for his role in the Indian uprising of 1857. Bahadur Shah was 
exiled and sent to Rangoon in Burma where he died five years later, officially signalling the 
end of 1,200 years of Muslim rule in the subcontinent. Nevertheless, the Mughal empire left 
an enduring legacy: the idea of a politically united India under a single authority. 
 
The fact that the subcontinent was already familiar with Muslim settlement and rule, to a 
certain extent facilitated the political and ideological expansion of the Mughal Empire. To 
their fellow Muslims, Mughal emperors legitimised their rule by citing established tradition 
and Islam as their main sources of authority.213 However, Mughal emperors, like their 
predecessors the Delhi Sultans, faced the difficult question of how a minority with imperial 
ambitions might successfully rule an overwhelming non-Muslim population. In order to 
expedite their India-wide political ambitions, these new Muslim rulers were heavily reliant 
on existing administrative systems. In addition, political and economic necessity required 
that Mughal emperors accommodate their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, particularly 
the powerful land-holding elite who were already firmly established in the region. 
Consequently, a number of Muslims and non-Muslims were to be found amongst the 
Mughal elite, as well as in the military. However, foreign-born Muslims dominated the 
majority of elite positions within the Mughal court, constituting changes at the top level of 
the socio-economic structure. In contrast, Indian-born Muslims and converts to Islam tended 
to occupy the lower levels of the socio-economic structure, thus reinforcing an already 
ethnically and socially diverse population.214 
 
Nevertheless, one of the main features of the Mughal court was its ethnic, social, and 
religious diversity. At this stage in the history of Islam in the subcontinent there was much 
ethnic variation amongst the, albeit minority, Muslim community. The Muslim men and 
women in this period could claim Afghan, Arab, Central Asian, and Turkish lineage. At the 
same time, the Mughal period ushered the introduction of new Mongol, Turkish, and 
Persian elements into the cultural, administrative, and economic systems of the subcontinent 
further adding to Muslim diversity.215 The second of the great Persian Mughal emperors, 
Nasir ud-din Muhammad Humayun (r. 1530-40, 1555-56), returned to South Asia after 
reclaiming the territory he had previously lost to the Sher Shah Suri (r. 1540-45) of the 
Afghan Sur Dynasty. With him, Humayun took a retinue consisting of ‘a small cadre of 51 
officers, nearly all of whom came from outside the Indian subcontinent – there were 27 high-
status Chaghatai or Uzbek clan leaders from Central Asia, and 16 Persian Shias’.216 This 
situation was somewhat reversed under Humayun’s son, Emperor Jalal ud-din Muhammad 
Akbar, who increased the number of Persians within the Mughal court in order to lessen the 
authority of Central Asian clan leaders, particularly rebellious Uzbek nobles. In an attempt 
to extend the Empire, and requiring additional manpower to do so, Akbar pressed Indian-
born Muslims and Hindus into service. Akbar’s grandson, Emperor Shahab ud-din 
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Muhammad Khurram or Shah Jahan (r. 1627-58) further added to the ethno-cultural 
diversity of the Mughal court. Muslims, the majority of whom were Persian, dominated elite 
positions within the Mughal Empire. The Muslim elite also comprised of Afghan nobles, as 
well as Indian-born Muslims from the south of the subcontinent. Similarly, Shah Jahan 
recruited a number of non-Muslims into the Mughal court, particularly Maratha and Rajput 
landed elite, in order to secure their political allegiance.217 
 
As discussed previously, the caste system was widely adhered to throughout the 
subcontinent by the majority Hindu population. However, the hierarchical division of 
society, embodied in the caste system, was not the sole preserve of the Hindu community. 
Muslims were themselves socially fragmented into two main groups: the ashraf and the ajlaf. 
The ashraf or high-born class claimed foreign ancestry and were further divided into the 
following socio-ethnic categories: sayyids or descendants of the prophet Muhammad 
(through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib), shaykhs (descendants of 
Arab and Persian émigrés), Pashtuns (Pashto-speaking Muslims from Afghanistan), and 
Mughals (Muslims of Turkish or Central Asian origin). The ajlaf or low-born class were 
primarily made up of indigenous converts and were further divided by status and 
occupation very much like the Hindu caste system, with the focus being on ritual and 
pollution.218 This social stratification demonstrates a contradiction between the egalitarianism 
of Islamic doctrine as stated in the Qur’an and the actual social practice of Muslims in the 
subcontinent. It also demonstrates that the Muslim community in the subcontinent was itself 
divided, with social and ethnic categories of identification and association predominant over 
religious categories. 
 
While the Mughal Empire was notable for the idea of a politically united India, as well as its 
relative success in establishing a single political power across much of the Indian 
subcontinent from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, it also witnessed much political 
variation and rivalry. As previously observed, the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent may 
have been joined by a common faith but they had been long divided by political ambition. 
The situation was no different for the Mughal emperors, despite their successes. These 
emperors faced internal threats to their political power from within their own family and 
administration. They also faced threats from local regional powers, both Muslim and non-
Muslim, as well as from Muslim leaders from outside the centres of Mughal authority. 
Muslim political hegemony under Mughal suzerainty, therefore, was by no means absolute. 
Nor did Muslims unite under a single political consciousness in this period. 
 
Muslim disunity in this period was characteristic of relationships between Mughal rulers 
and their Muslim nobility, regional governors, landed-elite, and Muslim rulers from outside 
Mughal territories. Muslim disunity was also present within dynastic families themselves. 
As in the Sultanate era, succession disputes were a regular occurrence within the Mughal 
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court. Emperor Nur ud-din Muhammad Salim (r. 1605-27), or Jahangir as he is widely 
known, faced opposition to the throne from his eldest son, Khusrau. Jahangir had his son 
blinded, and his supporters executed, to prevent further dissention. Jahangir’s second son, 
Shah Jahan, also faced opposition from within his own family when he was emperor. The 
fifth of the great Mughal emperors was incarcerated in Agra Fort by his politically ambitious 
son Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). Meanwhile, all four of his sons descended into a bloody 
succession battle for the title of emperor. Shah Jahan was renowned for the construction of 
the Taj Mahal (Agra), the Jama Masjid (Delhi), and the Lal Qila (Delhi). Mughal emperors, 
like the Muslim rulers before them, had to be constantly vigilant in case family members 
harbouring independent ambitions attempted to usurp their power.219 
 
At this stage in the history of Islam in the subcontinent the Muslim presence, and Islam as a 
religion, had been an established fact for more than eight hundred years. As in the Sultanate 
period, Mughal political power and authority rested firmly upon Islamic foundations. 
Within the ideal Islamic social order, God was the supreme divine power whilst kings, 
scholars, and prophets were responsible for exercising God’s will on earth. Muslim rulers, 
therefore, had a duty to protect Islam and ensure that the Shari’a and the five pillars of faith 
were correctly observed. Muslim rulers were also required to ensure that Islamic religious 
and educational establishments, as well as charities and pilgrimages, were properly 
maintained and funded. In short, a good Muslim ruler was one who was the epitome of a 
pious and devoted Muslim and in all aspects of this Mughal emperors were guided by the 
ulama. Mughal emperors relied upon Islam, and the support of the ulama, to provide 
legitimacy to their rule. In theory, therefore, each of the Mughal emperors aimed at 
achieving an ideal Islamic social order for the Muslim community in the subcontinent. The 
reality, however, was somewhat different. The Muslim population in this period was by no 
means a homogeneous community, nor did it share a single religious consciousness. Instead, 
what is witnessed is a mix of accommodation, syncretism, and conservatism amongst 
Muslims, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 
Islam, nevertheless, was an important aspect of the Mughal Empire. Islam provided 
legitimacy of kingship to Mughal emperors and emperors carried out the duties and 
responsibilities of a good Muslim ruler.220 The religious policies and personal practices of 
Emperor Akbar, in particular, reflect the ways in which he attempted to balance his 
obligations as a Muslim ruler and his responsibilities towards his non-Muslim subjects. They 
also hint at the great vitality and diversity of the period. There can be little doubt that Akbar 
was a devout Muslim. He openly observed the five pillars of Islam, including the recitation 
of daily prayers. Akbar made regular pilgrimages to important places of worship, including 
the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. He also made pilgrimages to the shrines of Sufi 
saints. Akbar was a devotee of the Sufi saint Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti and made regular 
visits to the saint’s tomb at Ajmer. He was also a devotee of Shaikh Salim Chishti, a well-
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respected Sufi saint who prophesised the birth of Akbar’s first son and heir, Salim, or 
Jahangir as he is most widely known. In honour of the saint, Akbar built Fatehpur Sikri and 
made it the capital of the Mughal Empire for a time. Later, Akbar built a tomb for Shaikh 
Salim Chishti within the walls of Fatehpur Sikri. This was a tolerant age and Akbar’s 
religious policies, particularly towards his non-Muslim subjects, reflect this. He 
demonstrated tolerance towards other religions, abolished the tax on non-Muslims (jiziya), 
celebrated some non-Muslim festivals, and married outside of the Muslim faith. One activity 
Akbar was renowned for was the study of comparative religion. He constructed the Diwan-e-
Khas at Fatehpur Sikri where he encouraged religious debate amongst various religious 
leaders including Muslims, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, and Jesuit priests. Notably, Akbar 
experienced criticism from some ulama for his so-called tolerant attitudes towards non-
Muslims, the repercussions of which would be felt later.221 
 
Akbar’s immediate successors quickly realised that it was more prudent to abstain from 
overtly pious religious policy in order to avoid inciting religious controversy. With this in 
mind, Emperor Jahangir adopted similar religious policies to those of his father. He showed 
tolerance towards other religions, whilst at the same time carrying out the duties expected of 
a good Muslim ruler. Like his father, Jahangir made regular pilgrimages to the tomb of Sufi 
saint Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti and, in doing so, legitimised his own kingship and that 
of the Empire through association with the saint. However, despite the overall climate of 
tolerance and diversity, some ulama attempted to cultivate a religious consciousness 
amongst South Asian Muslims, a consciousness built on the idea of a Muslim ‘Other’.  
 
In this period, the most prominent reformist writings on Islam and the Muslim community 
in the subcontinent can be attributed to Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624). Sirhindi was a 
leading Muslim theologian, scholar, and follower of the Sufi Naqshbandi order.222 Sirhindi 
was fearful that Islam, the Shari’a, and the Muslim community in the subcontinent would be 
weakened as a result of the political and cultural concessions of the Mughal Emperors 
towards their non-Muslim subjects. He was particularly derisive of the policies of Akbar and 
Jahangir, who he criticised as having abandoned the religious principles of Islam. Sirhindi 
was also ideologically opposed to Shi’a Islam, as well as towards Sufi orders he believed had 
absorbed so-called non-Islamic elements. He was especially concerned by the syncretic 
tendencies found within Sufi poetry and qawwali, which resembled those of the Bhakti poet-
saints, and which were practiced widely by the local Hindu converts to Islam.223 Sirhindi 
expressed his position towards the religious tolerance of Emperor Akbar as follows: 
 
In the very early days of Islam the most successful pens were those that 
clarified problems of the Shari’a and that propagated theological opinions in 
accordance with the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the consensus of the community, so 
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that such errors and innovations as did appear did not lead people astray and 
end in their corruption.224  
 
The reign of Emperor Shah Jahan signalled somewhat of a departure from the pluralist 
religious policies of his father (Jahangir) and his grandfather (Akbar). Whether out of 
personal piety, or at the behest of influential groups of ulama and Sufis, there was an 
increase in the religiosity of Muslim rulers. Shah Jahan actively patronised Muslim religious 
leaders and establishments, supported the hajj and pilgrimages to Sufi shrines, and placed 
much emphasis on the celebration of Islamic festivals.225 His successor, Emperor Aurangzeb, 
continued many of these religious policies. He actively promoted conversion to Islam, 
restored the tax on non-Muslims, and prohibited the building and maintenance of non-
Muslim places of worship. Like his great-grandfather, Aurangzeb was also a follower of 
Naqshbandi Sufism.226 Under Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire drew its authority and 
legitimacy from a more narrow adherence to Sunni Islam. According to Johnson, Aurangzeb 
‘pushed the Mughal empire into becoming more of an Islamic state, conforming more to the 
sharia, and having as its aim the benefit of the community of believers’.227 
 
By the late seventeenth century, during the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb, the Mughal 
Empire had begun to show signs of decline. As a consequence, strong independent regional 
interests began to gradually reassert themselves across the subcontinent. This occurred 
during a period of increased religious piety on the part of both the emperors and the ulama. 
It also occurred during a period of religious controversy, where a ‘pure’ Islam was pitted 
against an Islam that had been infiltrated by so-called non-Islamic elements. The political 
misfortunes of the Mughal Empire in this period were simplistically attributed to the 
degeneration of Islam in the subcontinent by some ulama, and many political conflicts took 
on decidedly religious connotations. In this period, an Islamic scholar named Shah Wali-
Ullah attempted to reconcile the conflicts within Islam. His main objective was to reverse the 
spiritual and political degeneration of Muslims in the subcontinent. Wali-Ullah aimed at 
unifying the Muslim community, as well as reviving Muslim rule and Muslim education, in 
response to increasing British political and economic power whose political presence had 
begun to be felt in the subcontinent. He also aimed at purifying Islam of so-called non-
Islamic elements, such as the popular superstitions associated with the tombs of popular 
saints.228 According to Robb, Wali-Ullah ‘prepared the ground for a revival of Sunni 
orthodoxy that stressed the importance of the prophet’s hadith to Muslim conduct, and 
criticized popular devotional religion and the worship of saints’.229 
 
At the height of the Mughal Empire, the Muslims of the subcontinent were ethnically, 
culturally, linguistically, and philosophically diverse. This diversity contributed to an 
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intermingling of cultures, which mark this period in the history of Islam in the subcontinent 
as a particularly golden age in art, architecture, language, and culture. This diversity is 
reflected in the composition of the Mughal Court, as well as in the tolerant religious policies 
of the Mughal rulers themselves. The climate of religious tolerance was resultant upon, but 
not limited to, the political and economic considerations of the Mughal emperors, the 
personal convictions of individual emperors themselves, and the Indian environment itself. 
Notably, it was not until the Mughal Empire began showing signs of political disintegration 
and decline that the early assertions of a Muslim consciousness based on religion were 
witnessed. Up until that time, ethnicity rather than religion was a more powerful rallying 
category but it was also one that served to divide the Muslim community rather than unite 
it. Some religious leaders, such as Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Wali-Ullah, attempted 
to reverse the perceived spiritual, political, and economic degeneration of Muslims by 
reforming Islam and by attempting to establish a Muslim community under a single 
religious consciousness. However, they served to further divide the Muslim community by 
pitting a ‘pure’ Islam against an Islam that they argued had been infiltrated by so-called 
non-Islamic elements, thus relegating a large proportion of the Muslim population in the 
subcontinent to the pejorative category of kafir. 
2.4.2 Islam in British South Asia, AD 1600 – 1947  
 
In the seventeenth century, a small group of British traders arrived in the Indian 
subcontinent. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth I granted the East India Company a charter to 
conduct trade in the East Indies. When the British first arrived in the subcontinent, and over 
the next one hundred years, the Mughal Empire was at the height of its political power. The 
East India charter spanned the reigns of the great Mughal Emperors Akbar, Jahangir, Shah 
Jahan, and Aurangzeb. Company officials would have negotiated with these rulers for the 
commercial trading rights which permitted them to set up trading posts along the west and 
east coast of the subcontinent in Surat (1612), Madras (1639), Bombay (1668), and Calcutta 
(1690).230  
 
The British were not the only Europeans conducting trade in the subcontinent at this time. 
They were competing with the Danish, Dutch, French, and Portuguese, as well as local 
traders, to protect and advance their commercial interests. In the early eighteenth century, 
when the Mughal Empire started showing signs of decline and disintegration, various 
regional powers began jostling for political control. In an attempt to expand and protect their 
commercial interests in the region, British and other European traders were increasingly 
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drawn into political struggles over territory. One of the major political conflicts was the 
Battle of Plassey (1757). The defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, and his French allies, marked the 
commencement of Company rule over Bengal. Shortly thereafter, further British success in 
the Battle of Buxar (1764) against the combined forces of the Nawab of Bengal, the Nawab of 
Oudh, and the Mughal Emperor, extended Company rule across Bengal to include Bihar. 
From this point onward, the British began gradually extending their political authority 
across the subcontinent until it became, in the mid-nineteenth century, part of a great empire 
upon which it was said that the sun never set. 
 
The British period in the history of South Asia ushered in a host of changes that ultimately 
had a profound impact on the political, economic, and social composition of the 
subcontinent and its people. While religion had long been a major feature of Indian life, 
religion, and perhaps more significantly religious difference, came to be the foremost symbol 
of cultural and political identity not only for South Asian Muslims but for all Indians, 
particularly in the last decades of British rule. There can be no doubt that British policy 
played a significant role in the formation of a Muslim cultural and political identity based on 
religion, as well as the rise of Muslim nationalism, which culminated in the partition of the 
Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This section demonstrates the ways 
in which the political, economic, and social policies of the colonial government 
institutionalised and popularised religious difference. It also looks at the role South Asian 
Muslims themselves played in the creation of their own consciousness, as well as the 
fundamental impact their agency had on elevating religion to one of the most important 
symbols of cultural and political identity. Significantly, an examination of the variety of 
Muslim responses demonstrates that Muslim political leaders, as well as the Muslim 
community itself, was by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period. 
 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the British in South Asia embarked on a 
program of reform in the subcontinent which was greatly influenced by the ideological 
currents of the age. Reforms were made across political, economic, and social spheres. 
Modifications were made to the way revenue was collected and administered in the 
subcontinent. Changes were also made to the legal system, and laws were gradually 
codified. English was made the official language, replacing Persian at the higher levels of the 
administration and courts, as well as in education. Indian responses to these reforms were 
varied. Some sections of Indian society embraced western ideas and made attempts to work 
within the new system. Others, including sections of the newly dispossessed Muslim elite, 
attempted to remain aloof from British rule. The imposition of British rule, and the 
subsequent loss of Muslim dominion and state authority, as well as the decision to replace 
Persian with English in government and in education, all contributed to Muslim 
dissatisfaction and roused various Muslim reform movements in this period. 
 
As previously touched upon, the Islamic scholar and reformer Shah Wali-Ullah and his son 
Shah Abd al-Aziz (1746-1824) remained reserved towards the British presence in the 
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subcontinent. Father and son argued that Muslims living under British rule were ‘living in a 
zone of war with infidels (dar al harb)’.231 In response, Wali-Ullah and Abd al-Aziz aimed at 
uniting Muslims under a single religious consciousness based on a strict observance of the 
sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. While the pair were influenced by Sufi thought, they 
were critical of popular Sufism and the practice of saint-worship. Subsequently, they called 
for a reform of Islam to rid it of the so-called non-Islamic elements that they argued had 
crept into Muslim ritual as a result of the long contact with the majority non-Muslim 
population. Wali-Ullah and his son blamed these innovations for the spiritual and political 
degeneration of South Asian Muslims.  
 
A number of other reformist movements shared the sentiments of Shah Wali-Ullah and Shah 
Abd al-Aziz in this period. Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of Barelvi (1786-1831), founder of the 
Tariqah-e-Muhammadiya (The way of the Prophet), was greatly influenced by the ideologies 
of Shah Wali-Ullah and Shah Abd al-Aziz. His Tariqah-e-Muhammadiya began as a socio-
religious reform movement but displayed decidedly political undertones in 1826 when 
Sayyid Ahmad called for a jihad against Sikhs in the Punjab. This movement was deemed 
‘Wahhabi’ by the British administration, as well as by some ulama and Sufi pirs. In Bengal, 
another Islamic reformer called Hajji Shari’at-Ullah (1781-1840) founded the Faraizi 
Movement, which aimed at ridding Islam of any un-Islamic elements amongst the peasantry 
of east Bengal. Shari’at-Ullah was said to have been influenced by Wahhabi Islam following 
time spent in Saudi Arabia. Like Shah Wali-Ullah, he too was critical of the so-called non-
Islamic elements that had crept into Muslim ritual.232 All of these movements were intended 
to purify Islam and unite Muslims under a single religious consciousness in order to return 
them to their former political position. Despite the activities of these Muslim reform 
movements, the Muslim community in the subcontinent continued to remain fragmented. In 
fact, these reform movements served only to further divide South Asian Muslims. As Robb 
succinctly observes, ‘the Islamic reformers were beginning to divide the Urdu-speaking 
elites, and attempting to separate the whole community, more distinctly along religious 
lines’.233 
 
In 1858 the British Government assumed direct responsibility for administering British 
dominions in the subcontinent. The Government of India Act of 1858 called for the 
dissolution of the East India Company, following an uprising of Indian troops against 
Company rule in the north of the subcontinent, and a general loss of confidence in the 
Company’s administration. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the 
subcontinent. It also signalled the official end of approximately 1200 years of Muslim rule. 
For the next one hundred years, a large part of South Asia would be ruled by a European 
power whose centre of authority remained firmly outside the subcontinent. 
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From the nineteenth century onward, two features of British policy in South Asia were to 
have a profound impact on the way in which Indians began to perceive themselves. First, the 
British administration embarked on an extensive project of counting and classifying the 
Indian population; with the first modern census commissioned during this period. Second, 
the British administration began to endorse the gradual participation of Indians in 
government; the Indian Councils Act of 1861 was the first of many efforts to devolve 
political power to Indians. Regardless of the intention, British census data served to create a 
sense of awareness of community, and of community separateness, within Indian society. It 
also made community groups aware of their numerical size. While British census data 
introduced the idea of Muslims and Hindus being two separate and distinct socio-religious 
categories, the establishment of separate electorates for minorities institutionalised the 
concept. The potential consequences of this were not lost on Muslim leaders who recognised 
that, if the Indian subcontinent were to achieve independence from British rule, the Muslim 
community would be a minority, albeit a very large minority, in a predominantly Hindu 
India. This triggered an increase in Muslim community association and identification. 
However, Muslims were by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period. 
 
The latter half of the nineteenth century was characterised by the rise of a number of 
different reform and revival movements, which theorised and debated topics such as the 
Shari’a, the Sunnah, Sufism, Muslim education, and language to name only a few. Within 
this context two Muslim reform movements were prominent in the north of India: the 
Deoband Movement and the Ahle-Hadith Movement. These two groups shared similar 
features. Both emphasised a strict adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. Both 
were influenced by Sufism, but drew predominantly upon the ideologies of the Naqshbandi 
tariqah. According to Robb, ‘students were taught to know the shari’a and to follow the 
tariqah or path of religious experience, under the guidance of the ulama’.234 Both groups were 
greatly influenced by the writings of Shah Wali-Ullah. They called for the religious and 
educational reform of Muslim society, as well as the purification of Islam of so-called non-
Islamic elements, to help restore Islam and the Muslim community it to its former 
predominance in the subcontinent. At the same time, the Ahl al-Sunnat wa al-Jama'a 
Movement (People of the tradition of Muhammad and consensus of the community) was 
prominent in the north of India. This movement was also known as the Barelvi Movement, 
after its ideological founder Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi (1856-1921). Unlike the Deoband and 
Ahle-Hadith movements, the Barelvi Movement was supportive of the popular practices 
that had become associated with Sufism in the Indian subcontinent, such as shrine-worship. 
 
At the same time, other Muslim reform movements gained prominence in the subcontinent. 
Elite Muslims such as Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) became increasingly aware that 
democracy in an independent India would mean Hindu-majority rule. Initially, Khan was in 
favour of a continuation of British rule in the subcontinent. He believed that the British 
played an important role as arbitrator between Hindus and Muslims, who had gradually 
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become aware of their separate community status under colonial rule. Moreover, Syed 
Ahmed Khan believed that the best way Muslims could safeguard their interests was by 
working within the colonial system itself. In order to better equip Muslims to work within 
the changed socio-political environment he established the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental 
College at Aligarh in 1875. This college combined a modern western curriculum with a 
traditional Islamic one. Syed Ahmed Khan was an important Muslim reformist figure in this 
period and is credited in Pakistan as being the founder of the two-nation theory. However, 
some Muslims were critical of Khan’s promotion of western education. His response to that 
criticism provides an interesting glimpse into his attitude towards Islam and the Muslim 
community. 
 
The Muslims have nothing to fear from the adoption of the new education if 
they simultaneously hold steadfast to their faith, because Islam is not irrational 
superstition; it is a rational religion which can march hand in hand with the 
growth of human knowledge. Any fear to the contrary betrays a lack of faith in 
the truth of Islam.235 
 
By the early twentieth century it appeared that South Asian Muslims had coalesced into a 
single politico-religious community. In this period, events occurring outside the Indian 
subcontinent had an important impact on Muslim consciousness. The Balkan wars (1912-13) 
and World War I (1914-18) prompted a movement by South Asian Muslims to rise up 
against the British to defend the Caliph of Ottoman Turkey. The Khilafat Movement (1919-
24) was initiated by Muhammad Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali and served to unite South 
Asian Muslims, for a time, under a single politico-religious consciousness. However, it also 
pitted the emergent idea of a territorial nationalism against a universal pan-Islamic ideology. 
The Khilafat Movement was later incorporated into the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-
22) led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi against colonial rule in South Asia. These events 
reflect a brief period of Hindu-Muslim unity in the subcontinent. They also mark an 
important turning point for the British because it became manifestly apparent in this period 
that colonial rule in the subcontinent could not be sustained indefinitely. 
2.4.3 Islam and the Pakistan Movement, AD 1940 – 1947 
 
The problem of Muslim unity in the subcontinent was of particular importance when the 
question of Muslim nationalism was raised. When Mohammad Ali Jinnah first put forward 
his famous Pakistan Resolution in 1940 he was thought to be representative of the majority 
of South Asian Muslims. Seemingly, ‘Pakistan’ represented the social, religious, political, 
and economic ambitions of a quarter of the population. Neither the British government nor 
the Indian National Congress seemed able to prevent its apparent inevitability. However, 
there were a considerable number of Muslims who fervently opposed the movement for 
Pakistan. As discussed, South Asian Muslims were not a monolithic homogeneous group 
united under a single consciousness. Socially and culturally, Muslims were separated by 
ethnic, caste, and class interests. Religiously, Islam was itself a diverse tradition with various 
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schisms having occurred since its inception. The Pakistan Movement, and the Muslim 
opposition to it, provides a particularly useful case study of the disunity of the Muslim 
community in the subcontinent in the years leading up to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. It 
also provides an essential foundation for understanding the controversies that continue to 
confound efforts to establish a single unified consciousness for the Muslims of Pakistan 
today.  
 
In March 1940, South Asian Muslims gathered near the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore to hear 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the AIML, give his presidential address. It was there that 
Jinnah put forward what has widely come to be known as the Lahore or Pakistan 
Resolution. Within that resolution, Jinnah demanded the creation of separate Muslim states 
based on the notion that Muslims and Hindus in South Asia were two separate and opposed 
religious and cultural groups. 
 
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social 
customs and literature. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together … 
they have different epics, their heroes are different, and … very often the hero 
of one is a foe of the other … To yoke together two such nations under a single 
state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to 
growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built 
up or the government of such a state.236 
 
Jinnah’s objective was the establishment of autonomous and sovereign Muslim states to be 
located in the north-west and east of the subcontinent, where South Asian Muslims were in 
the majority albeit only marginally. However, beyond vague geographical references to 
where Pakistan should be founded, Jinnah was unclear as to what he meant by ‘Pakistan’ 
and how it would work in practice. Muslims represented a quarter of the overall population 
of the Indian subcontinent. In the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, Muslims were in the 
majority. Throughout the rest of subcontinent, Muslims were in the minority. Because South 
Asian Muslims were so widely spread across South Asia, in practical terms a single 
territorial Muslim state would be difficult to achieve. This was, however, only one of the 
reasons why Jinnah was ambiguous in his definition of Pakistan.  
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Jinnah’s emphasis on the unity of the Muslim community, and the separateness of Muslim 
and Hindu communities, rallied much of the support for the Pakistan Movement in the 
decade preceding partition. In the climate of nationalism and home-rule, however, Jinnah 
was not the first to put forward the concept of a separate homeland for Muslims. In 1930, the 
poet Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938), widely considered the spiritual father of Pakistan, wrote 
about communal separateness and the need for a political homeland for Muslims. He 
envisaged ‘Pakistan’ as the amalgamation of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind 
and Baluchistan into a single Muslim state within an independent India. Iqbal favoured a 
universal Islam, rather than a territorial nationalism based on religion, as demonstrated in 
the following poem entitled ‘Muslims Profess no Fatherland’. 
 
Our Essence is not bound to any place; 
The vigor of our wine is not contained 
In any bowl; Chinese and Indian 
Alike the shard that constitutes our jar, 
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay 
Forming our body; neither is our heart 
Of India, or Syria, or Rum, 
Nor any fatherland do we profess 
Except Islam.237 
 
Three years later, four students led by Cambridge law student Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali also 
advocated a separate Muslim homeland based on the amalgamation of the Punjab, North-
West Frontier Province, Kashmir, and Baluchistan. However, one of the problems of 
achieving Muslim nationhood, apart from practical geographical considerations, was that 
South Asian Muslims were themselves not a homogeneous group unified under a single 
religious consciousness. This is evidenced by the fact that the idea of the creation of a 
separate Muslim homeland was, on the whole, rejected by a number of Muslim politicians, 
scholars, and clerics who instead worked towards attaining security, equal rights, and equal 
opportunities for Muslims within a united and free India. Thus confirming, to a certain 
extent, that there were Muslims in South Asia who did not think in terms of communal 
separateness. 
 
The main opposition to the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland came from the 
two Muslim-majority regions in the west and east of the subcontinent: the Punjab and 
Bengal. Politicians in those regions were fiercely protective of the specifically regional 
flavour of their culture. Moreover, the different communities in those regions had worked in 
relative harmony to produce vibrant, competitive, and prosperous economies, particularly in 
the Punjab. In addition, regional politicians who had only recently begun to benefit from the 
British devolution of political power to Indians at a local level feared losing control over 
their specifically regional political and economic interests. Punjabi and Bengali politicians 
believed that the partition of their regions would be largely detrimental to Muslim interests 
therein. Nevertheless, despite the opposition, both of these regions were ultimately 
partitioned from India and incorporated into Pakistan in 1947.  
                                                            




Some of the staunchest opponents of the Pakistan Movement had their origins in the 
Muslim-majority province of the Punjab. These included the National Unionist Party (1923), 
and its foremost leaders Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hayat, together with various Muslim 
organisations and institutions. The reasons for this can be found in the unique political, 
economic, and socio-religious history of the province. Putting aside the vested interests of 
Punjabi politicians, the province was a microcosm of South Asia itself. It encompassed the 
subcontinent’s three major religious communities: Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh. These 
communities had lived and worked alongside one another for centuries. According to 
Talbot, ‘the rural population shared a common language, songs, poetry and folklore. The 
tragic love tales of Hir Rajha, Sassi Punnu and Sohni Mahival were popular with all 
communities. Sufism acted as a cross-community focus of religious devotion’.238 The focus 
was undeniably regional in character, rather than national or religious. Sikander Hayat, one 
of the leaders of the National Unionist Party, maintained that he was ‘first a Punjabi and 
then a Muslim’.239 Punjabi politicians believed that the creation of Pakistan would pose a 
danger to the cross-communal harmony of the Punjab and threaten to force its Muslims into 
a community in which there would be no binding factor other than a common religious 
belief that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger. 
 
Bengal, the other major Muslim-majority province in the subcontinent, shared some of the 
features of Punjabi nationalism and opposition to the Pakistan Movement. Similarly, the 
province’s political, economic, and socio-religious history played an important role. Between 
1927 and 1937, Bengal politics experienced a medley of competing rivalries. Political success 
largely depended on obtaining majority support within a province where Muslims were a 
marginal majority. Obtaining majority support was dependent upon a party’s readiness and 
ability to work cooperatively with its counterpart in the religious community, be it Hindu or 
Muslim. The most significant political party in Bengal, and one that worked towards Hindu-
Muslim cooperation, was the Krishak Praja Party under the leadership of Fazlul Haq. The 
outcome of the provincial elections of 1937 reflects the specifically rural and provincial 
leanings of the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, as the AIML failed to make any 
significant advances in either region. 
 
Like the Punjab, Bengal had its own unique regional culture which formed the basis of a 
specifically Bengali identity. According to Mohammad Shah, a small group of Muslims were 
intensely protective of this identity with little regard for the concerns of Muslims outside the 
province.240 Moreover, politically, these Muslims tended to favour the nationalist sentiment of 
the Indian National Congress Party rather than what they considered the divisive sentiment 
of the AIML. They argued that ‘a Bengali Muslim was a human being first by the right of his 
birth, then a Bengali by being made of the soil of Bengal, and then a Muslim – a Bengali 
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Muslim last’.241 The basis for Bengali opposition to the Pakistan Movement was that Muslims 
in South Asia were not a coherent homogenous group and therefore could not effectively be 
unified within an artificially created Pakistan. 
 
Opposition to the Pakistan Movement did not come only from the Muslim-majority regions 
of the Punjab and Bengal. There were a number of other Muslims who worked towards 
gaining independence from the British for an undivided India. Such Muslims included the 
pro-Congress Abul Kalam Azad, Husain Ahmad Madani, Abu al-A'la al-Maududi, and 
Muslim associations such as the Deoband Movement, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Jama'at-i 
Islami, the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the Ahrar Movement. These groups had a number of 
features in common. First, they supported a combined Hindu-Muslim effort towards 
achieving freedom from British colonial rule. Second, they were opposed to what they 
considered the divisive communal politics of the AIML. Third, they believed that Pakistan 
would be damaging for Muslims, particularly those Muslim minorities that would remain in 
India after partition. 
 
One notable Muslim who rejected the divisive politics of Muhammad Jinnah and the AIML 
was Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958). Azad was one of the foremost Muslim leaders in the 
Congress party. He became President of the Indian National Congress in 1939 and remained 
in that position until his retirement in 1947. Azad was an important figure for Indian-
nationalist Muslims in the face of growing support for the Pakistan Movement. A guiding 
principle in Azad’s thinking, and one which influenced his political activities, was that a 
person could be both a Muslim and an Indian at the same time. He did not believe in the 
synthesis of religion and nationality, and he was hostile to what he considered the separatist 
politics of Jinnah.  
 
As a Musalman I have a special interest in Islamic religion and culture and I 
cannot tolerate any interference with them. But in addition to these sentiments, 
I have others also which the realities and conditions of my life have forced upon 
me. The spirit of Islam does not come in the way of these sentiments; it guides 
and helps me forward. I am proud of being an Indian. I am a part of the 
indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. […] I am an essential element which 
has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.242 
 
A number of Muslim religious scholars shared Azad’s pluralistic approach to nationalism in 
the subcontinent. Maulana Syed Abu a’la Maududi (1903-1979) was a Muslim theologian 
and journalist. In 1941 he founded an Islamic movement called the Jama'at-e-Islami (JI), in 
opposition to the Pakistan Movement led by Jinnah and the AIML. Similarly, a Deobandi 
theologian named Syed Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) led the Deobandi movement 
against Pakistan under the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH). Indian-nationalist Muslims, such 
as Maududi and Madani, believed that the AIML was not representative of South Asian 
Muslims, and that the creation of Pakistan would be damaging for Muslims. They argued 
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that ‘Pakistan’ would be harmful for Muslims because territorial nationalism based on 
religion was the antithesis of universal Islam, as espoused by Muhammad Iqbal and Syed 
Ahmad Khan. In other words, they argued that the creation of Pakistan would be 
contradictory to the idea of a universal Islamic brotherhood. Moreover, theologians like 
Maududi and Madani argued that a Muslim state, established and administered under 
Jinnah’s leadership, would be un-Islamic. The ulama in particular were focussed on a strict 
adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. They believed that the western-
educated Jinnah would be unconcerned with true Islamic principles and, therefore, could 
not represent the best interests of Muslims. They considered him to be nothing more than an 
‘infidel barrister’ and that Pakistan under Jinnah would be an ‘infidel state’.243 These ulama 
argued that Islam needed political and religious freedom to effectively guide the Muslim 
community. They felt this would be best achieved under their direction within a united 
India. Moreover, the ulama argued that peaceable cross-communal cooperation in the 
freedom struggle might encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islam. They also argued that 
‘Pakistan’ would be harmful for Muslims because the minority status of Muslims remaining 
in India after partition would be reinforced, and they would no longer have the support of 
their majority Muslim brothers. 
 
By 1947 the idea of a territorial nation based solely on religion had culminated in the 
partitioning of the Indian subcontinent into two separate and distinct nations: one Hindu 
and the other Muslim. This partitioning ended a relationship of co-existence that had begun 
more than twelve hundred years earlier and which had influenced the people of the 
subcontinent in very meaningful and lasting ways. The construction of a Muslim nation, and 
a Muslim identity, was crucial in creating mass appeal and support for a separate political 
and spiritual homeland for the Indian subcontinent’s largest minority community, the 
Muslims. This ideology privileged a monolithic homogenous religious national identity, 
Islam, above the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological differences that 
existed amongst the Muslims of South Asia. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Pakistan was 
established on the basis of one nation (Pakistan), one culture (Muslim), and one language 
(Urdu).244  
2.5 Independent Pakistan 
2.5.1 Pakistan, AD 1947 – 1999 
 
The Pakistan Movement bestowed two indelible and challenging legacies on the nation. 
First, the movement established the foundation upon which Islam was regarded as the 
foremost national identity for Muslims in Pakistan. Second, the Pakistan Movement 
demonstrated that Islam could be effectively utilised for political mobilisation. These 
legacies have continued to hamper national integration, and socio-economic and political 
development in Pakistan. Since independence, the military, civilian leaders, and religious 
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groups have all sought to mobilise a version of Islam in pursuit of their particular objectives. 
However, rather than act as a unifying force in the Muslim-majority nation, the complex and 
competing interpretations of Islam that exist in Pakistan continue to divide it. Moreover, on-
going debates concerning Islam, and its role in the state and society, have been exacerbated 
by endemic incidents of sectarian violence. Alongside the bitter and recurrent rivalry 
between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan, is the enmity between the Sunni Deobandi 
and Sunni Barelvi schools of thought. During the Pakistan Movement, Barelvis supported 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah in his call for a Muslim nation in which the political, economic, and 
cultural interests of Muslims would be protected. Conversely, Deobandis fervently opposed 
the creation of Pakistan. The leader of the Deobandi opposition to the Pakistan Movement, 
Syed Husain Ahmad Madani, argued that territorial nationalism was the antithesis of united 
ummah. Moreover, Madani argued that a Muslim state, administered under Jinnah’s 
leadership, would be un-Islamic. 
 
In independent Pakistan, the ideological struggle over Islam has continued in two broad 
directions: liberal and conservative. Taking a predominantly liberal position, Barelvi 
Muslims have tended, on the whole, to want less of a role for Islam in the state and society. 
According to Talbot:  
 
Those steeped in Sufi tradition have expressed hostility to attempts to create a 
‘mullahocracy’ in Pakistan. The uneducated and hypocritical mullah has emerged 
as a stereotype in Pakistani literature and in the folklore of the region.245 
 
In contrast, Deobandi Muslims have taken a largely conservative position and tend to work 
towards embedding Islam more firmly in both the state and in society. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Deobandis aim at effecting Muslim socio-religious uplift through strict 
adherence to the Shari’a and their narrow interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. They 
eschew what they consider ‘un-Islamic’ elements, such as the intercession of Sufi saints, saint 
worship, and the annual urs celebrations, which are so beloved of Barelvi Muslims. In the 
political arena, religio-political parties have never been widely successful in Pakistan. 
However, they are well organised and have been able to exert considerable street power 
with which to influence public opinion and political policy. Their rhetoric, and the public 
response to it, reflects the continuing functional role of Islam as a source of legitimacy. 
 
Signalling a partial victory for the conservative position, the Objectives Resolution of 1949 
firmly placed Islam as the guiding principle for Pakistan. Endorsed on March 12, 1949, by 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the resolution 
stated that sovereignty belonged to Allah and that Muslims should be able to live their lives 
in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah.  
 
I beg to move the following Objectives Resolution embodying the main 
principles on which the constitution of Pakistan is to be based: 
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In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful; 
WHEREAS sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone 
and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its 
people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred 
trust.246 
 
The Objectives Resolution endorsed the primacy of religion in the state. With its passing, 
Pakistan became a more overtly religious state, rather than the democratic Muslim-majority 
nation conceived of by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The principles of ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, 
‘equality’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘social justice’ were embedded in the resolution, insofar as they 
were consistent with the teachings and traditions of Islam.247 This resolution became the 
foundation upon which the Constitution of Pakistan would later be based. Crucially, the 
resolution created a space in which debates concerning Islam and its relationship to the 
state, as well as ‘correct’ forms of religious identity, belief, and practice in society, were 
contested. 
 
The sectarian riots of 1953 marked the first violent rupture over the question of the role of 
Islam in the state, and what it means to be a Muslim in Pakistan. In March that year serious 
sectarian riots took place in the Punjab (West Pakistan) in response to the rejection by Prime 
Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin (r. 1951-53) of a demand from some ulama to have Qadiani 
Ahmadis declared non-Muslim (kafir). The riots necessitated military intervention, and 
culminated in a declaration of martial law and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. 
A commission was set up to investigate the causes of the violence. Significantly, the resultant 
Report of the Court of Inquiry demonstrated the complete lack of doctrinal agreement 
amongst ulama regarding the definition of a Muslim and the role of Islam in the state and 
society.248 The report provided an ominous forewarning of the problems associated with 
combining religion and the state in Pakistan. 
 
The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-
i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other 
must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the 
Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other 
party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the 
consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have 
agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.249 
 
Despite this early recognition of some of the difficulties arising from combining religion and 
the state, Islam remained crucial to national identity and government legitimacy. The 
continuing importance placed on Islam, its relationship to the state, and the ways in which 
successive leaders have embedded Islam more firmly in the state, are most clearly 
demonstrated in the Constitution of Pakistan. The first constitution was adopted on March 
23, 1956, under Major-General Iskander Mirza (r. 1956-58). In that constitution, Pakistan was 
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officially declared the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan was to be a democratic state 
based on Islamic principles. The president of Pakistan must be Muslim, and the laws of 
Pakistan must be in accordance with the Qur’an and the Sunnah.250 Since then, the 
constitution has witnessed numerous constitutional amendments and reforms. 
 
General Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. He envisaged Pakistan as a 
broadly secular and democratic Muslim nation. In 1961 Khan introduced the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance (MFLO), which aimed at the reform of Muslim customs such as divorce, 
marriage, and inheritance. His reformist agenda was influenced by the ‘Westernizing’ 
traditions of Syed Ahmed Khan.251 Ayub Khan was a student at Aligarh University, which 
was founded by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1875. According to Talbot: 
 
The modernist reformism of the Aligarh movement possessed a twofold aim; 
first to encourage Muslims to engage with Western scientific thought and 
second to reconcile the Islamic concept of the sovereignty of God with the 
nation state.252 
 
Despite his largely secular agenda, General Ayub Khan recognised the need to link his 
government to Islam. In the Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Khan reiterated the 
government’s commitment to Islam. The provisions of the constitution shared similarities 
with the previous constitution: it was based on the Objectives Resolution of 1949, Pakistan 
was to be a democratic state based on Islamic principles, the president must be a Muslim, 
and all laws must be in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah. Under the provisions of the 
constitution, Ayub established the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Islamic 
Research Institute (IRI). The role of the CII was to ensure that the laws of Pakistan were in 
accordance with Islamic law. The role of the IRI was to assist in the reconstruction of an 
Islamic society. Despite his endorsement of Islam, Khan faced opposition from conservative 
religious leaders who were dissatisfied with what they viewed as government interference 
in their religious beliefs and traditions.  
 
Khan also faced opposition from Sufi pirs and landowners who were unhappy with what 
they perceived to be attempts to reduce their religious and political authority in the 
countryside. As discussed in Chapter One, Ayub Khan implemented the West Pakistan 
Waqf Properties Ordinance in 1959 and the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance in 
1961. Ewing argues that, in order to avoid sharing political control with conservative ulama, 
he instead attempted to link his administration to the Sufi tradition to construct national 
identity and claim political legitimacy.253 Khan also attempted to redefine and control Sufism 
and its symbols (saints and shrines) in line with his particular socio-political agenda. He 
placed emphasis on the role of the early saints as important social reformers. He also 
reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare by building hospitals, schools, research 
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centres, and libraries at popular shrines.254 Saifur Rahman Sherani argues, however, that 
Ayub Khan’s policies towards Sufi pirs served to strengthen their influence in the Pakistani 
countryside rather than diminish it.255 
 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was president of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973 and prime minister from 
1973 to 1977. In the first year of his presidency, the Indo-Pak war and secession of East 
Pakistan caused an ideological crisis in Pakistan. When Pakistan was created in 1947, it 
comprised of East and West Pakistan. The Punjab had been divided to form West Pakistan 
and Bengal had been divided to form East Pakistan. Territorially, these two regions were 
separated by approximately 1,600 km of Indian territory. Culturally, both of these regions 
were fiercely protective of the specifically regional flavour of their culture. Politically, West 
Pakistan was dominant. Central government was based in West Pakistan, with Bengalis 
forming the majority in the legislative branch of government but not in the executive. In 
1970, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, won the elections, 
giving the party a majority in the National Assembly. In contrast, the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan, was a minority. West Pakistan refused to 
recognise the election result, leading to widespread unrest in East Pakistan. In 1971, the West 
Pakistan army attacked East Pakistan. Rahman was arrested and taken to West Pakistan. 
Leaders of the Awami League sought exile in India, and from there declared independence. 
In December 1971, the Indian army entered East and West Pakistan. Pakistan surrendered 
two weeks later, and Bangladesh was established as an independent nation. 
 
The succession of East Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh, demonstrates the failure of 
Islam to act as a coherent unifying principle with which to bind Muslims from different 
regional, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Despite this, what followed were increased 
attempts by the leaders of Pakistan to build a cohesive national identity based on Islam. In 
this period, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto increased the religious rhetoric in his political discourse. He 
also implemented a number of policies that seemingly conformed to conservative Islamic 
principles. In the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Bhutto made salient provisions for Islam: 
Islam was deemed the state religion of Pakistan, the teaching of the Qur’an and Islamiat were 
made compulsory, and it was required that all laws conform to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
According to Saeed Shafqat, the constitution of 1973: 
 
Carried references to the Islamic way of life, compulsory teaching of the Holy 
Koran, Islamiat, and encouraged learning of Arabic. It gave a commitment to 
promote the institution of zakat, organize mosques under the Auqaf 
department, and declared that no law repugnant to the Holy Koran and Sunna 
would be adopted.256 
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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aimed at shaping Pakistan into a modern secular nation state, albeit with 
socialist leanings. However, like previous leaders Bhutto recognised the need to link his 
government to Islam. He was also obliged to make concessions to the conservative religious 
lobby in Pakistan. As discussed in Chapter One, Ewing argues that in order to construct 
national identity and claim religious legitimacy without having to share political control 
with the ulama, Bhutto linked his administration to the Sufi tradition.257 Bhutto, however, 
attempted to redefine and control Sufism and its symbols (saints and shrines) in line with his 
socio-political agenda. He implemented the Auqaf (Federal Control Act) in 1976 and 
reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare.258 In doing so, his government 
undermined the traditional role of the pirs as hereditary custodians and benefactors of the 
shrines. At the same time, Bhutto’s preference for Sufism impelled conservative religious 
groups to increase their demand for the primacy of Islam in the state and in society. In 1977 
a coalition of religious parties, under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 
contested the general elections against Bhutto and his PPP. The PNA advocated for the 
Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet) and the enforcement of Shari’a. The PNA religious 
coalition performed poorly in the elections. After the elections, the PNA accused the PPP of 
rigging the elections and organised widespread demonstrations in protest. The military, 
under the leadership of General Zia ul-Haq, the protests necessitated military intervention to 
restore law and order in cities across Pakistan.  
 
In 1977, General Zia ul-Haq deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and appointed himself chief martial 
law administrator. He was president of Pakistan from 1978 to 1988. His ten-year rule marked 
a period of increased religiosity. Zia ul-Haq continued the process of embedding Islam and 
Islamic principles more firmly in the state. He took up the slogan Nizam-e-Mustafa as part of 
his Islamisation project to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state. He established laws that 
prescribed Islamic punishments for crimes, established Shari'a courts, banned the sale of 
alcohol and gambling, encouraged the use of Urdu over English in the government sphere, 
enforced traditional dress in educational institutions, and strengthened regulations 
governing religious institutions. Lieven argues that General Zia ul-Haq’s attempts to 
transform Pakistan into an Islamic state: 
 
Reflected not only Zia’s own profound personal religious convictions, but also a 
nationalist belief (which has been shared by some more secular figures within 
the military and civilian establishment) that religion is the only force which can 
strengthen Pakistani nationalism and national identity.259 
 
The introduction of predominantly Sunni Islamic principles alienated the Shi’a community 
and left a lasting legacy in the form of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a groups in 
Pakistan. In addition, Zia ul-Haq’s presidency was contemporaneous with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which transformed Pakistan into a front-line state in the Soviet-
Afghan war (1979-89). In this period we witness increased US investment in Pakistan’s 
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military and its intelligence agencies, as well as increased investment from the US, the Gulf 
States, and Saudi Arabia in madrassah education in Pakistan. As previously discussed, many 
of the Afghan mujahedeen, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani cadres who fought 
alongside them, were trained in Sunni Deobandi madrassahs in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border areas. The expansion of Deobandi madrassahs in Pakistan contributed to the 
deepening of sectarian identities in Pakistan, not only between Sunni and Shi’a but also 
between Deobandi and Barelvi. 
 
As discussed, the leaders of Pakistan have also had to negotiate politics that is strongly 
influenced by the traditional relationship between Sufi pirs and the elite land-owning 
classes, which are firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside. 
Ewing argues that Zia ul-Haq, like Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, attempted to reduce 
the political power of Sufi pirs by enforcing greater control over shrines.260 Thus, he retained 
the auqaf regulations that were introduced by his predecessors. In addition, his policies 
towards the saints and their shrines were not a major departure from that of Ayub Khan and 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite his Islamisation project. Zia ul-Haq attempted to reduce the 
religious role and authority of the pirs by placing emphasis on the role of the early saints in 
the widespread conversion of the population through pious belief and behaviour, and by 
reducing the distinction between Sufism and shari’at.261 
 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif was prime minister of Pakistan from 1990 to 1993 and from 1997 
to 1999.262 He rose to political prominence under the military government of Zia ul-Haq. Like 
previous leaders of relatively mainstream political parties, Sharif was obliged to link his 
government to Islam, as well as negotiate politics that was strongly influenced by 
conservative religious leaders, pirs, and land-owners. In 1988 Sharif formed an alliance with 
the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic Democratic Alliance, a coalition of parties that 
included diverse groups including the Pakistan Muslim League, Awami National Party 
(ANP), and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). In 1990 the IJI passed The Enforcement of Shariat as a 
private members bill in the senate. Talbot argues that: 
 
The support of IJI senators for a Shariat Bill in the closing months of Benazir 
Bhutto’s government, together with the presence of religious parties in the 
subsequent IJI Government, meant that Islamisation which had been in 
abeyance since 1988 would re-emerge during Nawaz Sharif’s premiership.263 
 
In 1998, Nawaz Sharif put forward the Constitution (15th Amendment Act). The amendment 
provided for the implementation and enforcement of Shariat-e-Muhammadi or Shari’a laws. 
Significantly, the amendment gave the government powers of enforcement, including the 
authority to implement Shari’a, enforce salat (prayer), administer zakat (charity), promote 
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amr bil ma’roof (acknowledged virtues), and prohibit nahi anil mumkar (sin). According to 
Mubarak Ali: 
 
Nawaz Sharif’s concept of the shariat was confined only to the Islamic 
punishment provisions, since he believed that the Islamic penal code would 
eradicate all crimes from society. Speedy justice and exemplary punishments 
were viewed by him as the solution to all problems.264 
 
Under the Islamic penal code, the penalty for theft is amputation, the penalty for adultery is 
public flogging, and the penalty for blasphemy is death. Sharif was criticised by human 
rights groups for attempting to implement harsh Islamic penalties in Pakistan. At the same 
time, some religious leaders accused Sharif of exploiting Islam for political ends. The 
Constitution (15th Amendment Act) was approved in the national assembly, but not in the 
senate. 
 
Each of these attempts by Muslim politicians to embed Islam more firmly in the state and 




This chapter provides a general history of some of the dominant trends that helped shape 
Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its 
creation in 1947. In particular, this chapter demonstrates the unique ways in which the 
Indian environment influenced Islamic belief and practice over a period of approximately 
twelve hundred years: the results of which are reflected in the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslims of Pakistan today. This chapter also 
illustrates that, whilst Islam is now widely considered to be the dominant tradition amongst 
the heterogeneous Muslims of the subcontinent, the persistent lack of doctrinal agreement 
has prevented the formation of an enduring national identity for Pakistan’s Muslims. This 
historical narrative provides an essential background for a more complete understanding 
and analysis of the post-9/11 socio-political context in Pakistan, in which the Government of 
Pakistan posited its own construction of Sufism as the national identity in place of an 
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3 The early discourse of President Musharraf, 2001 – 2004  
3.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, political leaders use persuasive language (spoken and written) 
in the political arena for a variety of purposes. They use language to reinforce and reproduce 
their own political power, that is, the political power of the status quo.265 Political leaders use 
persuasive language to assert the dominant ideologies of the status quo.266 They also use 
language to convince people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of a 
greater good.267 This type of persuasive speaking or writing is what scholars call discourse. 
Based on research into what he refers to as ‘call to arms discourses’, Graham argues that 
throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies in order to 
successfully persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater 
good, such as risking their lives at war. He further contends that such discourses typically 
occur in contexts that are ‘characterised by deep crises in political legitimacy’ or contexts 
that are ‘historical turning points’.268 This theory is supported in the work of William Sewell 
who argues that historical events, or transformative occurrences, usually begin ‘with a 
rupture of some kind – that is, a surprising break with routine practice’.269 Furthermore, 
Sewell states that such historical events trigger a series of occurrences that contribute to a 
fundamental transformation of existing social, economic, and political conditions. 
 
If ‘call to arms discourses’ typically occur in societies that have experienced a profound 
rupture of some kind, then the military coup of 1999, followed by the decision for Pakistan 
to join the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’, undoubtedly provided the catalyst for the 
new discourse that emanated from the political leadership in Pakistan. On October 12, 1999, 
General Musharraf overthrew the democratically elected government in a military coup and 
appointed himself the dual role of chief executive of Pakistan and chief of army staff. 
Domestically and internationally this move triggered a deep crisis in his, and in Pakistan’s, 
political legitimacy. Two years later, the United States suffered four coordinated terrorist 
attacks on its soil. President Musharraf called September 11, 2001, the ‘day that changed the 
world’.270 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 constituted a major ‘rupture’ or ‘historical turning 
point’, which prompted transformative occurrences in the United States and in many 
countries around the world including Pakistan. 
 
In order to critically analyse the new discourse that emanated from the political leadership 
in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employs a converse form of Graham’s Discourse-Historical 
‘call to arms’ approach. The theoretical assumption is that, in the climate of terrorism, 
                                                            
265 D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, and H.E. Hamilton, The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Malden, 
2001. 
266 De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999. 
267 Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004. 
268 Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 200. 
269 W.J. Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, p. 
227. 
270 Musharraf, 2006. 
 
 75 
extremism, and sectarianism, political actors in Pakistan relied upon four generic strategies, 
not to persuade people to go to war, as in Graham’s model, but to encourage them to form a 
unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. This chapter 
demonstrates how President Musharraf attempted to urge the nation to support the decision 
for Pakistan to join the US-led ‘war on terror’, persuade the nation to support the domestic 
campaign against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic 
uplift during the first half of his political tenure. 
3.2 Catalysts for change in Pakistan 
3.2.1 The coup of 1999:  Pakistan returns to military rule 
 
O Allah! The only thing I can promise my Army and my Nation is sincerity, 
honesty, integrity, and unflinching loyalty. 
You give me the vision to see and perceive the truth from the false. 
The wisdom to comprehend the problem and find a solution. 
The courage to speak and project and the clarity to express the right. 
The chance to serve the Nation as I deserve.271 
 
The first historical turning point or rupture, which triggered a series of occurrences aimed at 
a transformation of the existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan, was 
the coup d’état of October 12, 1999. General Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif from office, following what he called a ‘counter-coup’, and assumed the dual role of 
chief executive of Pakistan and head of government. It was Pakistan’s fourth military coup 
in the nation’s short history, with Musharraf following in the footsteps of military leaders 
President Muhammad Ayub Khan, President Muhammad Yahya Khan, and President 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. 
 
Events began earlier that day when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced his decision to 
replace General Musharraf as chief of army staff on national television. At that time, 
Musharraf was en route from Sri Lanka following an official visit. Musharraf would later say 
that, despite the previous tension between himself and the prime minister over the Kargil 
conflict, he felt quite easy about his visit to Colombo and believed that he and Sharif had 
finally reached a ‘truce’.272 His ease, however, proved to be misplaced when the prime 
minister refused to allow the Pakistan International Airlines flight PK-805, carrying 
Musharraf and 198 civilian passengers, to land at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. 
Instead, Sharif attempted to divert the airliner outside Pakistani airspace despite urgent 
requests by the pilot to be permitted to refuel. When the plane eventually landed, it had only 
seven minutes of fuel remaining.273 General Musharraf later said that during the harrowing 
incident he recalled a verse from a quatrain from the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, an 
eleventh-century Persian Sufi poet and philosopher. 
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The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.274 
 
Three and a half hours after the initial televised broadcast announcing that General 
Musharraf was to be replaced, the Commander of the Rawalpindi Corps entered the prime 
minister’s Islamabad residence and took him into custody. Sharif was charged with 
kidnapping, attempted murder, hijacking, and terrorism. Facing the death penalty, the 
deposed prime minister was later pardoned by General Musharraf and exiled to Saudi 
Arabia, where he remained until 2007. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned 
the charges against Sharif due to insufficient evidence.275 
 
Military leaders in Pakistan have frequently cited poor political leadership, corruption, 
socio-economic underdevelopment, and inefficient judicial and constitutional systems in 
order to justify the need for military intervention. As the following national address by 
General Musharraf demonstrates, his justification for the military coup was no different.  
 
You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country has 
gone through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played 
around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of 
collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which 
have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan. Dear brothers 
and sisters, your armed forces have never and shall never let you down, 
Inshallah. We shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the 
last drop of our blood. I request you all, to remain calm and support your 
armed forces in the re-establishment of order to pave the way for a prosperous 
future for Pakistan.276 
 
Despite the initial popularity of Prime Minister Sharif, and the considerable public support 
that had brought him into power, by 1999 his national approval rating had dropped 
considerably. The economy was dangerously fragile, suffering high levels of unemployment, 
poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. According to General Musharraf, ‘all the social 
indicators – health, education, income – were shamefully low and were continually 
deteriorating. Between 1988 and 1999 absolute poverty – people who earn $1 per day or less! 
– had risen alarmingly, from 18 percent to 34 percent’.277 A Federal Investigation Agency 
(FIA) report later revealed that Prime Minister Sharif, along with some of his family 
members and business associates, had amassed more than US$400 million from corruption 
and money laundering schemes during his tenure as finance minister (1984-85) and prime 
minister (1991-93; 1996-99).278 
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The fragile political and economic situation was worsened when Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif authorised a series of six nuclear tests in the Balochistan desert in response to the 
nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998. Although India’s decision to conduct the 
nuclear tests was regarded by Pakistan as a major security threat, Pakistan initially hesitated 
to respond in kind, waiting seventeen days before reacting. Thazha Varkey Paul suggests 
that Sharif appeared to have been willing to abstain from nuclear testing in return for 
‘substantial economic and military aid and security guarantees from the West’.279 That did not 
happen and, under increasing pressure from opposition parties and the army, Sharif gave 
the order for the tests. Hasan Askari Rizvi sites a number of reasons for Pakistan’s ultimate 
decision to conduct nuclear tests.280 
 
The major factors that shaped Pakistan’s decision included the reluctance of the 
Western powers to impose tough sanctions against India; non-availability of 
credible security guarantees to Pakistan; Pakistani perception that the U.S. 
administration would not be able to deliver an attractive package of economic 
assistance and military sales; the hawkish and anti-Pakistan statements of 
India’s Union ministers and the senior members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata 
Party, creating the impression in Pakistan that India might use its nuclear status 
to extend its military reach beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir; and the 
growing domestic pressure for testing in order to restore “strategic balance” in 
South Asia.281 
 
Many of these motivations were communicated by the prime minister to the Pakistani public 
in a televised address on May 28, 1998. Primarily, Nawaz Sharif stated that the nuclear tests 
were an ‘inevitable’ defence measure taken to protect Pakistan’s national security from 
Indian aggression in the region. He further justified his decision by stating that he had wide 
support from the people of Pakistan. He also stated that he had the support of the ‘great 
sons of the nation’, the military. Sharif went on to criticise ‘global powers’ for failing to exert 
pressure on India to halt its nuclear program. He also criticised Indian leaders for their 
‘provocative statements’ following the nuclear tests.282  
 
The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in this period were widely condemned 
by the international community. The United Nations Security Council criticised the actions 
of both nations. The Security Council regarded the nuclear tests as a grave threat to 
international peace and security, and requested that India and Pakistan refrain from 
conducting any further tests.283 The United States went even further by imposing military and 
economic sanctions on Pakistan. These sanctions came at a time when Pakistan could ill 
afford to be isolated, diplomatically or economically, from the international community. 
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Nevertheless, the prime minister’s determination for Pakistan to rival India’s nuclear 
capability is reflected in his call for national austerity and sacrifice in the face of these 
sanctions. 
 
Let us brace ourselves and if the need arises be ready to even go hungry. We 
have to change our lives in revolutionary style. Sanctions will be imposed. Hard 
and difficult times will come. Hardships will increase. But if you keep your 
morale high and accept the challenge boldly, there is no reason that we will not 
be successful in this test. This is a chance to show your capabilities.284 
 
The following year, Pakistan came under further criticism from the international community 
for its role in the Kargil conflict. It is generally understood that, early in 1999, General 
Musharraf gave the final order for Pakistani forces to cross the Line of Control (LOC) into 
Indian-administered Kashmir where the army, together with Kashmiri militants, clashed 
with Indian troops. The Indian army suffered heavy losses, and tens of thousands of people 
were displaced during the three-month conflict. Pakistan repeatedly denied that its forces 
were conducting operations in Indian territory, claiming instead that the forces were pro-
Kashmiri liberation groups. Under increasing pressure from President Bill Clinton, India 
and Pakistan held a series of talks in an attempt to ease tensions in the region between the 
two nuclear powers. The conflict officially ended in July 1999, with both sides claiming 
victory.285 
 
Militarily, the operation was considered a success by Pakistan. Its army made significant 
strategic territorial gains in the Kargil Heights. Politically, however, the operation was a 
failure. Three months prior to the conflict, the prime minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, 
and the prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif met in Lahore to sign a bilateral treaty. 
The Lahore Declaration aimed at building peace, stability, progress, and prosperity in the 
region. The treaty between the two long-term nuclear rivals was well received in South Asia 
and internationally. However some religio-political parties in Pakistan, namely the Jamaat-e-
Islami (JI) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F), were highly critical of the 
treaty, claiming Sharif had betrayed Muslims in Pakistan and in Kashmir. The hostilities 
between India and Pakistan during the Kargil conflict stalled the Lahore treaty. 
Economically, the military expenditure for the Kargil conflict further weakened the already 
frail economy.286 
 
The on-going dispute over Kashmir has profoundly influenced foreign policy and public 
sentiment in Pakistan. 
 
The failure to acquire Kashmir has been consistently represented to the 
Pakistani populace as an enduring hindrance to the consummation of the 
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Pakistani state and by extension its national ethos. Pakistanis have been fed a 
stead diet of “regaining Kashmir”.287 
 
Many people in Pakistan expected a military victory in the struggle for the liberation of 
Kashmir, and were disappointed when Prime Minister Sharif decided to withdraw Pakistani 
forces upon the request of President Clinton. Consequently, anti-government and anti-US 
protest marches were held in major cities in Pakistan, including Lahore and Karachi, calling 
for the government to hold fresh elections.  
 
Most critically for the Sharif government, the Kargil debacle served to alienate elements in 
the Pakistan army, who were already wary of increasing government interference in what 
they considered to be strictly military affairs. General Musharraf, in particular, was not 
pleased to have been named by Sharif as the instigator of the conflict, stating that ‘it was not 
credible for a prime minister to claim that something like Kargil could happen without his 
knowledge’.288 It is not entirely clear whether Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was aware of the 
operation, either fully or in part. However, Iftikhar Malik writes that ‘Sharif denied any 
Pakistani participation even as Kashmiri militants were holding funeral processions in 
Pakistani cities and basked in the glory of the initial Indian defeats with their Pakistani 
supporters’.289 
 
Having ended what he called a ‘dreadful decade of sham democracy’, General Musharraf 
began the task of ‘putting the system right’.290 On October 17, 1999, Musharraf announced the 
strategy he planned to implement as leader of Pakistan. In that national address, Musharraf 
said his first thought was that Pakistan ‘must avoid another period of martial law’ because 
martial law is harmful to civilian and military institutions.291 His intention was that Pakistan 
continue to be a constitutional state but that the constitution, which he believed had been 
damaged by former leaders, should be amended. Subsequently, Musharraf placed the 
constitution in abeyance and suspended the national assembly, all provincial assemblies, 
and the senate. He removed the prime minister, all federal and state ministers, secretaries, 
governors, chief and provincial ministers, and their advisors from office. The judiciary was 
permitted to function, provided it refrain from challenging his authority as chief executive 
and head of government. General Musharraf then went about installing a transitional 
government. He announced the continuation of Rafique Tarar as president, the formation of 
a six-member National Security Council, and the appointment of a cabinet of ministers that 
would work under the guidance of the council.292  
 
The political philosophy of General Musharraf is clearly outlined in his October 17, 1999, 
address to the nation. In it, he revealed a seven-point program designed to rebuild national 
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confidence and morale, strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony, and 
restore national cohesion. He promised to revive the economy and restore investor 
confidence, ensure extensive accountability, depoliticise state institutions, devolve political 
power to local government, uphold press freedom, and guide Pakistan toward what he 
called ‘true’ democracy.293 Demonstrably, Musharraf’s main political focus during the early 
phase of his leadership was on working towards national cohesion, socio-economic 
development, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. These policy objectives appear 
frequently throughout his speeches and constitute the major leitmotifs of his rule. 
  
Despite the commitment to devolve political power to local government, prevent corruption, 
revive the economy, and work towards ‘true’ democracy, Pakistan was formally suspended 
from the Commonwealth of Nations. At a special meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG), held in London on October 18, 1999, it 
was decided that the military coup constituted a serious breach of its central political 
principles.294 The group called for the Musharraf military administration to set a deadline for 
the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, and to ensure the safety of the former prime 
minister and all government detainees. At the same time, the United States prohibited all 
economic and military assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 
508).295 
3.2.2 The crisis of 9/11:  Pakistan joins the ‘war on terror’ 
 
The second historical turning point or rupture occurred on September 11, 2001. On that day, 
the United States experienced four coordinated terror attacks. Two planes were flown into 
the World Trade Centre in New York, one was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington County, 
Virginia, and a fourth crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. That event triggered a series 
of responses, not only from the United States, but also from many countries around the 
world including Pakistan, aimed at countering terrorism. President Musharraf later 
described that September day as: 
 
an uneventful day in Pakistan, at least while the sun was high. Little did I know 
that on the other side of the globe [an event] was about to alter the course of my 
life, and the course of Pakistan. Little did I know that we were about to be 
thrust into the front line of yet another war, a war against shadows.296  
 
The following day, President Musharraf made an official statement condemning the attacks 
as a ‘barbaric act of terrorism, which will live in memory as a most heinous crime against 
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humanity’.297 Musharraf concluded by assuring President George W. Bush of his ’unstinted 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism’.298 The presidential statement was reinforced in a 
letter sent to the UN General Assembly Security Council from the Permanent Representative 
of Pakistan, Shamshad Ahmad.299 Despite Pakistan’s initial assurances to the United States, 
the official decision to join the US-led coalition against terrorism was made on September 14, 
following a meeting with the military hierarchy. President Musharraf met with several army 
corps commanders and senior staff officers, as well as representatives from the Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) agencies, in order to discuss the list of 
demands put forward by the US State Department.300  
  
For the military leadership, the most compelling reason for joining the US-led coalition 
against terrorism was that Pakistan could not risk having the United States as an adversary. 
In his memoirs, President Musharraf recounted that he had received a phone call from US 
Secretary of State Colin Power, the day after 9/11, who told him ‘you are either with us or 
against us’.301 According to Musharraf, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage went 
even further, purportedly telling the director general of Inter Services Intelligence that if 
Pakistan chose to side with the terrorists then it should ‘be prepared to be bombed back to 
the Stone Age’.302 Musharraf professed that he initially ‘war-gamed’ whether Pakistan was 
able to resist US pressure. Ultimately, however, he decided that Pakistan was too weak 
militarily, economically, and socially to risk having the United States as an adversary. 
Fundamentally, Pakistan lacked ‘the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into an 
active confrontation’.303 
 
Equally compelling for the military leadership was that Pakistan could not risk Indian 
aggrandisement in the region. After 9/11, the Government of India offered to provide local 
and logistical assistance to support the US-led military campaign against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan. The offer of support from Pakistan’s long-term rival, India, 
undoubtedly influenced President Musharraf’s decision to join the US-led coalition against 
terrorism. In order to justify his decision to the people of Pakistan, Musharraf stressed that 
the decision was made in the national interest. First, he warned that India aimed to use the 
opportunity to harm Pakistan’s sovereignty, economy, strategic assets, and the struggle for 
Kashmir.304 Second, as the below extract demonstrates, Musharraf warned that India aimed to 
have Pakistan declared a terrorist state and, thus, isolated internationally.  
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We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation. Perhaps as critical as the 
events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be 
harmed. Our neighbours […] have promised US all cooperation. They want to 
isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state.305  
 
As Musharraf predicted, the US reaction to the terrorist attacks was swift and resolute. On 
September 20, 2011, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of congress. In the 
televised address, President Bush announced that evidence for the 9/11 attacks pointed to a 
group of ‘loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda’ and its leader Osama 
bin Laden.306 He went on to say that ‘our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not 
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated’.307 Less than three weeks later, the United States and its allies launched a 
military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. 
 
The events of 9/11, and the subsequent attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 
dramatically altered Pakistan’s international relations, and amplified its domestic issues. In 
particular, the crisis exposed the poor law and order situation faced by ordinary Pakistan 
citizens as a result of rising militancy, extremism, and religious intolerance and violence. A 
report by the HRCP stated: 
 
The events of September 2001 and the war against terrorism again made the 
gun the pre-eminent instrument of determining human affairs and pushed 
human rights and basic needs lower in the table of priorities, especially in 
countries still struggling to establish democracy and rule of justice.308 
 
The pragmatic decision to support the US-led military campaign against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan helped Pakistan avoid international political isolation and brought it 
back from the threshold of an economic crisis.309 Domestically, however, that decision 
triggered tense opposition within Pakistan. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
forty five per cent of Pakistanis opposed the US-led war against terrorism and thirty six per 
cent felt that the United States failed to consider the interests of Pakistan in its efforts to fight 
terrorism. Conversely, only twenty per cent of Pakistanis supported the US-led war against 
terrorism. In addition, a mere ten per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of the 
United States. The Global Attitudes Project revealed that the deep-rooted feeling of aversion 
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towards the United States had more to do with US foreign policy and US failure to consider 
the interests of other nations in their approach to international issues.310  
 
The widespread antipathy within Pakistan towards the United States had a negative impact 
on the legitimacy of the Musharraf administration, which was already struggling with a 
multitude of domestic challenges. Decades of political and economic instability, coupled 
with the fragile law and order situation, hampered government efforts toward economic and 
social development. After 9/11, the rise in religious extremism and violence in Pakistan 
made the nation increasingly unsafe for its many citizens. It also had an adverse affect on 
local and foreign investment. Musharraf claimed that, after 9/11, he was forced to 
concentrate government efforts on security rather than on restructuring Pakistan, which had 
a significant impact on the government’s capacity to reinvest in much-needed healthcare, 
education, and economic development.311 At the same time, despite its commitment to the 
‘war on terror’, Pakistan experienced rising negative perceptions internationally. The failure 
of government efforts to overcome internal disunity, religious intolerance and violence, 
implement effective governance, and achieve socio-economic growth and development 
exacerbated negative world opinion. Western audiences, amidst media reports of ongoing 
terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, together with the nation’s internal instability and 
dependence on international aid, increasingly viewed Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, 
and regressive. 
 
September 11, 2001, therefore, constituted a significant ‘rupture’ or ‘turning point’ in 
Pakistan’s history. Moreover, it triggered a series of occurrences that aimed to 
fundamentally transform existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan. At 
the same time, it reignited unresolved debates concerning the place of Islam in the state and 
society. What became apparent in the political discourse of President Musharraf from this 
point onward was his attempt to build national cohesion and national identity within a 
heterogeneous Pakistani society in order to rally popular support for non-violent action. He 
did this by appealing to a territorial nationalism in combination with the ethical and peace-
building aspects found within Islam, namely itjihad (independent interpretation) and Sufism. 
Elements of Antonio Gramsci’s cultural hegemony paradigm are particularly evident in this 
strategy.312 For Musharraf, the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was 
central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for 
physical force. He believed this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-
needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and 
prosperous civil society and, in turn, reverse negative world opinion. 
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3.3 Official responses to the new socio-political challenges 
3.3.1 Urging the nation to support the decision to join the ‘war on terror’ 
 
On September 19, 2001, President Musharraf made a national address to the people of 
Pakistan. The main aim of his address was to convince the Pakistani public to support the 
decision for Pakistan to cooperate with the United States in the ‘war on terror’. Musharraf 
began by conveying his deep sympathy to the family members of the Pakistanis who were 
killed in New York on September 11. He then informed the nation what the main US targets 
were, and what types of support the US expected to receive from Pakistan. The main US 
targets were Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban in particular, and 
international terrorism in general. The US expected Pakistan to provide intelligence and 
logistical support, and permit the use of its airspace. To justify Pakistan’s involvement in the 
military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to persuade the 
Pakistani public to support him, Musharraf emphasised three important considerations. 
First, that the United States ‘had the support of the UN Security Council’.313 Second, a ‘UN 
resolution specifies punishment for those committing terrorism’.314 Third, that the resolution 
was ‘supported by all the Islamic countries’.315  
 
If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to once again collaborate 
with its former ally then he had good reason. Historically, US-Pak relations have at times 
been difficult and challenging. Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the United States 
were formed as early as 1947, in the months following Pakistan’s creation as an independent 
nation. The collapse of World War II alliances, rising antagonisms between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, the Cold War threat, the unstable environment in Asia due to 
decolonisation, and the conflict on Pakistan’s borders with India and China all heightened 
the threat to Pakistan’s new-found sovereignty. In that political climate, a number of 
developing nations chose to take a neutral stance, rejecting affiliations with both the US-led 
western coalition and the Soviet-led eastern coalition. US policy, which at the time was to 
contain international communism, was demonstrated in the strategic need to establish 
military bases close to the Soviet Union and China. The Indian subcontinent was, therefore, 
of vital importance to US security interests. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
chose to pursue a policy of non-alignment, which aroused US suspicion and hostility. In 
contrast, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States which, in return, gave the fledgling 
nation much-needed military and economic support. 
  
US-Pak relations deteriorated shortly thereafter when the United States imposed economic 
and military sanctions on Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Relations between the 
two nations deteriorated again when Pakistan’s then-prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
failed to persuade the United States to impose sanctions on India in response to its nuclear 
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tests of 1974. Despite those setbacks, Pakistan worked closely with the US in the 1980s in 
joint military operations in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet 
threat was contained, and Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s 
nuclear activities came under intense US scrutiny. The United States stipulated that Pakistan 
must refrain from developing nuclear weapons in order to receive economic and military 
assistance. At the same time, many in Pakistan believed that the US was an unreliable ally 
owing to its failure to assist in the rehabilitation of post-war Afghanistan. Relations soured 
even further when the US imposed full sanctions in response to the five nuclear tests 
Pakistan carried out in the Balochistan desert in 1998. The following year, US President 
Clinton requested that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif withdraw Pakistani forces from Indian-
administered Kashmir and end the Kargil conflict. It was a move that saw widespread anti-
US and anti-government protest marches in major cities across Pakistan. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf relied on an appeal to the 
ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society in order to convince the public to support the 
decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’. 
 
Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our 
strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause. All four 
will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions 
they must be according to Islam. […] Allah has said that he who has ‘hikmat’ 
has a huge blessing. We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, 
everything else is secondary. […] At this time, we have to be make sure that our 
enemies do not succeed in their designs to harm us. Pakistan is regarded as a 
fort of Islam. If this fort is damaged, Islam will be damaged. […] May Allah 
guide and protect us. Pakistan Zindabad!316 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf privileged two ultimate moral forces within 
Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The first and 
foremost moral force for Musharraf, however, was nationalism. In this address, Musharraf 
repeatedly appealed to a national consciousness in order to legitimise his exhortations. This 
is demonstrated in statements such as: ‘our critical concerns are our sovereignty’, ‘Pakistan 
comes first, everything else is secondary’, and ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ (long live Pakistan). The 
second moral force emphasised by President Musharraf in this national address was 
religion. Statements such as: ‘when we make these decisions they must be according to 
Islam’, ‘Allah has said that he who has ‘hikmat’ [wisdom] has a huge blessing’, and ‘may 
Allah guide and protect us’ reveal that Musharraf was also appealing to a shared religious 
consciousness to give authority to his political exhortations. For even greater emphasis, 
Musharraf relied upon the combined moral forces of nationalism and religion. This is 
apparent in his statement: ‘Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is damaged, 
Islam will be damaged’.  
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In Pakistan, nationalism and religion are undeniably the most dominant moral forces within 
society. This is perhaps unsurprising in a nation that was created in 1947 to safeguard the 
political, economic, and cultural interests of South Asian Muslims. The reliance on the moral 
forces of nationalism and religion, separately and in combination, reveal President 
Musharraf to be a nationalist in the tradition of twentieth-century Pakistani nationalist 
leaders such as Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. As 
discussed previously, in order to rally popular support for the Pakistan Movement its 
secular nationalist leaders based their claims for a territorial Muslim homeland (Pakistan) on 
a shared Muslim identity (Islam). For Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan would be established 
on the basis of: one nation (Pakistan), one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu).317 
During his political tenure, Musharraf made frequent references to these leaders. Like the 
nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf relied upon religion in his political discourse to 
strengthen and legitimise his exhortations. Similarly, Musharraf also chose to privilege a 
monolithic homogeneous Islam as Pakistan’s national identity. For the most part he, too, 
ignored the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological differences that exist 
amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. At this critical juncture, President Musharraf needed 
popular political support for the largely unpopular decision to support the United States in 
the ‘war on terror’. His reliance on the ultimate moral forces of ‘Pakistan’ and a monolithic 
‘Islam’ were intended to help him achieve this aim. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf attempted to establish a 
link between the popular historical consciousness and the contemporary crisis in Pakistan in 
order to convince the public to support the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition 
in the ‘war on terror’. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant historical narratives 
President Musharraf invoked in this address to justify the unpopular decision. 
 
We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation. Perhaps as critical as the 
events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be 
harmed.318 
 
In the first extract, above, President Musharraf attempted to link the popular historical 
consciousness surrounding the events of 1971 to the crisis faced by Pakistan after 9/11. The 
short-lived but violent Indo-Pak war of 1971 came in the wake of increasing calls from the 
political leadership of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) for political independence from West 
Pakistan (now Pakistan). Crucially, the subsequent military defeat of West Pakistan marked 
the partial failure of the two-nation theory. As discussed in Chapter Two, this theory was 
first put forward by Syed Ahmed Khan in the nineteenth century and was the concept upon 
which Pakistan owes its existence. The two-nation theory was based on the assertion that 
South Asian Muslims constituted a nation, distinct and separate from the Hindus, with their 
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own traditions, history, culture, and social organisation. This theory gradually crystallised 
into a demand for a separate Muslim nation within the wider anti-colonial Quit India 
campaign, and was translated into a political reality in 1947 with the creation of East and 
West Pakistan.  
 
The success of the Pakistan Movement can primarily be attributed to the ability of nationalist 
leaders to effectively appeal to the ultimate moral forces in society: the idea of the nation 
(Pakistan) and religion (Islam). However, nationalist leaders failed to reconcile the 
monolithic homogeneous identity they privileged (Pakistan/Islam/Urdu) with the rich 
diversity of South Asian Muslims and their corresponding multiple identity associations. 
This served to undermine the founding ideology of Pakistan as a homeland for all South 
Asian Muslims and as a model Muslim political nation. Two factors demonstrate this. First, 
rather than join their co-religionists in their newly established ideological homeland in 1947, 
many Muslims chose to remain in a predominantly Hindu India. Second, a mere two 
decades after independence, the Muslims of East Pakistan eventually chose to separate from 
their co-religionists in West Pakistan. Moreover, the resultant creation of Bangladesh was 
based on the privileging of specifically regional political, economic, and cultural interests, 
including the Bengali language and regional cultural traditions, over a monolithic religious 
identity (Islam). The events of 1971, therefore, form an essential part of the popular historical 
consciousness of Pakistani society. 
 
We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is 
secondary. Some ‘ulema’ are trying to react on pure emotions. I want to remind 
them of Islam’s early history. The move from Mecca to Medina (hijrat). Was this 
(God forbid) cowardice? This was wisdom to save Islam. Then when the Jews 
saw that Islam was getting stronger they started to conspire against the 
Muslims. When the Prophet (PBUH) saw this happening he signed a no war 
pact with his enemies in Mecca. I want to remind you of that pact. At the end of 
the pact, where his signature was required, the Meccans demanded that he 
cannot sign it as “Prophet Mohammed”. The Prophet (PBUH) agreed. The 
Prophet explained later that its best for Islam, and it’s the right thing to do. And 
time proved him right. Six months later there was a war with the Jews and the 
Meccans did not support the Jews and the Muslim forces won.319 
 
In the second extract, above, President Musharraf attempted to link an important juncture in 
the history of Islam to the contemporary crisis in order to justify the decision for Pakistan to 
support the United States in the ‘war on terror’. In 622 AD, the Prophet Muhammad and his 
devotees migrated from the holy city of Mecca to Medina (City of the Prophet) to escape the 
religious persecution of the Meccans and to mediate between the warring Arab and Jewish 
tribes. This migration is known as the hijrah and it marks the beginning of the Muslim era in 
history. For the next thirty-nine years, Medina was the capital of the Islamic empire. Shortly 
after the hijrah, the Prophet Muhammad established the Medina Charter, or the Constitution 
of Medina, which was an agreement between all of the tribes and religious groups of 
Medina. The Charter was intended to solve the problem of social and political disunity in 
the region. It set out the fundamental principles upon which the region should be governed, 
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including methods for peaceful dispute resolution, the idea of an ummah, and the rights of 
non-Muslims. The Charter is considered to be the ultimate model for an ideal Muslim state.320 
Six years after the hijrah, the Treaty of Hudaybiyah was formally ratified between the 
Prophet Muhammad (and the Muslims of Medina) and the Quraysh tribe of Mecca. The 
treaty signalled a ten-year suspension of hostilities between the rivals, and allowed 
Muhammad and his followers unhindered access to the holy Kabah in Mecca. According to 
Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, the ‘forging of a mutually beneficial peace agreement with an 
enemy in the midst of an intense battle for power and territory is often upheld as an example 
of the Prophet 's enduring patience, foresight, and ability to compromise’.321 
 
To illustrate to the people of Pakistan why they should support the decision for Pakistan to 
join the ‘war on terror’, President Musharraf chose to draw upon the popular perceptions 
within Pakistani society of a shared Islamic history. Paradoxically, it was a history that had 
its roots in a region situated firmly outside the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, whilst Pakistan was founded as a territorial homeland for South Asian 
Muslims, it also shares a historical and ideological consciousness with the wider Muslim 
ummah. Moreover, Pakistan was originally intended to be the model of an ideal Muslim 
state. Although this was challenged in 1971 when Pakistan’s east wing succeeded and 
became Bangladesh. Interestingly, President Musharraf attempted to link the early historical 
narrative, of the Prophet Muhammad’s migration to Medina in 622, and the Treaty of 
Hudaybiyah to find a solution to its socio-political crisis, to Pakistan’s own situation in the 
wake of 9/11. The Medina Charter resolved the crisis in Medina by setting out the 
fundamental principles upon which the region should be governed, including methods for 
peaceful dispute resolution, the idea of an ummah, and the rights of non-Muslims. Whilst the 
Treaty of Hudaybiyah enabled the Prophet Muhammad, and his Muslim followers, to make 
the pilgrimage to Mecca unimpeded. In making this link, President Musharraf was inferring 
that the political elite of post-9/11 Pakistan faced similar socio-political challenges. By 
drawing on the combined moral forces of nationalism and Islam, the message was that the 
decision for Pakistan to cooperate with the United States was taken to save Pakistan and, 
ultimately, to save Islam. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf attempted to construct a 
negative ‘Other’ in order to convince the public to support the decision for Pakistan to join 
the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’.  
 
Lets look at our neighbors. They have promised US all cooperation. They want 
to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state. They have met in Dushanbe with 
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some other countries and plan to try and install anti Pakistani government in 
Afghanistan. So our neighbour is busy trying to harm us. If you see their 
television they are busy with propaganda against us.322 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of elements to construct 
a negative ‘Other’. As discussed previously, the first and foremost moral force for Musharraf 
was nationalism. His construction of a negative ‘Other’, therefore, relied primarily on an 
appeal to nationalist sentiment. In the following examples, the negative ‘Other’ was 
presented to the public as such because it posed a danger to Pakistan: ‘They want to isolate 
us, get us declared a terrorist state’, ‘[They] are busy trying to harm us’. The ‘Pakistan in 
danger’ slogan is a familiar strategy and the message is clear: if Pakistan does not cooperate 
with the United States in the ‘war on terror’ it will be declared a ‘terrorist state’. This was an 
outcome that the nation could ill afford. At best, Pakistan would, once again, be isolated 
from the international community and subject to military and economic sanctions. This, in 
turn, would adversely impact Pakistan’s economy and, more importantly for the Pakistani 
administration, its foreign policy, which had for the most part been driven by strategic 
considerations with regards to India. At worst, Pakistan would be plunged into an 
unwinnable war against the United States. 
 
Significantly, the negative ‘Other’ was not referred to directly in this extract. Instead, 
President Musharraf made an appeal to the nation’s shared historical consciousness to 
reinforce his meaning. Indo-Pak relations had been less than favourable since the partition of 
the subcontinent in 1947. In fact, the memory and trauma of partition is an extremely 
important part of the shared historical consciousness of both nations. Moreover, subsequent 
and frequent disputes between Pakistan and India since their separation into two nations 
had done little to reverse their mutual suspicion and hostility. Therefore, owing to the long 
history of animosity between the two nations, it was enough for President Musharraf to 
simply direct the public’s attention to ‘our neighbors [who have] promised US all 
cooperation’. When the Government of India offered to provide the United States with full 
support in the ‘war on terror’, it roused very real fears from within the Pakistani 
administration. Those fears undoubtedly prompted Musharraf to join the US-led anti-
terrorism coalition, and were relied upon by him to construct a negative ‘Other’ in order to 
justify that unpopular decision. 
 
To reinforce his message, President Musharraf stated: ‘They have met in Dushanbe with 
some other countries and plan to try and install anti Pakistan government in Afghanistan’.323 
Musharraf was referring to a meeting held in Dushanbe, the capital of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, in the wake of 9/11. Like Pakistan, Tajikistan had agreed to join the US-led 
coalition in the ‘war on terror’. Strategically positioned on Afghanistan’s northern border, 
the former Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic granted the United States access to its airspace 
from which the US could launch its offensive against the Afghan Taliban. The India-led 
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meeting in Dushanbe was attended by an initiative comprising of representatives from 
India, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Afghan Northern Alliance.324 The alliance, 
between Pakistan’s long-term rival, India, and the India-backed Afghan Northern Alliance, 
was seen by the Pakistani administration as posing a grave threat to their strategic 
considerations. 
 
In the late nineteenth century, the British put in place a 2,500 km-long border to separate 
British India from Afghanistan. This border, known as the Durand Line, separates Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. Both of these nations are home to large numbers of ethnic Pashtun or 
Pathan tribespeople. Conservative figures, owing to the political sensitivity of enumerating 
ethnicity in the region, have placed the Pashtun population of Pakistan at approximately 
fifteen per cent and the Pashtun population of Afghanistan at forty-two per cent.325 While the 
Durand Line officially separates the Pashtun community, the border is largely porous. 
According to historian Anatol Lieven, the Pashtun community forms a strong and, for the 
most part, united ‘ethno-linguistic group with a very strong consciousness of common 
ethnic culture and identity […] with an ancient ethnic code of behaviour (the pashtunwali)’.326 
A large number of Pashtun tribesmen were trained in Sunni Deobandi madaris located in the 
Afghan-Pak border areas. Many joined the US-led anti-Soviet movement in the 1980s, with 
the support of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Moreover, Pashtun tribesmen formed the 
original base of the Taliban movement, which emerged as a political force in Afghanistan in 
the mid-1990s. In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s main rival was the US- and India-backed 
Northern Alliance, which comprised of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara Shi’a Muslims. 
 
As discussed previously, the majority of Muslims adhere to the Sufi-inspired Barelvi 
tradition in Pakistan. It might safely be said, therefore, that they do not necessarily share the 
religio-political ideologies of the Afghan Taliban. What many Pakistanis do share is a strong 
ethnic kinship with their Pashtun brothers in Afghanistan. This is demonstrated by 
Pakistan’s foreign policy which, prior to 9/11, took into consideration the interests of its 
large ethnic Pashtun community with regards to Afghanistan. Pakistan favoured a friendly 
Taliban ally on its western border, as a counter to a largely unfriendly neighbour on its 
eastern border. After 9/11, however, Pakistan was compelled to withdraw its support for the 
Afghan Taliban. What is clear in the above extract is President Musharraf’s attempt to 
construct a negative ‘Other’, in the form of India and its ally the Afghan Northern Alliance, 
based on the inference that both posed a danger to Pakistan. This, in turn, was relied upon to 
further justify to the nation the unpopular decision to join the US-led ‘war on terror’ against 
Pakistan’s former allies, the Afghan Taliban. 
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3.3.2 Persuading the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism 
 
After 9/11, President Musharraf was compelled to make significant domestic reforms. On 
January 12, 2002, four months after the terrorist attacks on the United States, President 
Musharraf made a national address to the people of Pakistan. The purpose of the address 
was two-fold. First, Musharraf introduced the proposed Deeni Madaris (Voluntary 
Registration and Regulation) Ordinance (2002). Second, he announced a ban on five 
extremist organisations: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP), and Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad 
(TNSM). He placed a sixth organisation, Sunni Tehreek (ST), on a watch list. By way of 
justification, President Musharraf told the nation that the measures were necessary to ‘rid 
the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and […] to project Islam in its true 
perspective’.327  
 
If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to support these two 
policies then he had good reason. First, the Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002) was contentious 
because it endorsed government reform of religious seminaries, which have long been 
important centres of social welfare in Pakistan. Madaris provide free education and 
accommodation for Pakistan’s poorest children, particularly in the tribal areas where state-
funded educational institutions are few in number. While President Musharraf recognised 
the important service these self-funded institutions provided, he argued that many 
graduates were entering society ill-equipped to compete successfully in the employment 
sector. Musharraf believed this was partly due to the lack of provision for mainstream 
subjects such as mathematics, science, and English. He noted that many madaris were funded 
by religious parties or groups and provided only religious education. Controversially, 
Musharraf said that such madaris ‘produce only semi-literate religious scholars’.328 Moreover, 
he also said that some madaris ‘promote negative thinking and propagate hatred and 
violence instead of inculcating tolerance, patience and fraternity’.329 As previously discussed, 
many of the Afghan mujahedeen, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani cadres who fought 
alongside them, were trained in Deobandi madaris in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. 
 
Second, the decision to ban five extremist organisations, and place a sixth on a watch list, 
was also contentious in Pakistan. Two of the banned organisations were pro-Kashmiri 
liberation groups: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). While it might 
safely be said that Musharraf did not share the religio-political ideologies of these groups he 
did, however, share their ideology with regards to Kashmir. For many Pakistanis, Kashmir 
has long been an essential part of the national historical consciousness. As discussed 
previously, Pakistan was carved out of the Muslim-majority areas in the east and west of the 
subcontinent. In 1947, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, wavered in his 
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decision to join the Indian Union or the Dominion of Pakistan, finally deciding on India. For 
India, Kashmir’s accession to the Union represented the success of its secular, non-
communal ideology. For Pakistan, because Kashmir was an integral part of its own national 
identity, its accession to India represented the partial failure of the two-nation theory. 
Kashmir Solidarity Day is an annual national holiday in Pakistan. On that day, Pakistan 
shows its solidarity and support for Muslims in Indian-administered Kashmir and what is 
regarded as their legitimate and principled struggle for self-determination. Prior to 9/11, 
Pakistan provided militant groups with moral, political, and diplomatic support in the 
struggle to liberate Kashmir from Indian control. The decision to ban these two extremist 
organisations after 9/11 marked a reversal of previous policy and left President Musharraf 
vulnerable to criticism that he was placing Pakistan’s foreign policy above the nation’s 
domestic interests. 
 
To contextualise the January 12, 2002, national address, the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, 
and anti-terrorism measures introduced by President Musharraf came not only in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania but also followed 
other events that occurred outside Pakistan in the months after 9/11. On September 28, 2001, 
the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which endorsed 
the enforcement of strict anti-terrorism policies.330 On October 1, a car bomb was exploded at 
the main gate of the State Assembly building in Srinagar, the capital of Indian-administered 
Kashmir. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) claimed 
responsibility for the attack in which three of their members were killed.331 On December 13, 
the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi was attacked by a group of armed militants. 
The Indian government blamed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) for the 
attack. The Government of Pakistan denounced the attack, denying any involvement. 
Shortly after the attack on the Indian Parliament, the Indian and Pakistani governments 
assembled troops on either side of the Line of Control in Kashmir, reigniting old tensions 
between the two nuclear-capable rivals. These events served to undermine the legitimacy of 
President Musharraf and Pakistan in the international arena. Pakistan was viewed as 
responsible for acts of violence committed by Pakistan-based militants on its western border 
in Afghanistan, and on its eastern border in India, and was widely considered a capricious 
ally in the ‘war on terror’. 
 
Domestically, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and authority. 
He was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, 
undemocratic government. Musharraf was also widely criticised for capitulating to US 
pressure by aligning Pakistan with the US in the ‘war on terror’ being carried out in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban. This decision was opposed by many in Pakistan who 
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considered the Afghan Taliban to be ‘engaged in a legitimate war of resistance against 
foreign occupation’.332 In addition, and under further pressure from the US and India, 
Musharraf’s decision to ban two militant pro-Kashmiri liberation groups was opposed by 
many in Pakistan who considered their cause to be both legitimate and principled, including 
Musharraf himself. Within this context, the main aim of the January 12, 2002, national 
address was to convince the Pakistani public, en masse, to support the domestic anti-
extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures. However, this national address had 
a second audience. Under increased international scrutiny, particularly from the United 
States and India, President Musharraf would not have been unaware that his national 
address offered a forum in which to convince the global community that Pakistan was 
committed to the ‘war on terror’. If he were successful in his exhortations, Musharraf would 
avoid damaging sanctions by the US and a war with India. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf relied upon a combination 
of strategies in order to convince the largely averse Pakistani public to support the proposed 
Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002), and the ban on extremist organisations. First, President 
Musharraf appealed to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistan society: the idea of the 
nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The first and foremost moral force Musharraf chose to 
promote was nationalism. 
 
We must remember that we are Pakistanis. Pakistan is our identity, our 
motherland. We be aliens outside Pakistan and be treated as aliens. Pakistan is 
our land. It is our soil, If we forsake it we will face difficulties. This lesson we 
must learn.333 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf appealed to a shared national consciousness in 
order to persuade the nation to support the controversial policies. Like the twentieth-century 
nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf privileged a territorial nationalism over cultural or 
religious nationalism, and citizenship over communalism. This is clear in the statements: 
‘We are Pakistanis’, ‘Pakistan is our identity, our motherland’, ‘We be aliens outside 
Pakistan’, and ‘Pakistan is our land. It is our soil’. 
 
The objective was to take them [Ulema and Mashaikh] on board in our 
campaign against terrorism and extremism. These measures have been 
continuing since our government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all 
this to you in great detail only because of the fact that the campaign against 
extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning is in our own national 
interest. We are not this under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are 
conscious that it is in our national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid 
our society of extremism and this is being done right from the beginning. 
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This domestic reforms process was underway when a terrorist attack took place 
against the United States on the 11th of September. This terrorist act led to 
momentous changes all over, the world. We decided to join the international 
coalition against terrorism and in this regard I have already spoken to you on a 
number of occasions. We took this decision on principles and in our national 
interest. By the grace of God Almighty our decision was absolutely correct. Our 
intentions were noble and God Almighty helped us. I am happy to say that the 
vast majority of Pakistanis stood by this decision and supported us. I am proud 
of the realistic decision of our nation.334 
 
Similarly, in the above extract, the appeal to a shared national consciousness is clear in 
statements such as: ‘the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very 
beginning is in our own national interest’, ‘we are conscious that it is in our national 
interest’, and ‘we took this decision on principles and in our national interest’. In both 
extracts, President Musharraf relied upon the use of the pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’, and ‘our’ in 
order to construct national unity and identity. Because the ideological construction of nation, 
and of national identity, always coincides with the construction of difference, Musharraf 
employed a divisive strategy. President Musharraf and his supporters (we-group or in-
group) were portrayed as acting in the national interest, whereas his opponents or rivals 
(they-group or out-group) were portrayed as acting against the national interest. 
 
At the same time, President Musharraf appealed to a shared religious consciousness in order 
to give authority to his political exhortations. In the above extract, statements such as: ‘I 
begin in the name of God, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful’, ‘My brothers and sisters, 
Pakistan is an Islamic Republic’, ‘By the grace of God Almighty’, ‘God Almighty helped us’, 
‘Pakistan is the citadel of Islam’, ‘May God guide us to act upon the true teachings of Faith 
and Islam’ are examples of this type of discursive strategy. As seen, pre- and post-
independence political leaders in Pakistan frequently relied upon religion in order to rally 
popular support. Like the nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf privileged a monolithic 
homogeneous Islam persuade the nation to support the controversial policies. For the most 
part, he ignored the heterogeneous differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. 
3.3.3 Rallying the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift 
 
In the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, what is apparent in this period are 
the early attempts of President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a 
unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially 
and economically. As discussed, for Musharraf the formation of a coherent and cohesive 
national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony 
without the need for physical force. He envisaged this would enable the government to 
focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then 
result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. His aim was for Pakistan to become ‘a 
progressive and dynamic Islamic Welfare State’.335 Musharraf believed that socio-economic 
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political strategy would help Pakistan avoid damaging sanctions by the US, a war with 
India, and reverse negative world opinion. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
As discussed above, in his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf relied 
on an appeal to a shared religious consciousness based on a monolithic Islam in order to 
convince the Pakistani public to support the proposed Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002) and 
the ban on extremist organisations. At the same time, Musharraf also made a specific appeal 
to the moral and peace-building aspects found within Islam in order to rally the nation to 
non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. This was a new and salient feature of his 
political discourse from this point onward. Throughout his national address, President 
Musharraf reiterated that the people of Pakistan, and Pakistan itself, personified a number of 
essential values found within Islam, namely: ‘love’, ‘tolerance’, ‘universal brotherhood’, and 
‘peace’. These themes are not unfamiliar to Sufi philosophy. With its message of 
philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism has often been interpreted as being 
inclusive, moderate, peaceful, and tolerant.  
 
In Pakistan, the majority of Muslims belong to the Sufi-inspired Barelvi tradition. For Barelvi 
Muslims, love or devotion for the Prophet Muhammad is a particularly important theme. A 
devotee of the Prophet Muhammad is often referred to as an ashiq-e-rasul or a lover of the 
Prophet. Barelvi Muslims celebrate the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (Eid Milad un-Nabi). 
That day is an important public holiday in Pakistan, where people gather to recite naat or 
Sufi devotional poetry in veneration of the Prophet. Naat is also recited at urs celebrations to 
mark the death anniversaries of Sufi saints. Devotees of the Barelvi tradition believe that 
they are following ‘true’ Islam as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God and practiced 
by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi saints. In the below extract, President Musharraf 
repeatedly relied on the moral force of ‘true’ Islam in order to appeal to the shared religious 
consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. 
 
I […] strived to project Islam in its true perspective. […] I expect them [Ulama] 
to come forward and present Islam in its true light. […] It is imperative we 
teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity 
and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. […] May God guide us to act upon 
the true teachings of Faith and Islam.336 
 
As well as love for the Prophet Muhammad, and love for God (Ishq-e-Haqiqi), love of 
humanity (Ishq-e-Majazi) is another central aspect of the Barelvi tradition. As Mahmood 
Jamal puts it: 
 
Since God is unseen and formless, most humans need to find him through his 
creation and through human love. In loving another human being one 
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discovers the all-consuming power of love, while the astonishing beauty of the 
Beloved reduces the lover to a state of helpless abandon.337 
 
Sufi poet-saints proclaimed their love of God, the Prophet Muhammad, and humanity as 
they disseminated the message of Islam to the people of the Indian subcontinent. To this 
day, Sufi saints are themselves beloved and revered by Barelvi Muslims throughout the 
subcontinent. When President Musharraf spoke of love of humanity as one of the essential 
values and peace-building aspects found within Islam, he was again appealing to the shared 
religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. The extract below 
provides one example of the way in which Musharraf relied upon the themes of ‘love’ and 
‘tolerance’, in combination with an emphasis on ‘true Islam’, in order to rally the nation to 
non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. 
 
We must rid the society of sectarian hatred and terrorism, and promote mutual 
love. […] It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, 
compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. 
[…] If we want to normalise relations between Pakistan and India and bring 
love to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully. […] 
You must play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of 
lasting peace and love in the region. […] and We should get rid of intolerance 
and hatred and instead promote tolerance and love.338 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf also attempted to establish a 
link between the popular historical consciousness and the contemporary crisis in Pakistan in 
order to justify the domestic reforms, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-
economic uplift. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant historical narratives 
invoked by Musharraf. 
 
When Islam was at its zenith, every discipline of learning, e.g. mathematics, 
science, medicine, astronomy and jurisprudence was taught at these 
institutions. Great Muslim luminaries such Al-Beruni, Ibn-e-Sina (Avesia) and 
Ibn-Khuldoon were the products of the same madaris. And if we study history, 
we see that from the 7th to the 15th century AD, transfer of technology took 
place from the Muslims to the rest of the world. Look at Muslims’ condition 
today. Islam teaches us to seek knowledge, even if it involved travel to China. I 
am sure you are aware that the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) had told 
prisoners of war in the Battle of Badr that they would be set free if each of them 
imparted education to ten Muslims. Quite obviously, this education could not 
have been religious education as the prisoners were non-Muslims. So the 
Prophet (Peace be Upon Him) was actually referring to worldly education. If 
we do not believe in education, are we following the teachings of Islam or 
violating them? 339 
 
In the first extract, above, President Musharraf highlighted an important event in the history 
of Islam. He recalled three prominent Muslim scholars who had received a madaris 
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education but who went on to make important intellectual and academic contributions in 
non-religious fields. Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni (al-Biruni) and Abu Ali 
al-Husayn ibn Abd Allah ibn Sina (Ibn Sina) were both prominent tenth-century Central 
Asian scholars, whilst Ibn Khaldun was a reputed fourteenth-century Tunisian scholar. Each 
of these scholars made valuable contributions in the fields of science, astronomy, 
mathematics, literature, philosophy, history, geography, jurisprudence, and medicine. Al-
Biruni and Ibn Sina were both knowledgeable in theology, particularly Islamic theology, but 
their expertise was not limited to religion. These two scholars lived between the mid-eighth 
and mid-thirteenth centuries, a period widely considered a golden age in Islamic history. 
This era was contemporaneous with the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258), in which many 
Muslim intellectuals made important scholarly contributions in various temporal fields. 
Thus, in order to justify his decision that madaris make provision for secular subjects such as 
mathematics, science, and English, President Musharraf attempted to link the popular 
historical consciousness surrounding the golden age in Islamic knowledge with the crisis 
faced by Pakistan in the sphere of education. 
 
To further justify the controversial decision to regulate madaris, Musharraf highlighted 
another important event in the history of Islam. In 624 AD, two years after the Prophet 
Muhammad and his devotees migrated from the holy city of Mecca to Medina (City of the 
Prophet), Muhammad set out to intercept a Meccan camel train laden with merchandise. At 
the oasis of Badr, Muhammad and his forces converged with Meccan forces that were sent to 
protect the camel train. The ensuing battle, known as the Battle of Badr, is widely considered 
to mark the beginning of the spread of Islam as a political force, a religion, and a culture.340 
The victory at the Battle of Badr has since become entrenched in the historical consciousness 
of Pakistani Muslims. The Kargil conflict of 1999, for example, was code-named ‘Operation 
Badr’.341 What Musharraf chose to emphasise in his re-telling of the Battle of Badr narrative 
was the legend of the non-Muslim prisoners of war who were offered their freedom in 
return for teaching ten Muslims to read and write. By placing importance on the secular 
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, President Musharraf was attempting to justify the 
controversial domestic reforms. 
 
Have we forgotten the example of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) 
where Islam was spread by virtue of his personal conduct, true leadership and 
that is how changes in the world took place at that time. We have forgotten the 
teaching of revered personalities of Islam like Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat 
Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Fareed Ganj Shakar, Baha-uddin-Zakria etc. Was Islam 
spread by them through force and coercion? No. They preached Islam by 
personal example. I give these examples because it hurts me to see where we 
have relegated ourselves now. We must restore that status of Madaris to what it 
originally was. We have to change the state of affairs and take them on the path 
of improvement. 342 
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In the second extract, above, President Musharraf invoked the personal example of the 
Prophet Muhammad in order to persuade the public to support the domestic campaign 
against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. 
Many Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad represents the epitome of ethical and 
spiritual virtue on earth, and his personal example serves as a worldly source of inspiration 
at both a batin and zahir level. The inner and outer aspects of Islam characterise, on the one 
hand, the achievement of a greater awareness of God and, on the other hand, the adherence 
to Islamic legal obligations and norms. As discussed in Chapter One, Sufism is widely 
considered the inner or esoteric aspect of Islam, concerned with matters of the soul and the 
attainment of a more profound understanding of the divine. In Sufism, the Prophet 
Muhammad is regarded as the ultimate source of divine wisdom. Over time, spiritual 
masters have passed this divine wisdom to their disciples through an unbroken chain of 
transmission (silsila). 
 
Also in the above extract, President Musharraf invoked the personal example of four 
prominent Sufi saints to support his call for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. 
Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Hazrat Baba Farid, and Hazrat 
Baha-ud-din Zakariya are all renowned poet-saints. Their shrines, which are located in the 
Punjab and Sindh, attract hundreds of thousands of devotees from across the nation. These 
saints are particularly venerated for their role in disseminating Islam in the subcontinent. As 
discussed in Chapter One, Sufi saints popularised Sufism through Sufi hagiographical texts 
and narratives, Sufi shrines and retreats, and charismatic spiritual leaders and their 
hereditary successors. Sufism also became accessible to a greater number of people through 
popular practices such as remembrance, listening, poetry, and music. Essentially, Sufi saints 
appealed to local communities in ways that the high culture of Islam could not. These 
popular poet-saints, with their poetry written and sung in the local vernacular, were able to 
transcend high Islamic culture and bring Islam to the masses. There is much scholarly 
literature on the moral, peace-building, and integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition in the 
Indian subcontinent. Consequently, Sufism is often considered an important force for 
religious and communal harmony. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf also attempted to construct 
a negative ‘Other’ in order to justify domestic reforms, and rally the nation to non-violent 
action and socio-economic uplift. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant 
narratives used by Musharraf to create a negative ‘Other’ in the minds of the people of 
Pakistan. 
 
These measures [against religious extremism] have been continuing since our 
government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all this to you in great 
detail only because of the fact that the campaign against extremism undertaken 
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by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest. We are not this 
under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are conscious that it is in our 
national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid our society of extremism 
and this is being done right from the beginning.343 
 
In the first extract, above, President Musharraf relied upon an appeal to nationalist 
sentiment. In this narrative, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as negative because it posed 
a distinct threat to Pakistan. This is demonstrated in statements such as: ‘the campaign 
against extremism […] is in our own national interest. […] We are conscious that it is in our 
national interest’. Once again, President Musharraf made repeated use of the pronouns ‘our’, 
‘us’, and ‘we’ to construct national unity and identity. President Musharraf and his 
supporters (in-group) were portrayed as acting in the national interest, whereas his 
opponents or rivals (out-group) were portrayed as acting against the national interest. The 
reliance, too, on the familiar ‘Pakistan in danger’ slogan served to further delineate between 
the in-group and the out-group. At the same time, Musharraf took the opportunity to 
reinforce his own political legitimacy and authority by claiming that the anti-extremism, 
anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures were not new but had been ‘continuing since our 
government assumed office in 1999’. In the face of widespread criticism for capitulating to 
US pressure to join the ‘war on terror’, Musharraf asserted that his policies were taken in the 
‘national interest’ rather than ‘under pressure or advice from anyone’. 
 
Ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the society of 
extremism, violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true 
perspective. In my first speech on October 17, 1999, I had said and I quote: 
“Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood, not enmity, peace 
and not violence. I have a great respect for the Ullema and expect them to come 
forward and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which 
are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our 
faith”.344 
 
In the second extract, above, President Musharraf emphasised the moral force of religion in 
order to give authority to his political exhortations. In this narrative, the negative ‘Other’ 
was presented as negative because it posed a distinct threat to ‘true’ Islam as revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad by God and practiced by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi saints. 
Statements such as: ‘I […] strived to project Islam in its true perspective’, ‘Islam teaches 
tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood, not enmity, peace and not violence’, and ‘I 
have a great respect for the Ullema and expect them to come forward and present Islam in 
its true light’ demonstrate President Musharraf’s attempt to appeal to the moral force of 
religion. In this instance, Musharraf avoided a monolithic Islam. Instead, he placed emphasis 
on the moral and peace-building aspects found within Islam in order to appeal to the shared 
religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. 
 
At the same time, President Musharraf employed a divisive strategy in order to construct a 
negative ‘Other’. As discussed, the ideological construction of nation, and of national 
                                                            
343 Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012). 
344 Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012). 
 
 100 
identity, always coincides with the construction of difference. In this national address, 
President Musharraf and his supporters (in-group) were portrayed as acting in accordance 
with ‘true’ Islam, whereas his opponents (out-group) were portrayed as acting against ‘true’ 
Islam. The latter is demonstrated in the statement: ‘I urge them [ulama] to curb elements 
which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith’. In 
addition, the negative aspects of the out-group were emphasised through the use of 
pejorative words such as ‘extremism’, ‘sectarianism’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘violence’. At the same 
time, the negative aspects of the out-group were contrasted with the positive aspects of the 
in-group. Approbatory words such as ‘tolerance’, ‘universal brotherhood’, ‘peace’, and ‘non-
violence’ were used to emphasise the positive aspects of the in-group. The underlying 
message was that the majority of Pakistanis are tolerant, integrative, non-violent, and 
peaceable. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf made an appeal for 
unification behind the ultimate moral forces by presenting various incentives and rewards. 
The motivating sources Musharraf relied upon were closely tied to the ultimate moral forces 
within Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In his attempt 
to restore ‘national cohesion’, ‘strengthen the federation’, and remove ‘inter-provincial 
disharmony’, Musharraf adopted a hybrid appeal to both temporal and spiritual rewards. 
As discussed previously, in the climate of extremism and violence, Musharraf believed that 
the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment 
of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He envisaged this 
would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic 
development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. His aim 
was for Pakistan to become ‘a progressive and dynamic Islamic Welfare State’.345  
 
Don’t forget that Pakistan is the citadel of Islam and if we want to serve Islam 
well, we will first have to make Pakistan strong and powerful. There is a race 
for progress among all nations. We cannot achieve progress through a policy of 
confrontation and feuds. We can achieve progress through human resource 
development, mental enlightenment, high moral character and technological 
development. I appeal to all my countrymen to rise to the occasion. We should 
get rid of intolerance and hatred and instead promote tolerance and love.346 
 
In the above extract, the construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of 
Pakistan was not only dependent on an economic and political utopian strategy, but was 
also contingent upon the social and moral development of Pakistani society. In this national 
address, President Musharraf used a number of different narratives to encourage the people 
of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, 
and progress socially and economically. 
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The question is what is the correct path? First of all, we must rid the society of 
sectarian hatred and terrorism, and promote mutual love. Remember that 
mindsets cannot be changed through force and coercion. No idea can be 
forcefully asserted on anyone. Maybe the person changes outwardly but minds 
and hearts can never be converted by force. Real change can be brought about 
through personal example, exemplary character and superior intellect. It can be 
brought about by Haqooq-ul-Ibad (Obligation towards fellow beings).347 
 
In the above extract, as in the aforementioned extract, President Musharraf focused on the 
ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam in his appeal to the community for 
unity and peace. The appeal for unity and peace is particularly evident in the question to the 
Pakistani public: ‘what is the correct path’. Significantly, the word ‘path’ is often used in Sufi 
phraseology. As discussed in Chapter One, the Sufi path is the means by which an 
individual can draw nearer to God, or achieve a greater awareness of the divine. The Sufi 
path is generally concerned with an individual’s spiritual growth, which combines correct 
behaviour and correct belief. In the above extract, President Musharraf reasoned that the 
violence and hatred that existed within society could only be reversed through ‘mutual 
love’, ‘personal example’, ‘exemplary character’, and ‘superior intellect’. For Barelvi 
Muslims, these character traits are epitomised in the Prophet Muhammad, who is regarded 
as the embodiment of spiritual and ethical virtue on earth and the ultimate source of divine 
wisdom. Moreover, for Barelvi Muslims, these qualities are also a distinguishing 
characteristic of Sufi saints, many of whom were renowned for their virtuous behaviour, 
knowledge, and their peaceful dissemination of Islam in the Indian subcontinent. Societal 
change, Musharraf argued, would be achieved through huquq al-ibad (obligations towards 
fellow beings). Fundamental to this concept is not only a basic notion of human rights but 
also love for humanity, which is a central aspect of the Barelvi tradition, and which allows 
for cooperation and respect beyond narrow religious or sectarian boundaries.348 
 
I feel that in addition to Haqooq Allah (Obligation to God), we should also 
focus on Haqooq-ul-ibad (Obligations towards fellow human beings). At 
schools, colleges and Madaris, obligations towards fellow human beings should 
be preached. We know that we have totally ignored the importance of correct 
dealings with fellow human beings. There is no room for feuds in Islamic 
teachings. It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, 
compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. 
We must adopt this. We must shun negative thinking.349 
 
Similarly, in the above extract, President Musharraf relied on two dominant narratives as a 
means by which to eliminate exclusivism and discrimination from Pakistani society. In the 
first narrative, President Musharraf reiterated the importance of huquq al-ibad for Pakistani 
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society. This is clear in the statements: ‘we have totally ignored the importance of correct 
dealings with fellow human beings’ and ‘there is no room for feuds in Islamic teachings’. In 
this, Musharraf made an appeal to the community to practice love for humanity in order to 
eliminate exclusivism and discrimination. Again, the emphasis was on building national 
unity by appealing to the moral and peace-building aspects within Islam. However, 
Musharraf was careful not to neglect huquq Allah (obligation to God) in his exhortations. In 
the second narrative, President Musharraf linked the concept of huquq al-ibad with ‘true’ 
Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God, and practiced by the Prophet, 
his companions, Sufi saints, and the majority Barelvi community. This is clear in the 
statement: ‘it is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, 
justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam’.  
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates that, in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, President Musharraf attempted a fundamental transformation of existing social, 
economic, and political conditions in Pakistan. 9/11 proved to be an important turning point 
in Pakistan’s history. Domestically, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in 
political legitimacy and authority. Only two years previously, he had overthrown the 
democratically elected government in what he referred to as a ‘counter-coup’ and appointed 
himself the dual role of chief executive of Pakistan and chief of army staff. As a result, 
Musharraf was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, 
therefore, undemocratic government. At the same time, he was widely criticised for 
capitulating to US pressure by aligning Pakistan with the United States in the ‘war on terror’ 
being carried out in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The events of 9/11, and the subsequent 
attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which saw many of its members taking 
refuge in Pakistan, dramatically amplified the nation’s domestic issues. Moreover, Pakistan’s 
economy was dangerously fragile, with the nation suffering high levels of unemployment, 
poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. Ordinary citizens also faced a deteriorating law 
and order situation as a result of rising militancy, extremism, and religious intolerance and 
violence. 
 
Internationally, Pakistan experienced rising negative perceptions after 9/11. Western 
audiences, amidst media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, 
together with the nation’s internal instability and dependence on international aid, 
increasingly viewed Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, and regressive. The failure of 
government efforts to overcome internal disunity, religious intolerance and violence, 
implement effective governance, and achieve socio-economic growth and development 
exacerbated negative world opinion. At the same time, a number of events served to further 
undermine the legitimacy of President Musharraf and Pakistan in the international arena. 
Pakistan was viewed as responsible for acts of violence committed by Pakistan-based 
militants on its western border, in Afghanistan, and on its eastern border, in India, and was 




The largely unpopular decision to join the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’ was based 
primarily on pragmatic considerations. President Musharraf recognised that Pakistan was 
too weak militarily, economically, and socially to risk having the United States as an 
adversary. In his words, Pakistan lacked ‘the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into 
an active confrontation’.350 Instead, Musharraf attempted to rally popular support for non-
violent action and socio-economic uplift within Pakistan. Musharraf reasoned that the 
formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of 
political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this 
would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed socio-economic 
development, which would result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society and, in turn, 
reverse negative world opinion of Pakistan. The following chapter demonstrates how 
President Musharraf expanded his discourses of peace by appealing to a specific type of 
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4 President Musharraf and the formation of the National 
Council for the Promotion of Sufism, 2005 – 2008  
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how President Musharraf attempted to construct an 
enlightened and moderate identity for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The particular focus of that chapter was to show how, in the climate 
of terrorism and extremism, Musharraf attempted to rally popular support for non-violent 
action and socio-economic uplift. Using a combination of strategies found within the ‘call to 
arms’ genre, rather than persuade people to go to war, Musharraf aimed to encourage the 
people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact 
peaceably, and progress both socially and economically. He did so by appealing to a specific 
type of territorial nationalism in conjunction with a moderate Islam. 
 
This chapter takes a similar approach. It critically analyses the political language of 
President Musharraf, and his supporters, during the latter half of his nine-year political 
tenure. The specific focus of this chapter is to show how Musharraf attempted to redefine 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. Advancing his strategy of 
‘Enlightened Moderation’, President Musharraf increasingly privileged Sufism as the 
ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. His aim was the socio-economic uplift of 
Pakistani citizens, and the creation of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan. 
The increased official preference for Sufism is most clearly demonstrated by the 
establishment of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in the latter half of 2006. 
However, actively resisting the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety were religiously 
conservative Muslims, committed to the primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic system of 
governance in Pakistan. In this period, tensions between groups advocating for an Islamic 
state and groups advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in a number of 
debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in state and society. These, sometimes 
violent, contestations over the role of Islam in the state and society raised doubts as to 
whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf and his 
supporters contended. 
4.2 Historical events, the expansion of discourses of moderation, and oppositional 
discourses 
 
Despite the early attempts of President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to 
form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress 
both socially and economically by appealing to a specific type of nationalism in combination 
with a moderate Islam, a number of events served to undermine his discourses of 
moderation. For the first time in Pakistan’s history a coalition of religious parties, the 
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won the provincial elections in the North West Frontier 
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Province (NWFP) and Balochistan.351 The MMA was able to form a government in the NWFP 
and a coalition government in Balochistan. Despite their considerable theological 
differences, these religious parties were able to unite on an anti-US platform. The MMA 
aimed at implementing a more narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in 
Pakistan. For the HRCP the success of the MMA in the October 2002 elections reflected the 
‘increased orthodoxy’ in the country.352 Paradoxically, the MMA alliance included the JUP; a 
political party largely considered moderate because it represents the interests of the majority 
Barelvi community. Also surprisingly, the Musharraf-led PML-Q joined forces with the 
MMA to form a coalition government in Balochistan. 
 
Six months after the MMA came to power it announced its decision to establish Islamic law 
in the NWFP. The Shari’a Act was tabled in the Provincial Assembly in May 2003 and 
unanimously adopted in June. In December the following year the MMA organised anti-
government rallies in cities across Pakistan to protest against the government’s decision to 
remove the religion column from passports. The MMA argued that, because Pakistan had 
been created in the name of Islam, the decision to remove the religion column was an attack 
on both Islam and Pakistan. Conversely, civil rights groups argued that the religion column 
equated to religious discrimination, and would cause sectarian violence, damage relations 
with neighbouring countries, and spoil Pakistan’s image. This debate continued into 2005 
and became conflated with wider criticism of President Musharraf’s decision to join the US-
led ‘war on terror’, as well as his decision to continue in the role of chief of army staff. 
Conservative religious groups became increasingly anti-US and anti-government in their 
political rhetoric in this period. The controversy surrounding the religion column in 
passports, particularly the tensions between the government and conservative religious 
groups over the issue, raised the question of whether Pakistan really was a moderate 
Muslim nation as President Musharraf contended. 
 
Amidst the renewed controversy surrounding Pakistan’s national identity, with religious 
leaders once again claiming that Pakistan was intended to be an Islamic state, President 
Musharraf intensified his campaign to promote a ‘soft image’ of the beleaguered nation. 
Musharraf was supported in his endeavours by other political actors who reproduced the 
official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens by 
drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. English-language newspapers in Pakistan played a 
very important role in reproducing this new political consciousness and extending it to a 
wider audience.353 In 2005, for example, newspapers began publicising the urs of Sufi saints, 
as well as government participation in ritual ceremonies at Sufi shrines. National news 
                                                            
351 The coalition of religious parties in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) comprised of: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); the 
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352 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2002, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
Lahore, 2003, p. 2. 
353 Data comprised of newspaper articles and editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers 




coverage also included reportage and commentary on various activities and themes 
concerning Sufism. From this point onward, a space was created in which Sufism became an 
important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest 
religious violence, and reconcile religious difference. However, a space was also created in 
which opposing discourses attempted to counter the state-sanctioned discourse concerning 
whose Islam, the place of Islam, and Islam’s role in the state and society. Notably, the PIPS 
in Islamabad reported a gradual rise in the number of attacks on Sufi shrines after 2005.354 The 
increased rise in targeted attacks on Sufi shrines is one physical example of the way in which 
the construction of a Sufi identity, and of who is and who is not a ‘true’ Muslim, was 
contested in Pakistan. 
4.2.1 The religion column in passports controversy 
 
In Pakistan, tensions between proponents of a state-sanctioned moderate Islam and the 
discourse of religious groups, one advocating for a progressive democratic Muslim nation, 
the other in favour of an Islamic state, were revealed in various domestic and international 
debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. In the opening 
months of 2005 the religion column in passports controversy dominated the headlines in the 
Pakistani print media. The debate began in late 2004 following the government’s decision to 
exclude the column that specified the holder’s religion from passports in order to comply 
with global standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The 
religion column was first included in passports at the behest of President Zia-ul-Haq as part 
of his policy to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. The decision to 
remove the religion column from passports was a firm reversal of this earlier policy and an 
important part of President Musharraf’s strategy to create an enlightened and moderate 
identity for Pakistan and its citizens. 
 
Proudly proclaimed to international audiences as an innovative philosophy, President 
Musharraf first announced the theory of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ in his address at the 58th 
session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2003. It was then 
presented and adopted at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit in 
Putrajaya, Malaysia, the following month. According to Samina Yasmeen, Enlightened 
Moderation was promoted by President Musharraf as the preferred identity for Pakistani 
Muslims. She writes:  
 
Carving out a place along the spectrum of moderation and extremism, Pakistan 
was to be both enlightened and moderate. It was a value that Pakistanis, as well 
as Muslims globally, needed to aspire to.355  
 
Designed to ‘build love, promote moderation, oppose extremism, and ensure justice’, 
Enlightened Moderation was a two-part strategy aimed at the social and economic uplift of 
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the entire Muslim ummah.356 Part of his strategy was to reverse the tendency of non-Muslim 
nations to equate Islam with terrorism, as well as to engender an understanding between 
Muslim and non-Muslim nations to avoid a so-called ‘clash of civilisations’.357 His strategy 
also aimed at protecting religious minorities in Pakistan and putting an end to religious 
discrimination and violence to achieve socio-economic uplift. Despite the efforts of President 
Musharraf to reorient Islam, Anatol Lieven writes that Enlightened Moderation was ‘never 
systematically developed or implemented’.358 More critically, Najam Sethi, editor of The 
Friday Times, wrote that President Musharraf had failed to reverse the ubiquitous state 
political culture that promotes extremism in Pakistan. Sethi argued that this was a direct 
result of a Faustian bargain between the military and the mullahs. 
 
In Pakistan, the military’s Faustian bargain involved exchanging control of 
religion, education and culture with the mullahs for their support to the state’s 
‘regional’ objectives as well as to the army’s requirement of blocking the 
development of a democratic, accountable and representative political system 
in which civilian supremacy is the norm rather than the exception.359 
 
Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Musharraf said: 
 
Islam is a faith of peace, love and justice. Islam is democracy in action. It 
upholds human rights, social equality, non-discrimination, freedom of speech. 
The protection of minorities is an article of faith in Islam. It does not 
discriminate on the basis of colour, caste, creed or religion. Our Faith is 
dynamic, promoting constant renewal and adaptation, through the process of 
Ijtehad (or interpretation through consultations), Islam’s vision is not trapped 
in any one period of history; it is modern and futuristic. Islam must not be 
confused with the narrow vision of a few extremists.360 
 
Opposition to the decision to remove the religion column from passports came primarily 
from religiously conservative groups in Pakistan. However, some members of the 
Musharraf-led PML-Q also criticised the decision to remove the column from passports. 
PML-Q President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was critical of the decision and promised 
religious groups that the column would be restored to passports. The main leaders of the 
pro-religion column movement, the MMA, called for a nation-wide ‘black day’ to be 
observed on January 14, 2005, to protest against the government’s decision. Reporting on the 
demonstration held in Lahore, the Daily Times stated: 
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MMA leaders vowed that no one would be allowed to take the country towards 
secularism. They warned the government of tough resistance if it did not add 
religion column in machine-readable passports.361 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The MMA relied upon a combination of strategies found within the ‘call to arms’ genre to 
counter the official discourse. To legitimise their own position, as well as to rally popular 
support behind their call to protect Pakistan’s Islamic identity from what they saw as a move 
by the government to secularise the nation, the MMA appealed to the ultimate moral forces 
within society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The MMA privileged a 
monolithic homogeneous Islam to construct national unity and national identity. However, 
theirs was a self-styled orthodox version of Islam, which placed greater emphasis on 
adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunnah alongside a more systematic application of Shari’a 
law. The dominant narrative was that Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam and 
the government’s decision to eliminate the religion column was both an attack on Pakistan 
and an attack on Islam. This view is reflected in a statement by Hafiz Hussain Ahmed of the 
MMA who said that the move was ‘an attempt to secularize Pakistan and strip it of its 
Islamic identity’.362 
 
As discussed previously, nationalism and religion are the most important moral forces in 
Pakistan. This dates back to the early twentieth century when calls for the creation of a 
nation to safeguard the political, economic, and cultural interests of the Muslims of the 
Indian subcontinent were first voiced. At the same time, there were a number of Muslims 
who took a pluralistic approach to nationalism and were strongly opposed to the creation of 
Pakistan. These Indian-nationalist Muslims believed that Pakistan would be harmful for 
Muslims. They argued that the creation of a territorial nation-state was contradictory to the 
idea of an ummah and that such a nation, established and administered as a secular state, 
would actually be un-Islamic.363 Once Pakistan had been achieved, some Indian-nationalist 
Muslims migrated to Pakistan and began agitating for a stronger role for Islam in the state 
and society. The tensions that appeared in 1947, between groups committed to the primacy 
of Islam in the state and those committed to the ideal of a broadly democratic Muslim 
nation, remain unresolved in Pakistan today and repeatedly reappear in debates that trigger 
sometimes violent contestations over Pakistan’s identity. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In order to legitimise their demands to have the religion column restored to Pakistani 
passports the MMA relied upon a strategy of demonisation in their political discourse. The 
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rhetorical device of disparaging the ‘enemy’ is typical in political discourse that is aimed at 
justifying policy. This is particularly true when policy is contentious, as in the case of the 
religion column in passports where MMA demands to have the column restored drew 
widespread disapprobation from the government, civil rights groups, and the international 
community. The approach of the MMA, therefore, was to positively present their own 
position to the nation and negatively present the position of the government. They did so by 
appealing to the ultimate moral forces within society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and 
religion (Islam). The MMA’s construction of a negative ‘Other’ was one that was closely tied 
to and which, crucially, posed a distinct threat to Pakistan and Islam. The below extract from 
the Daily Times provides one example of the way in which the MMA relied upon an appeal 
to nationalist and religious sentiment to justify their own position and persuade the 
Pakistani public to help pressure the government into reversing its decision to remove the 
religion column from passports. 
 
The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) on Friday observed a countrywide black 
day against President General Pervez Musharraf for not shedding his military 
uniform and the government’s decision to eliminate the religious column from 
the passport. MMA leaders vowed that no one would be allowed to take the 
country towards secularism. They warned the government of tough resistance 
if it did not add religion column in machine-readable passports.364 
 
In the above narrative the MMA’s construction of a negative ‘Other’ was rather wide and 
included the Musharraf-led government and anyone who wished to ‘secularise’ Pakistan. 
An all-encompassing negative ‘Other’ was presented to the Pakistani public as negative on 
the basis that it posed a distinct threat to Pakistan and, most importantly, to its Islamic 
identity. This is demonstrated in the statement: ‘no one would be allowed to take the 
country towards secularism’. This view is also reflected in a comment by Qazi Hussain 
Ahmad of the JI, one of the coalition parties in the MMA religious alliance. Ahmad led the 
pro-religion column and anti-government demonstration in Lahore. In what he saw as a 
move to ‘secularise’ Pakistan by ‘anti-state elements and people who were promoting 
western policies in the name of national development’, Ahmad was reported to have vowed 
that the JI would not allow the government to exclude the religion column.365 In both of these 
examples, the reliance on the familiar ‘Pakistan in danger’ and ‘Islam in danger’ rhetoric was 
intended to negatively present the policy of the out-group, which acts against the national 
interest. It was also intended to positively present the policy of the in-group, which acts in 
the national interest. Here, the MMA negatively presented the Musharraf-led PML-Q 
government and anyone who wished to ‘secularise’ Pakistan as the out-group working 
against the interests of the nation by trying to divest it of its Islamic identity. In contrast, the 
MMA presented themselves as the in-group working for the good of the nation by trying to 
implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan in-line with its identity as an Islamic 
state.  
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At the same time, the religion column in passports controversy and the attendant debate 
over Pakistan’s identity was conflated with wider criticism of President Musharraf’s 
decision to continue in the role of chief of army staff. The Daily Times reported: 
 
Addressing the protestors, Qazi said the MMA would not accept the army’s 
involvement in the presidency and politics. “We will not accept the supremacy 
of Army over the Constitution, parliament and democracy,” he said, adding 
that Musharraf had become controversial both as the president and the chief of 
Army staff after he violated his earlier pledge to step down as the army chief by 
December 31, 2004. He said the MMA would launch a street-to-street anti-
Musharraf campaign after Eidul Azha.366 
 
The above extract illustrates the dominant narrative used by the MMA to further reinforce 
President Musharraf as a negative ‘Other’ in the minds of the Pakistani people. It is 
demonstrated in the statement: ‘we will not accept the supremacy of Army over the 
Constitution, parliament and democracy’. In this example, Musharraf was negatively 
presented as not only attempting to divest Pakistan of its Islamic identity but as a self-
appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government. 
Conversely, the MMA positively presented themselves in favour of a constitutional 
parliamentary democratic system of governance for Pakistan, albeit as an Islamic state. The 
dominant narrative was that the MMA was acting in the national interest by supporting the 
democratic process.  
 
A further narrative was that the MMA was acting in accordance with international norms, 
whereas President Musharraf was not. Pakistan was readmitted into the Commonwealth of 
Nations in May 2004 following its suspension in the wake of the military coup of 1999, 
which was deemed as constituting a serious breach of CMAG’s central political principles. 
At the time of the suspension, CMAG called for Musharraf’s military administration to set a 
deadline for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. President Musharraf was also urged 
to relinquish his military position. However, despite guarantees that he would step down as 
chief of army staff, by December 31, 2004, Musharraf had failed to do so.367 The pro-
democracy anti-military narrative was quite powerful in the contemporaneous context and 
was used by the MMA and various opposition parties to challenge the Musharraf 
administration. 
4.2.2 Building a soft image of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism and oppositional 
voices 
 
Amidst the debates surrounding the religion column in passports controversy, and the 
concomitant struggle over Pakistan’s contested identity, President Musharraf embarked on a 
campaign to create a soft image of the nation. On February 1, 2005, Musharraf formally 
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inaugurated the National Academy of the Performing Arts (NAPA).368 Housed in the historic 
Hindu Gymkhana building in Karachi, NAPA was Pakistan’s first performing arts academy, 
established to provide tertiary education in music, dance, and drama. The formation of 
NAPA was an important part of President Musharraf’s socio-economic policy, one aspect of 
which was to build a soft image of Pakistan by presenting a culturally rich alternative to the 
image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism and extremism. Another aspect was to promote 
tourism, sports, and culture in Pakistan in order to develop the domestic tourism industry 
and hence strengthen the nation’s economy.369  
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
As part of his campaign to promote a soft image of Pakistan, both domestically and 
internationally, President Musharraf relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral forces 
within Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). 
 
It is unfortunate that Pakistan's image abroad has been tarnished so badly that 
the world associates it only with terrorism and extremism. Many people think 
of our society only as intolerant and regressive. However much we plead that 
the vast majority of Pakistan is moderate and that only a fringe element is 
extremist - and that our national fabric has been damaged by the turbulence to 
our west in Afghanistan and to our east in Kashmir, not by anything inherent 
within our borders and society - the message does not get across. I have 
therefore tried to project a truer image of Pakistan, which I call a soft image, 
through the promotion of tourism, sports, and culture.370 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf repeatedly appealed to a shared national 
consciousness in order to project the nation as moderate and enlightened. This is 
demonstrated in his statements: ‘Pakistan’s image abroad has been tarnished’, ‘the vast 
majority of Pakistan is moderate’, and ‘our national fabric has been damaged’. Musharraf 
explained that the international community blamed Pakistan for the acts of violence 
committed by Pakistan-based militants in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. Further, he asserted 
that this negative image not only undermined Pakistan’s reputation but hampered 
government efforts to revive the economy and restore investor confidence.371  
 
At the same time, President Musharraf also relied upon Islam to give moral authority to his 
political exhortations. At the inauguration of NAPA, Dawn Newspaper reported: 
 
The President expressed the hope that the academy would carry forward the 
genius of Ustad Salamat Ali, Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, melody queen Noor 
Jehan and unmatched Ghazal singer Mehdi Hasan.372 
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In the above extract, President Musharraf avoided a monolithic Islam in his attempt to 
convince the nation and the international community that being enlightened and moderate 
was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. Instead, he relied on an appeal to the 
shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. This is 
evident in his praise of Ustad Salamat Ali, and Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan. Musharraf 
credited these renowned qawwals (Sufi devotional singers) with having popularised qawwali 
to audiences not only in Pakistan but internationally. Typically, a qawwali performance is a 
spiritual expression aimed at drawing listeners nearer to God through popular practices 
such as remembrance and listening. These spiritual gatherings often take place at Sufi 
shrines on the death anniversaries of saints. The lyrics sung by the qawwals are drawn 
predominantly from Sufi poetry, which has a long history in the Indian subcontinent. 
Notably, it was the popularity of the early poet-saints with their poetry and their songs 
written and sung in the local vernacular that enabled them to transcend high Islamic culture 
of the ulama and bring Islam more readily to the masses. 
 
To further reinforce his message, President Musharraf went on to say that theatre, drama, 
and music ‘are the cultural features of any civilised society’.373 This statement, together with 
his specific mention of Sufi devotional singers, reflects the preferred official notion of what it 
means to be a Muslim in contemporary Pakistani society. As discussed previously, the 
majority Barelvi community consider Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition, as well 
as an essential feature of Pakistan’s heritage and culture. Thus, Musharraf chose to present a 
utopian vision of ‘civilised society’ made up of moderate Muslims who visit Sufi shrines and 
listen to Sufi devotional music. By inference, these Muslims were deemed to be acting in the 
national interest. Conversely, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions, who are 
vehemently opposed to aspects of Sufi belief and tradition such as singing and dancing, 
were deemed not only uncivilised but also anti-state. 
 
Attempts by President Musharraf to create a soft image of the nation, in the eyes of the 
nation and internationally, were undermined the month after his formal inauguration of 
NAPA. On March 19, 2005, a bomb was exploded at the shrine of Pir Syed Rakheel Shah in 
the Jhal Magsi Kachhi district of Balochistan. PIPS reported that forty people were killed and 
fifteen were injured in the attack.374 The shrine attracts both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. 
Between 10,000 and 20,000 pilgrims had gone to the shrine for the annual urs festival and 
were congregating for their evening meal when the bomb exploded.375 The townspeople of 
Jhal Magsi announced that they would observe three days of mourning.376 HRCP reported 
that three members of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) had claimed responsibility for the 
attack. The SSP is a Sunni sectarian organisation, which was established in Jhang district 
(Punjab) in 1985. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) states that the main aim of the SSP 
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was to have Pakistan declared a Sunni state. It also states that one of its founders, Maulana 
Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was a follower of the Sunni Deoband tradition.377 The SSP was one of 
the five extremist organisations banned by President Musharraf on January 12, 2002, as part 
of his measures to ‘rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and […] to project 
Islam in its true perspective’.378 
 
In this period, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan increased their coverage 
on the subject of Sufism alongside official efforts to promote a soft image of the nation. Print 
media attention focussed on the presence of government officials, and their participation in 
religious and social-welfare activities, at Sufi shrines. Media attention also focussed on the 
urs festivals of prominent Sufi saints, Sufi conferences and seminars, Sufi music and arts 
festivals, and Sufi literature and film. This coverage reveals two things. First, the ways in 
which the Government of Pakistan attempted to construct a soft image of the nation by 
drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. Second, how other political actors, specifically the 
media, discursively reproduced the state-sanctioned construction of a national Sufi identity. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
On April 12, 2005, the Pakistan Times reported the upcoming urs of Bari Imam: 
 
ISLAMABAD: The centuries-old ceremonies of the Urs of great spiritualist and 
saint Hazrat Bari Imam [RA] will begin at Noorpur, close to the capital city of 
Islamabad on Sunday, May-22. The ceremonies, which shall be attended by the 
followers of Hazrat Shah Abdul Latif, popularly known as Hazrat Bari Imam 
[RA] from all-over Pakistan and even from abroad, will continue till Thursday, 
May-26. Islamabad District Administration and Auqaf Directorate has started to 
make all the necessary arrangements for the sanctified event.379 
 
The above extract illustrates a number of narratives the Government of Pakistan wished to 
popularise amongst the people of Pakistan, and which were typical of that reproduced in 
English-language newspapers in this period. Characteristically, two ultimate moral forces, 
the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam), were privileged in combination. The 
shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi (1617-1705), or Bari Imam as he is more popularly known, 
is located on the outskirts of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. Bari Imam is the patron saint of 
Islamabad and the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration, Auqaf Directorate, directly 
administers his shrine.380 Rather than present the urs as a regional event, the newspaper 
article emphasised it as being of national importance. This is clear in the assertion that the 
urs ceremonies will attract pilgrims from ‘all-over Pakistan and even from abroad’. What is 
apparent in this statement is the attempt to build a shared religio-national consciousness 
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within Pakistani society by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. An important underlying 
theme, alongside the government’s need to define the ideology of the state, was the need to 
claim political legitimacy and religious authority in terms of Islam. Both were achieved by 
means of control of Sufi shrines, and by linking the administration to Islam by way of the 
Sufi tradition. This is clear in the statement: ‘Islamabad District Administration and Auqaf 
Directorate has started to make all the necessary arrangements for the sanctified [emphasis 
added] event.’ 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
As discussed previously, an essential element of persuasive political discourse is the close 
association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical 
consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. In the article in the Pakistan Times on 
April 12, a number of dominant historical narratives were invoked. One narrative aimed to 
promote the historical importance of the urs ceremonies at the shrine. This is clear in the 
statement: ‘The centuries-old ceremonies of the Urs of great spiritualist and saint Bari Imam 
[RA] will begin at Noorpur’. The implication was that the ‘sanctified’ traditions that take 
place at the shrine of Bari Imam have a long and renowned history in Pakistan. Moreover, 
continuity with the nation’s valued past flows from devotion to Bari Imam and his shrine. 
Another historical narrative aimed to promote the important role Bari Imam played in 
bringing Islam to the Indian subcontinent in the seventeenth century.381 According to the 
article, Bari Imam was a ‘great preacher’ who ‘travelled through South Asia spreading 
Islam’.382 In order to invoke a shared national historical consciousness, rather than a narrowly 
defined regional identity, particular emphasis was placed on the role of the saint in the 
widespread conversion of the population throughout the subcontinent. 
 
Thieves and outcasts occupied Noorpur Shahan village at the edge of 
Islamabad. While travelling though the area, the great saint […] was stunned by 
the habits of those living among the natural beauty of the Margalla Hills. He 
decided to stay and teach the people about Islam.383  
 
At the same time, emphasis was placed on the saint’s purported success at conversion 
through his own exemplary belief and behaviour. In the above extract, when Bari Imam 
encountered ‘thieves and outcasts’ in the Margalla Hills region, located at the foothills of the 
Himalayas, and north of Islamabad, he made the decision to ‘stay and teach the people 
about Islam’. The inference was that Bari Imam holds an esteemed place in the nation’s 
history because of the peaceable manner in which he and other Sufi saints were said to have 
brought Islam to the subcontinent. Moreover, Islam, with its message of philosophical, 
spiritual, and social harmony, then, as now, serves as an example with which to encourage 
the people of Pakistan to interact peaceably and develop socially. 
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Five days after the Pakistan Times reported on the upcoming urs of Bari Imam, print media 
attention turned towards an event that was taking place at another venerable Sufi shrine. 
However, this shrine was not in Pakistan but more than one thousand kilometres away in 
neighbouring India. President Musharraf arrived in India on April 17, 2005, to meet with the 
prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh (r. 2004-2014). The meeting was part of a three-
day diplomatic visit aimed at improving relations between Pakistan and India, particularly 
on the issue of Kashmir.384 The official twenty-member delegation from Pakistan included 
President Musharraf, his wife Sehba Musharraf, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood 
Kasuri, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, and the High Commissioner to India 
Aziz Ahmed Khan. The first stop on this official visit to India was the shrine of saint 
Muinuddin Hasan Chishti (d. 1236) in Ajmer (Rajasthan). President Musharraf's visit to the 
shrine, and his preference for Sufism generally, reflects a number of recurring themes such 
as the use of religion for national integration and religious legitimacy, as well as the use of 
religion for moral and peace-building purposes. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Chishtiyya order was one of three prominent Sufi orders 
in the subcontinent in the thirteenth century. Muinuddin Chishti, whose genealogy is traced 
from the Prophet Muhammad, is regarded as the founder of the Chishti order. His shrine at 
Ajmer Sharif is one of the most popular Sufi shrines in India and is renowned for the special 
prominence given to ‘love’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘brotherhood’, as practiced and advocated by its 
founder. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Muinuddin Chishti: 
 
Freely adopted local Indian practices into his order, including the use of music 
in Sufi rituals, which then became an important point of contact between 
Muslims and the indigenous people of India. His tomb in Ajmer is one of the 
most popular shrines in northwestern India, visited by Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, 
and Christians alike.385 
 
In his memoirs, President Musharraf wrote that he first planned to visit the ‘highly revered’ 
shrine of Muinuddin Chishti in July 2001 following the historic Agra Summit between 
himself and the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (r. 1998-2004). However, 
the much hoped-for visit did not take place. Four years later, President Musharraf finally 
had the opportunity to pray at the historic thirteenth-century shrine.386 As a mark of respect, 
the custodians of the shrine performed the dastar-bandi or turban-tying ceremony, tying a 
pink turban around the head of the president. The dastar-bandi ceremony is normally carried 
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out when the hereditary spiritual and custodial responsibilities are passed down from a 
sajjada nashin to his successor. In the case of Musharraf, the ceremony symbolically marked 
his allegiance to the shrine. Gifts were exchanged. Musharraf was presented with a book of 
verses about the Sufi saint, as well as two ceremonial chador (sheet or veil) to be draped over 
shrines in Pakistan. Musharraf presented the shrine’s custodians with a green velvet 
ceremonial chador and a calligraphed prayer that he had brought with him from Pakistan. 
Musharraf later wrote in his memoirs that he considered the visit to the Sufi shrine to be 'an 
auspicious beginning' to the diplomatic talks between the two nations.387 Notably, his visit 
coincided with Fateha Chatti Sharif, which takes place on the sixth day of each lunar month, 
and begins with a recitation of the Qur'an. 
 
However, attempts by President Musharraf to create a soft image of the nation, and 
encourage the people of Pakistan to interact peaceably, were undermined on May 27, 2005, 
when a bomb was exploded at the shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi. The Bari Imam shrine 
is located near the diplomatic enclave in Islamabad, a short walk from the prime minister’s 
residence. The attack came only two months after the attack on the shrine Pir Syed Rakheel 
Shah, in the Jhal Magsi Kachhi district of Balochistan. The much-publicised urs had drawn 
thousands of pilgrims to the shrine for a week of festivities and celebrations in honour of the 
saint. Dawn newspaper estimated that between eight thousand and ten thousand Shi’a and 
Sunni pilgrims had congregated at the shrine for the annual urs festival.388 The explosion 
occurred as Shi’a Muslims gathered for the Majlis-e-Aza, a special religious gathering held 
to commemorate the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Karbala. According to PIPS, 
twenty-five people were killed and one hundred people were injured.389 Reports of the attack 
reached international audiences. The United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan 
condemned the attack, saying he was ‘outraged by repeated targeting of civilians at their 
place of worship’.390 Speaking to journalists in Karachi, Musharraf strongly condemned the 
attack. 
 
President Gen Pervez Musharraf condemned the bomb blast at the shrine of 
Bari Imam here on Friday and appealed to people to join hands with the 
government in ridding the society of extremism. The president expressed deep 
sense of shock and sorrow at the loss of lives and said it was everyone’s 
responsibility to eradicate extremism.391 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, after 9/11 President Musharraf embarked on a 
campaign to prevent extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and to promote Islam in its 
‘true perspective.392 However, he faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and authority. 
Musharraf was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, 
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therefore, undemocratic government. He was also widely criticised for capitulating to US 
pressure and aligning Pakistan with the US in the ‘war on terror’ being carried out in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban. The attack on the Bari Imam shrine in May, and on the Pir 
Syed Rakheel Shah shrine two months previously, served to reinforce the need for strong 
anti-terrorism measures in Pakistan.  
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In order to convince the Pakistani public to support him in his campaign to eradicate 
extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of 
familiar strategies which were directly associated with the ultimate moral forces within 
society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). First, Musharraf attempted to 
construct a negative ‘Other’. In this strategy, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as harmful 
because it posed a distinct threat to the ultimate moral forces in society: Pakistan and Islam. 
Difference was constructed by way of a polarising strategy of positive ‘us’-presentation and 
negative ‘Other’-presentation. The implication was that the in-group (Musharraf and his 
supporters) was acting in the national interest whereas the out-group (his opponents) was 
acting against the national interest. 
 
[President Musharraf] said Pakistan could achieve fast-paced socio-economic 
development if the entire nation made concerted efforts and proved with its 
actions that “we are a moderate Islamic country. Therefore, I appeal to all 
Pakistanis, each and every individual, that they should stand up against 
extremism; they should stop if they see anyone trying to incite hatred, publish 
and spread hate material or misuse the mosque for provoking hatred.” He said 
police alone would not be able to contain extremism until the entire nation 
came forward with pro-active efforts. 
 
The president said he could not say definitely at this stage whether the attack 
was an act of some extremist organization or sectarian violence or result of 
some rivalry. “But if this is a sectarian incident, I am deeply saddened. Pakistan 
should practise moderation in accordance with teachings of Islam so that we 
are able to achieve the goals of socio-economic development. This can only be 
possible if we show moderation and the world sees us as a moderate Islamic 
nation. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to materialize development at 
desired pace.”393 
 
The above extract illustrates the dominant narratives used by Musharraf to create a negative 
‘Other’ in the minds of the Pakistani people. For Musharraf, the negative ‘Other’ was 
presented as anyone who posed a threat to Pakistan’s religious identity. In this, his 
construction of a negative ‘Other’ was rather wide and included extremists and sectarianists. 
The use of pejoratives such as ‘extremism’, ‘sectarianism’, and ‘violence’ in President 
Musharraf’s political discourse served to delineate the negative aspects of the out-group. In 
this narrative, ‘anyone trying to incite hatred, publish and spread hate material or misuse 
the mosque for provoking hatred’ was not acting in accordance with the principles of a 
‘moderate Islamic nation’. Similarly, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who 
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threatened Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community in Pakistan. 
In this narrative, Sufi shrines were emblematic of Islam’s moderation and religious 
tolerance. This is clear in his repeated use of various forms of the word moderate in his 
discourse: ‘we are a moderate Islamic country’, ‘practice moderation in accordance with 
teachings of Islam’, and ‘a moderate Islamic nation’. Thus, the in-group was acting in 
accordance with ‘true’ Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and practiced by 
the Prophet, his companions, Sufi saints, and the majority Barelvi community, whereas the 
out-group was acting against Islam. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
Second, to convince the nation to support the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-
terrorism measures, as well as to encourage people to interact peaceably, President 
Musharraf appealed for unification behind the ultimate moral forces in society: the idea of 
the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In his attempt to rid Pakistani society of 
extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and project a moderate Islam, as part of his wider 
campaign to project a soft image of Pakistan, President Musharraf made his appeal based 
primarily on temporal rewards. As discussed in the previous chapter, in October 1999 
President Musharraf overthrew the democratically elected government of Pakistan in a 
military coup. In the address to the nation, Musharraf cited the socio-economic 
underdevelopment of the nation to justify the need for military intervention. At that time, 
Pakistan’s economy was dangerously fragile and the nation suffered high levels of 
unemployment, poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. Musharraf told the nation that 
his main political focus was to work towards national cohesion, socio-economic 
development, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. Musharraf also revealed the 
seven-point program he planned to implement as leader of Pakistan. The program was 
designed to overcome internal disunity, put an end to religious intolerance and violence, 
and implement effective governance to achieve socio-economic growth and development.  
 
Pakistan could achieve fast-paced socio-economic development if the entire 
nation made concerted efforts and proved with its actions that “we are a 
moderate Islamic country”. “Therefore, I appeal to all Pakistanis, each and 
every individual, that they should stand up against extremism.” 
 
“Pakistan should practise moderation in accordance with teachings of Islam so 
that we are able to achieve the goals of socio-economic development. This can 
only be possible if we show moderation and the world sees us as a moderate 
Islamic nation. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to materialize 
development at desired pace.”394 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf directly linked ‘moderate Islam’ with the socio-
economic development of Pakistan. This was in keeping with Gramsci’s hegemony 
paradigm, whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies or cultural norms 
within society in their political discourse to establish ideological control over that society by 
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means of acquiescence rather than physical force. This then allows for effective revenue 
extraction, and economic development, which ultimately results in a peaceful and 
prosperous civil society. Crucially for President Musharraf, the construction of a collective 
present and future for the citizens of Pakistan was dependent on an economic and political 
utopian strategy. Musharraf believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national 
identity, based on a ‘moderate Islam’, was central to the establishment of political legitimacy 
and hegemony without the need for physical force. He envisaged this would enable the 
government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which 
would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. 
4.2.3 The Hisba Bill (2005) 
 
On July 14, 2005, the NWFP Provincial Assembly unanimously passed the Hisba Bill. The 
Hisba or Accountability Bill was an extension of the Shari’a Act, which was adopted by the 
MMA-led NWFP Government in 2003. The Hisba Bill permitted the supervision of the 
implementation of Shari’a Law by a mohtasib (ombudsman). Supporters of the bill, Muslims 
who wished to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society, described it as ‘a first step 
towards establishment of a society based on Islamic principles’.395 Detractors of the Hisba Bill, 
such as Pakistan’s minority religious groups, were fearful that the implementation of the 
Bill, with its emphasis on gradually establishing Islamic values across society, would have 
damaging consequences for them. In its annual report, HRCP described the bill as follows: 
 
The bill envisaged the creation of what could be called a parallel 
administration/judiciary presided over by a Provincial Mohtasib enjoying 
immense powers. The ombudsmen were to be authorized to monitor adherence 
to moral values of Islam at public places, eliminate honour killings, swara and 
beggary, move against ostentatious and wasteful expenses in marriage and 
against child labour and hoarding and corruption, or any other matter 
suggested by the advisory councils headed by the ombudsmen themselves. No 
court could interfere with the working of the Mohtasib system. The 
ombudsmen were to be provided with police force required to enable them to 
achieve their purpose.396  
 
Dawn newspaper ominously reported that the Hisba Bill was passed with a majority vote 
from the MMA-led provincial government. The two major mainstream opposition parties, 
the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party, offered little or no protest 
against the controversial bill. According to the article, MMA Provincial Assembly Members 
‘raised slogans of Allah-o-Akbar’ after the bill was passed.397 The following month, President 
Musharraf filed Reference No. 2 of 2005 in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in order to 
ascertain whether the bill was in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan (1973).398 The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that certain sections of the bill were 
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ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the constitution. It was the opinion of the court that 
sections of the bill were 'vague, over broad, unreasonable, based on excessive delegation of 
jurisdiction, denying the right of access to justice to the citizens and attempting to set up a 
parallel judicial system'.399 The Supreme Court directed the Governor of the NWFP not to 
assent to the Hisba Bill in its present form.  
4.2.4 London bombings 
 
The passage of the controversial Hisba Bill by Pakistan’s first elected coalition of religious 
parties, the MMA, in the face of little to no resistance from opposition members, served to 
further undermine the efforts of President Musharraf to create a soft image of Pakistan. 
What is more, its passage came a week after London suffered four coordinated suicide bomb 
attacks on its transport system at the close of the morning peak-hour rush. Three bombs 
were detonated on the London underground (Liverpool Street, Edgware Road, and Kings 
Cross stations) and one on a bus in Tavistock Square. More than seven hundred people were 
injured and fifty-two were killed.400 One of the bombers was of Jamaican origin who moved 
to Britain with his mother; both converted to Islam in 2000. The other three bombers were 
second-generation British-born Muslims whose parents were of Pakistani origin. The 
ancestry of those three bombers prompted much media speculation as to the possible role of 
Pakistani contacts and/or Al-Qaeda in the planning, preparation, and execution of the 
bombings. British Prime Minister Tony Blair firmly requested that President Musharraf ‘curb 
extremists and radical madrassas in the wake of the London bombings of 7 July’.401 A Home 
Office report later found that, whilst two of the bombers, Siddique Khan and Shazad 
Tanweer, did visit Pakistan, it was unclear as to whether they received any logistical support 
from their contacts there. The report also found no clear evidence to support claims that the 
bombers received support from Al-Qaeda during their visits to Pakistan. However, the 
report did state that ‘the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical of Al 
Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies’.402 
 
Following the attacks of 7/7, the widespread speculation regarding Pakistani involvement in 
the bombings, and the request from Prime Minister Tony Blair that stronger steps be taken 
to eradicate extremism, President Musharraf was compelled to make significant domestic 
reforms. On July 21, 2005, Musharraf made a national address to introduce new anti-
terrorism measures. Under these measures: banned organisations were not permitted to 
operate under new names, there were to be no unlicensed weapons or their display in 
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public, there were restrictions on inflammatory material, including hand-bills, journals, 
papers, pamphlets, audio-video cassettes and their writers, publishers, and distributors, 
extremist and banned organisations were not permitted to collect donations, hate sermons 
were not permitted in places of worship, and all madaris were to be registered by December 
2005.403 By way of justification, President Musharraf told the nation that the measures were 
necessary to rid society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and to project Islam in its 
‘true’ perspective. 
 
If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to support these 
controversial policies, then he had good reason. Opposition to his anti-terrorism policies 
came predominantly from the coalition of religious parties, the MMA. Leaders of the MMA, 
President Qazi Hussain and Secretary-General Maulana Fazlur Rahman, called for a nation-
wide protest against what they deemed a 'global conspiracy against Islam'.404 MMA leaders 
were particularly critical of the restrictions placed on madaris, alleging that the measures had 
been taken ‘at the behest of the US and the UK’.405 Moreover, MMA leaders were offended at 
the implication that madaris propagate ‘extremism and sectarianism’.406 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
In order to convince the Pakistani public to support the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and 
anti-terrorism measures, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of familiar 
strategies in his July 21, 2005, national address. First, President Musharraf relied upon the 
ultimate moral forces within Pakistan society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion 
(Islam) in his political discourse. 
 
My dear countrymen I ask for your support for Pakistan and for true Islam. 
Stand up and launch a Jihad against extremism and propagators of enmity and 
anarchy. Be proud Pakistanis and rest assured of its bright future. May God 
save us from extremists and help us to follow a true Islam. May God be 
Custodian of all of us. Pakistan Paindabad.407 
 
In the above extract, Musharraf repeatedly appealed to a national consciousness to legitimise 
his exhortations. This is demonstrated in statements such as: ‘My dear countrymen I ask for 
your support for Pakistan’, and ‘Be proud Pakistanis and rest assured of its bright future’. 
Musharraf also relied upon the combined moral forces of nationalism and religion to create a 
shared religio-national consciousness. This is apparent in his statements: ‘I ask for your 
support for Pakistan and for true Islam’, ‘May God save us from extremists and help us to 
follow a true Islam’, and ‘May God be Custodian of all of us’. For Musharraf, Pakistan was 
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an ‘Islamic country’ and the ‘only ideological country carved out for the Muslims of the 
region’.408 While President Musharraf was committed to the ideal of Islam as the official 
national identity of Pakistan, he aimed ultimately for a unified and broadly democratic 
Muslim nation (as opposed to an Islamic state). His moderate discourse is demonstrated in a 
number of ways including his theory of ‘Enlightened Moderation’, Islamic philosophy 
(huquq al-ibad and huquq Allah), and his preference for Sufism. This is clear in the following 
statement: 
 
Islam is a ‘deen’ that is a way to lead a life that is more than a religion. It 
emphasizes on ‘Haqooq-ul-Ibad’ rather than ‘Haqooq Ullah’. Islam leads us 
towards ‘Ilm’, contemplation, thought, review, ‘Ijtehad’ and ‘Ijmah’. It teaches 
us peace, progress, prosperity, enlightenment, and moderation.409 
 
As discussed previously, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and 
authority throughout his political tenure. He was regarded as a self-appointed military 
leader heading an unelected and undemocratic government. He was also widely criticised 
for capitulating to US and UK pressure by aligning Pakistan with the US in the ‘war on 
terror’. The domestic reforms that were implemented following the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 
led many of his more religiously conservative detractors to accuse him of attempting to 
make Pakistan a secular nation. Within that context, Musharraf took the opportunity in his 
national address to reinforce his political legitimacy by asserting his own Muslim identity 
and his personal commitment to Islam. He stated: ‘I am a Syed and God has conferred upon 
me an honour which a few have had. The doors of Khana Kaba are opened when ever I visit 
there’.410 Syed is an honorific title which indicates that a person is not only of the high-born or 
ashraf class but, most importantly in this instance, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad 
through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib. As a descendant of the 
Prophet, a syed is endowed with unique spiritual authority. Moreover, only descendants of 
the Prophet can be hereditary Sufi pirs.411 This was particularly pertinent as, earlier in the 
year, President Musharraf was made an honorary sajjada nashin in a dastar-bandi ceremony. 
The ceremony symbolically marked his allegiance to the shrine of saint Muinuddin Chishti 
in Ajmer (India). 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
Second, to convince the public to support his anti-terrorism measures President Musharraf 
also relied upon the construction of a negative ‘Other’ in his political discourse. To build a 
negative ‘Other’, Musharraf emphasised the negative aspects of the out-group through the 
use of pejorative words such as ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, ‘violence’, ‘anger’, and ‘intolerance’. 
The negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone that posed a danger to Pakistan and anyone 
who threatened ‘true’ Islam. Alternatively, President Musharraf contrasted the negative 
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aspects of the out-group by emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group. He did this 
through the use of approbatory themes such as 'true Islam’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘moderation’, 
‘tolerance’, ‘brotherhood’, ‘solidarity’, ‘peace’, ‘non-violence’, ‘progress’, ‘prosperity’, and 
‘height of character’. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
Third, to encourage the Pakistani public to unite behind the moral forces of the day 
(Pakistan and Islam) against a negative ‘Other’, President Musharraf adopted a hybrid 
appeal to both temporal and spiritual rewards. As discussed, he believed that the formation 
of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political 
legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. Musharraf envisaged this 
would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic 
development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. The below 
extract demonstrates that his vision for Pakistan was not only dependent on an economic 
and political utopian strategy, but was also contingent upon the social and moral 
development of Pakistani society. 
 
My dear countrymen you should help me out in dealing with extremists and 
terrorists and strengthen me against such elements. Don’t get in the words of 
extremists. They are rendering damage to Pakistan. They are creating problems 
for Pakistani people and defaming Pakistani repute. They are spreading 
enmities and turbulence in the society. I would request you to not cast your 
vote to such conservatives and extremists. Cast your vote to those who are 
moderate and want to lead people to prosperity and progress.412 
 
Despite increased attempts by President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to 
form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress 
both socially and economically, by appealing to a specific type of nationalism in combination 
with a moderate Islam, a number of events served to further undermine his call for 
moderation. At the end of 2005 an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale killed 
thousands of people, primarily in the NWFP and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Human 
Rights Watch reported that 85,000 people had been killed and 75,000 injured.413 That disaster 
presented the Government of Pakistan with an extremely great humanitarian task. The BBC 
reported that the ‘devastation […] may take a decade to repair’.414 On October 10, 2005, 
President Musharraf made an appeal to the international community for assistance.  
 
The following year offered little relief for the nation. To compound the environmental 
catastrophe, Pakistan faced a multitude of domestic challenges. In its annual report, HRCP 
stated that there was a ‘climate of intolerance’ in Pakistan which adversely affected the 
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413 ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 2006 – Pakistan’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2006, 
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414 ‘Overview: Quake aftermath’, BBC News, 2 November 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4322624.stm, (accessed 
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welfare of its people, particularly minority religious groups, women, and children.415 It 
described Pakistan as a ‘country caught in a state of bitter internal strife'.416 Of particular 
concern was the increase in religious conservatism. In parts of the NWFP, religious groups 
attempted to forcibly impose their particular social and moral code on society. Girls’ schools 
were closed, video and music shops were attacked, barber shops were forbidden from 
shaving men’s beards, and women were instructed to avoid public places.417 In Islamabad, the 
MMA vowed to oppose any government reforms or amendments to the religious education 
curricula. They claimed that President Musharraf was attempting to ‘secularise’ education in 
Pakistan. In Lahore, the MMA threatened to prevent a mixed gender marathon from being 
held, alleging that government support for the marathon was both an attack on eastern 
culture and a demonstration of its plan to impose western culture on the nation. The MMA 
demanded the enforcement of Shari’a law across Pakistan. The MMA-led government again 
passed the controversial Hisba Bill in the NWFP Provincial Assembly. While the Supreme 
Court blocked the bill for the second time, it nevertheless raised national and international 
fears that it signalled the beginning of the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistani society.  
4.2.5 The Danish cartoon controversy 
 
By far the most compelling debate concerning the place of Islam in the state and society was 
demonstrated in the Cartoon Controversy, which dominated the headlines in the Pakistani 
print media in 2006. The debate began at the end of 2005 when a number of editorial 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were published in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten. In Sunni Islamic tradition it is prohibited for an artist to depict images of: 
God, prophets, including the Prophet Muhammad and his relatives, and all living beings, 
including humans and animals. The artistic representation of God and the Prophet 
Muhammad is considered blasphemous. Most crucially, some of the more provocative 
cartoons directly associated the Prophet Muhammad and Islam with terrorism and violence. 
Four weeks after the images were published Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen received complaints from ten representatives from Muslim-majority countries.418 
The images were then republished in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, closely 
followed by newspapers in several other countries around the world. The publication of the 
cartoons seriously damaged diplomatic relations between a number of non-Muslim and 
Muslim-majority nations. The incident prompted the Arab League (AL) and the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to seek a UN resolution and sanctions to protect 
religion against vilification. The publication of the cartoons triggered demonstrations across 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In Pakistan, anger over the caricatures of the Prophet 
Muhammad was expressed in large-scale protests across the country in February 2006. These 
demonstrations, some of which turned violent, took place in Peshawar in the NWFP, 
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Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, and Gujranwala in the Punjab, and Karachi, Hyderabad, and 
Dera Ghazi Khan in Sindh. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for a Muslim nation whose majority population holds the Prophet 
Muhammad in great esteem, there was much opposition within Pakistan to the publication 
of the cartoons. Opposition came from many sections of Pakistani society. President 
Musharraf and the Government of Pakistan, political parties, religious groups, trade unions, 
traders, teachers, and students, spoke out against the publication of the cartoons. Leading 
the anti-cartoon movement in Pakistan was the MMA. This coalition of religious parties 
called for a nation-wide campaign against the publication of the cartoons. On February 19, 
the MMA pledged to stage a demonstration in Islamabad despite the ban on public rallies 
put in place by the local district administration. In response, the government placed MMA 
President Qazi Hussain Ahmed and MMA Secretary General Maulana Fazalur Rehman 
under house arrest, and put hundreds of MMA activists in protective custody.419 The Alliance 
for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) announced it too would participate in the MMA-led 
demonstration in protest over the caricatures.420 Notably, the ARD included two of the largest 
mainstream political parties in Pakistan, the PPP and the PML-N. Both of these parties are 
generally regarded as representing the liberal-secular position. According to the Daily 
Times, the ARD was planning to participate in the MMA-led demonstration because the 
Musharraf government had not protested ‘strongly enough’ against the publication of the 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.421  
 
Also voicing their strong condemnation of the publication of the cartoons was a collection of 
prominent religious scholars and groups that represent the interests of Barelvi Muslims, the 
nation’s majority community. In Pakistan, Barelvi Muslims tend to have a reputation for 
being moderate, peaceful, and tolerant owing to their preference for Sufism. As discussed 
previously, love or devotion for the Prophet Muhammad is a particularly important part of 
Barelvi tradition. A devotee of the Prophet Muhammad is considered an ashiq-e-rasul (a lover 
of the Prophet). Barelvi Muslims believe that as devotees or lovers of the Prophet 
Muhammad they are following ‘true’ Islam as revealed by God. Alongside their profound 
love is an intense desire to protect the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad. Predictably, 
many Barelvi Muslims were offended by the cartoons, which they regarded as blasphemous. 
On March 12, a group of Barelvi scholars signed a fatwa (religious edict) proclaiming that 
anyone who blasphemes or disrespects the Prophet Muhammad can be executed. The fatwa 
was announced at a 2-day conference at Nishtar Park in Karachi, which brought together a 
number of Barelvi groups to celebrate the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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Anas Noorani of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani) (JUP-N), a Barelvi political party, 
was reported to have said: 
 
If the government of Pakistan is handing over Muslims to the West then why 
does it not demand the hand of the blasphemers to punish them and make 
them an example for the rest of the world. […] This is a warning that no other 
system but Nizam-e-Mustafa (PBUH) would reign in the country.422 
 
In the above extract, the reference to Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet) is particularly 
pertinent. The Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement first appeared in Pakistan in the late 1970s in 
opposition to the then-PPP government. Initially led by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the 
movement comprised of nine religio-political parties. This coalition of religious parties was 
committed to the primacy of Islam in the Pakistani state and society in the spirit of 
twentieth-century theologian Maulana Maududi, founder of the JI. The coalition believed in 
the inerrancy of divine revelation, as revealed through the sacred sources (Qur’an and 
Sunnah), and the Prophet Muhammad. The main aim of the movement was to establish an 
Islamic system of governance in Pakistan, with an Islamic constitution and Islamic laws 
(Shari’a). Paradoxically, the Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement included the JUP; a political party 
largely considered moderate because it represents the interests of the majority Sufi-inspired 
Barelvi community. The slogan Nizam-e-Mustafa was later taken up by General Zia-ul-Haq in 
1977 as part of his Islamisation project to transform Pakistan into a theocratic state. His ten-
year rule marked a period of increased religiosity in Pakistan. 
 
Liberal civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations in Pakistan 
condemned the cartoon-related violence. For the HRCP, the heated and at times violent 
protests reflected the increased levels of ‘intolerance’ in the country. In its annual report, the 
HRCP described the situation as follows: 
 
The growth of intolerance in society was reflected by the angry protests in 
February 2006, over the publication of cartoons perceived as blasphemous, 
published in a Danish newspaper. While the protests had political and social 
dimensions, they also reflected an decrease in levels of tolerance.423 
 
The Danish cartoon controversy continued throughout 2006 and became conflated with 
wider criticism of President Musharraf, who was regarded as a self-appointed military 
leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government, as well as attempting 
to divest Pakistan of its Islamic identity. Groups on both sides of the religio-political 
spectrum were increasingly anti-government in their political rhetoric in this period. The 
controversy surrounding the cartoons, in particular the widespread anger, the violent 
protests, and the government’s own at times harsh response, again raised the question of 
whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf contended. 
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4.2.6 The dissemination of discourses of moderation in the Pakistani press 
 
Against the background of heated, and at times violent, protests against the publication of 
the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, and the attendant debate over Pakistan’s 
identity, the campaign to construct a soft image of the nation by drawing on aspects of Sufi 
tradition intensified. This is demonstrated by the increased official preference for Sufism in 
this period. There was a rise in the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, 
particularly during the urs festivals of prominent Sufi saints. There was also rise in the 
presence of government officials at conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, 
art, and literature festivals. Notably, President Musharraf was supported in his endeavours 
by other political actors who actively reproduced the official construction of an enlightened 
and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens through the lens of Sufism. Alongside 
official efforts to promote a soft image of the nation, and non-official efforts to promote 
Sufism generally, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan intensified their 
coverage on the subject of Sufism. This included more extensive reporting on the urs festival 
dates of prominent Sufi saints, and on the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences 
and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and arts festivals. It also included more extensive 
reporting on the presence of government officials and their activities at Sufi shrines. The 
increased official and non-official preference for Sufism is reflected in the below table.  
 
Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006. 
March 15, 2006. Three-day Data Sahib urs begins from 19th.  
March 16, 2006. The saint will keep us here.  
March 17, 2006. Festivals of bygone days.  
March 19, 2006. Devotees throng Lahore for Data Sahib's Urs.  
March 20, 2006. Pushto poetry's greatest son celebrated: Remembering Shinwari.  
March 21, 2006. Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance.  
March 25, 2006. Madhu Lal's Urs begins.  
March 28, 2006. Conference on Shah Hussain starts tomorrow.  
April 5, 2006. Hazrat Mian Mir's urs from 6th.  
April 8, 2006. Mian Mir's Urs ends.  
April 8, 2006. Say it with Sufism.  
April 9, 2006. Mela Uch Sharif concludes.  
April 9, 2006. RPT bringing musical element of Sufism to 'life'.  
April 13, 2006. Sufi music festival beginning today.  
April 14, 2006. Take a look around, say Swiss tourists.  
April 15, 2006. Mystic music continues to delight audience.  
April 16, 2006. Spending 3 weeks in mystic touch.  
April 17, 2006. Sufi music festival mesmerises audience.  
April 22, 2006. World Punjabi Congress announces charter.  
May 1, 2006. International Conference on Sindh - Past, present and future.  
May 2, 2006. Shah Jamal's Urs begins today.  
May 3, 2006. Pappu Saeen beats the drum for Shah Jamal.  
May 14, 2006. Bari Imam urs begins today.  
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Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006. 
May 19, 2006. Bari Imam urs ends.  
May 19, 2006. 'It's the main religious and recreational event in the region'.  
May 20, 2006. Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace.  
June 3, 2006. Mystic's truth? Military dictator fulfilled a saint's prediction.  
July 19, 2006. Waris Shah's Urs begins on July 23.  
July 25, 2006. Colourful night.  
July 26, 2006. Urs of Pir Waris Shah concluded.  
August 17, 2006. Death anniversary of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan forgotten. 
August 19, 2006. Wasif Ali Wasif - a humanist in the true sense.  
August 20, 2006. Baba Bullay Shah's Urs.  
August 21, 2006. Daira Din Panah shrine set to recall past glory.  
August 21, 2006. Dreshak pays tribute to Wasif.  
August 27, 2006. Bulleh Shah's Urs begins in Kasur.  
August 27, 2006. 5-hour 'protocol' shutdown leaves devotees stuck.  
August 29, 2006. Bulleh Shah's Urs ends in Kasur.  
August 30, 2006. Lahore | Field of dreams.  
Table 1: Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006 
 
The above table lists the headlines that appeared in one English-language newspaper, the 
Daily Times on-line edition, on the subject of Sufism in the six-month period between March 
and August 2006.424 In this period, English-language newspapers regularly reported what 
political actors and commentators had to say on the subject of Sufism. However, the print 
media also played a more active role. The strategies used by the Government of Pakistan in 
the construction of a national Sufi identity were reproduced and disseminated in English-
language newspapers. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
Joining the campaign to foster moderate and enlightened interpretations of Pakistan’s 
national identity, and contribute towards the creation of a soft image of the nation, English-
language newspapers also relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral forces within 
Pakistani society: the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). One of the most important 
moral forces in society for the majority of Pakistani citizens is religion. In the climate of 
extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, what is apparent in this period are attempts to 
encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national 
identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. Like President 
Musharraf, the print media did so by promoting a shared religio-national consciousness 
                                                            
424 The Daily Times is a leading English-language national newspaper in Pakistan and proponent of liberal-secular 
ideas. The newspaper was founded in 2002 by Salman Taseer, a long-standing member of the PPP, and Governor of 
the Punjab between 2008-2011. Taseer was assassinated on January 4, 2011, by his bodyguard Malik Mumtaz Qadri 
who was a member of Dawat-e-Islami, a non-political group inspired by the essentially non-violent Barelvi 
ideology. Qadri and other religiously conservative Muslims were critical of Taseer's calls for a reform of the 
blasphemy laws, as well as his support of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman who was sentenced to death for allegedly 
insulting the Prophet Muhammad and Islam. 
 
 129 
based on the moral and peace-building aspects found within Sufism. Headlines such as: 
‘Education is the only way out’, ‘Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance’, ‘Say it with 
Sufism’, ‘Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace’, ‘Wasif Ali Wasif - a humanist 
in the true sense’ are examples of this type of strategy.425 In addition, the themes of ‘love’, 
‘tolerance’, ‘universal brotherhood’, and ‘peace’ appeared repeatedly in local, national, and 
international news articles, feature articles, editorials, columns, and opinion pieces.  
 
The relevance of Sufism in the creation of a shared religio-national consciousness was also 
evident in the increased official presence at Sufi shrines, at conferences and seminars on 
Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. This official preference for Sufism was 
widely reported in the Pakistani print media in this period. The urs festival of Abul Hassan 
Ali Hajvery or Data Ganj Bakhsh, as he is more popularly known, is a typical example. The 
Daily Times reported: 
 
Devotees throng Lahore for Data Sahib's Urs [Headline] 
 
LAHORE: Punjab Governor Lt General (r) Khalid Maqbool will inaugurate 
Data Gunj Buksh’s 962nd Urs today (Sunday). Millions of devotees from all 
parts of the country have arrived in Lahore to attend the event, one of the 
country’s largest spiritual gatherings, to pay tribute to the great Muslim saint. 
The Urs will continue for three days. Punjab government has allocated Rs 2.5 
million for special arrangements for the Urs, including a ‘langar’ and a ‘sabeel’, 
and the City District Government Lahore (CDGL) has planned to announce a 
local holiday on the occasion. Punjab Governor Lt General (r) Khalid Maqbool 
will lay a floral wreath and chador at the shrine and inaugurate the milk 
‘sabeel’ after Isha prayer.426 
 
Data Ganj Bakhsh is a renowned eleventh-century Sufi poet-saint whose shrine is located in 
Lahore. In March 2006, the dates of his 962nd urs festival were widely published in the print 
media. The City District Government (Lahore) declared a local holiday to mark the occasion. 
The Punjab Government announced the allocation of 2.5 million rupees to assist in the 
arrangements, which included provision for a langar (communal kitchen) and milk sabeel. 
The Aquaf and Religious Affairs Secretary (Punjab) Syed Rais Abass Zaidi opened the 
informal urs ceremonies with a speech and Qur’an recitation competition. A seminar entitled 
‘Syed Hajwair Tasawuf’ was held alongside the festivities. Lieutenant General (retired) and 
Governor (Punjab) Khalid Maqbool formally opened the urs with a traditional chador-poshi or 
sheet-laying ceremony. Notably, these spiritual and custodian ceremonies are customarily 
performed by the sajjada nashin. By firmly linking the administration to Islam by way of the 
Sufi tradition, the assertion was that religious legitimacy and authority flow from devotion 
to Data Ganj Bakhsh and his shrine. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
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As discussed previously, an essential element of persuasive political discourse is the close 
association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical 
consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. A number of official historical 
narratives were reproduced in the print media in order to appeal to a shared historical 
consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. For example, in February 2006 Chief Minister 
(Punjab) Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi addressed a two-day international conference History and 
Civilization of the Muslim World at the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 
Lahore. The Daily Times reported: 
 
Education is the only way out [Headline] 
 
LAHORE: Contemporary historians should follow the footsteps of sufis and 
play their role in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam, highlighting 
Islam’s role in the evolution of learning and art, said Punjab Chief Minister 
Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi at a two-day international conference on Muslim 
civilisation and history on Tuesday. Elahi said that conflicts between 
civilisations were disrupting global peace, therefore historians should step 
forward to set things right. He said knowledge and piety held a significant 
position in Islam and historians could not do justice to the Islamic history 
without determining its values. The chief minister said that Baba Farid Shakar 
Ganj, Data Ganj Buksh, Baba Guru Nanak, Baba Bulleh Shah, Waris Shah and 
Hazrat Mian Mir were not only preachers, but also historians of social history.427 
 
In the above extract, the narrative aimed to promote the important role Sufi saints played as 
social historians and educators in order to positively invoke a shared moderate and 
enlightened historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. This is clear in the 
statements: ‘Contemporary historians should follow the footsteps of sufis and play their role 
in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam’ and ‘Baba Farid Shakar Ganj, Data Ganj 
Buksh, Baba Guru Nanak, Baba Bulleh Shah, Waris Shah and Hazrat Mian Mir were not 
only preachers, but also historians of social history.’ In addition, emphasis was placed on the 
role these Sufis played in imparting essential Islamic values to others. This is clear in the 
statement: ‘Knowledge and piety held a significant position in Islam and historians could 
not do justice to the Islamic history without determining its values.’ The implications were 
two-fold. First, that moderate and enlightened values had long been an intrinsic part of 
Muslim culture in Pakistan. Second, that Sufi saints were instrumental in disseminating 
those values. 
 
In March, the urs festival or mela of Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari was also widely 
publicised in the media. Bukhari is a thirteenth-century Sufi saint whose shrine is located in 
Uch Sharif (Punjab). The town is famous for its Sufi tombs which are on the UNESCO World 
Heritage Tentative List.428 The Daily Times reported: 
 
Mela Uch Sharif concludes [Headline] 
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BAHAWALPUR: Mela Uch Sharif started on March 31 ended on Friday after 
weeklong celebrations. A large number of people from southern Punjab came to 
the historic town Uch Sharif to pay homage to the great sufi saint, Hazrat 
Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari (RA), for spreading Islam. Following the 
centuries old tradition, people visited the shrine of Hazrat Jalaluddin 
Surukhposh Bukhari to start the mela. Majority of the people and devotees of 
Hazrat Syed Jalal spent the entire day at the shrine and offered Friday prayers 
at the historic Jamia Masjid built by the Abbasid rulers. The mela was held to 
mark the historic congregation of sufi saints held in 600 AH on the invitation of 
Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari.429 
 
In the above extract, a number of narratives were relied upon to positively invoke a shared 
historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. The first narrative aimed to 
promote the important role Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari played in promoting Islam in the 
Indian subcontinent. According to the newspaper article, ‘a large number of people from 
southern Punjab came to the historic town Uch Sharif to pay homage to the great sufi saint, 
Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari (RA), for spreading Islam’. Bukhari is thought to be 
one of the legendary chaar yaar, four friends committed to converting the local population to 
Islam by way of the Sufi tradition. The second narrative aimed to promote the historical 
importance of the saint, the shrine, and the urs ceremonies held there annually. This is clear 
in the statement: ‘Following the centuries old tradition, people visited the shrine of Hazrat 
Jalaluddin Surukhposh Bukhari to start the mela. Majority of the people and devotees of 
Hazrat Syed Jalal spent the entire day at the shrine and offered Friday prayers at the historic 
Jamia Masjid built by the Abbasid rulers’. It is also clear in the statement: ‘The mela was held 
to mark the historic congregation of sufi saints held in 600 AH on the invitation of Hazrat 
Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari’. The implication was that the ‘centuries old tradition’, which 
takes place at the shrine of Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari, has a long and renowned history 
in Pakistan. In short, continuity with the nation’s valued past flows from devotion to 
Bukhari and his shrine. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
The third strategy that was reproduced in English-language newspapers in Pakistan was the 
construction of a negative ‘Other’. The negative ‘Other’ was closely tied to and, crucially, 
posed a distinct threat to the ultimate moral forces of nationalism and religion. Difference 
was constructed by way of a polarising strategy of positive ‘us’-presentation and negative 
‘Other’-presentation. The implication was that the in-group was acting in the national 
interest whereas the out-group was acting against the national interest. Based on that 
premise, the following extracts illustrate the ways in which the print media attempted to 
construct a negative ‘Other’ in order to persuade the Pakistani public to form a unified 
community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and 
economically. 
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As discussed, Chief Minister Elahi addressed a two-day international conference History 
and Civilization of the Muslim World at the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 
in February 2006. At the time, anger over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad was 
being expressed in large-scale, heated, and at times violent protests across the nation. His 
address contained two narratives: firstly, that moderate and enlightened values were an 
intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan, and secondly, that Sufi saints were instrumental 
in disseminating those values. Elahi urged contemporary historians to ‘follow the footsteps 
of sufis and play their role in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam’.430 The Chief 
Minister was also quoted as saying: 
 
[H]e was concerned about certain people who were trying to disrupt peace 
under the prevailing circumstances, but the world was not short of people that 
wanted to prevent a clash of civilisations. Common values should be promoted 
instead of contradictions and problems could be solved through dialogue, he 
said, adding that education was the only way out. 431 
 
The above extract illustrates one of the dominant narratives used to create a negative ‘Other’ 
in the minds of the Pakistani people. Interestingly, the negative ‘Other’ was not referred to 
directly in this extract. Instead, the construction of a negative ‘Other’ relied primarily on an 
appeal to religio-nationalist sentiment. In this example, the out-group was anyone who was 
‘trying to disrupt peace’ in Pakistan and anyone who wanted to engender a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ between Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Conversely, the in-group was 
anyone who supported ‘peace’ and ‘wanted to prevent a clash of civilisations’. In short, the 
out-group was acting against the national interest, whereas the in-group was acting in 
accordance with the national interest. The implication of this address, which focussed on the 
positive role Sufi saints played in the dissemination of moderate and enlightened values, 
was that the out-group was a threat to Islam whereas the in-group was acting in accordance 
with ‘true’ Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. 
 
Two months later, on the occasion of Eid Milad un-Nabi, Chief Minister Elahi addressed a 
gathering of ulama at a provincial Seerat Conference in Lahore.432 The main theme of the 
address was the elimination of sectarianism from Pakistani society. The Daily Times 
reported: 
 
Elahi urges clerics to preach tolerance [Headline] 
 
[Elahi] said it was a matter of concern that patience and forgiveness had 
vanished from Pakistani society. He said sectarianism was dangerous for 
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Pakistan and urged clerics to play their role to eliminate the menace. Elahi said 
that Islam was a religion of peace and it did not allow anyone to impose his 
ideology on others. He said it was unfortunate that Islam was being presented 
as a religion of extremism, which was because Muslims had not been able to 
project their religion in its true perspective. He said that Prophet Muhammad’s 
(peace be upon him) life was a practical manifestation of Islamic teachings and 
it was an article of faith for Muslims to follow the Holy Prophet’s (pbuh) 
teachings.433 
 
In the above extract, the construction of a negative ‘Other’ was rather wide and included 
sectarianists and extremists. The use of pejoratives such as ‘sectarianism’, ‘dangerous’, 
‘menace’, and ‘extremism’ served to portray the negative aspects of the out-group. Chief 
Minister Elahi presented the negative ‘Other’ as anyone who posed a threat to Pakistan. This 
is demonstrated in the statements: ‘sectarianism was dangerous for Pakistan’, ‘Islam was a 
religion of peace and it did not allow anyone to impose his ideology on others’ and ‘Islam 
was being presented as a religion of extremism’. For Elahi, the negative ‘Other’ was anyone 
who threatened Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community in 
Pakistan. In this narrative, Sufism was presented as moderate and tolerant. This is clear in 
the statements: ‘patience and forgiveness’, ‘Islam was a religion of peace’, ‘Muslims had not 
been able to project their religion in its true perspective’. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
As discussed previously, the motivating sources President Musharraf relied upon in an 
appeal for unification were the moral forces of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In 
his political discourse Musharraf adopted a hybrid appeal to temporal and spiritual 
rewards. He believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was 
central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for 
physical force. Musharraf envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing 
in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful 
and prosperous civil society. A number of narratives were reproduced in the print media in 
line with President Musharraf’s strategy to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a 
unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially 
and economically. The Daily Times reported: 
 
Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance [Headline] 
 
Monday’s ceremony began with recitation from the holy Quran. Speakers paid 
tribute to the great Muslim saint on the occasion and said Data Sahib preached 
Islam by practice. They said Pakistani society needed the tolerance, patience 
and inter religious harmony taught by the Sufi saint for Pakistan to progress.434 
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In the above extract, the print media focused on the ethical and peace-building aspects 
found within Islam in its appeal to the community for unity and peace. This is evident in the 
statements: ‘Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance’ and ‘Pakistani society needed the 
tolerance, patience and inter religious harmony taught by the Sufi saint for Pakistan to 
progress’. Notably, the themes of ‘tolerance’ and ‘religious harmony’ appeared frequently in 
the rhetoric of President Musharraf and constituted his major leitmotifs, particularly in the 
latter half of his political tenure. With its message of philosophical, spiritual, and social 
harmony, Sufism has often been interpreted as being inclusive, moderate, peaceful, and 
tolerant. This message is typical of that reproduced in the media in this period in an attempt 
to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community and interact peaceably. 
 
The annual urs festival of Abdul Latif Kazmi, or Bari Imam, was also widely published in the 
print media. The Islamabad District Administration and the District Auqaf Directorate 
arranged the event which was attended by 200,000 devotees. National Assembly Speaker 
Chaudhry Amir Hussain opened the ceremony, and the concluding ceremony was presided 
over by Senate Chairman Muhammad Mian Soomro. The Daily Times reported: 
 
Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace [Headline] 
 
ISLAMABAD: The five-day annual ‘Urs’ of the saint Syed Abdul Latif Kazmi, 
better known as ‘Bari Imam’, concluded after the Rasm-e-Charaghan ceremony 
at the Mazar, with prayers for the progress, prosperity and the solidarity of the 
Muslim Ummah and the Pakistani people. The ceremony opened with a ‘chadar 
poshi’ by National Assembly Speaker Chaudhry Amir Hussain on May 14 and 
the concluding ceremony presided over by Senate Chairman Muhammadmian 
Soomro underlined an increasing need for coordination and unity among the 
Ummah to overcome the challenges facing them at present. Soomro paid rich 
tributes to the religious and social services of the great saint and said that the 
world could be peaceful if people chose to follow in the footsteps of Sufis such 
as Hazrat Bari Imam. He also stressed on implementing the message of peace, 
love, fraternity, harmony and equity preached by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). 
“Our religion is the most tolerant religion in the world and we need to project it 
as a moderate religion to the international community,” he said.435 
 
The above extract illustrates the familiar official narratives popularised by the print media in 
this period. In an attempt to rid Pakistani society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, 
and project a moderate Islam, as part of the wider campaign to project a soft image of 
Pakistan, the print media chose to highlight temporal and spiritual rewards. This is clear in 
the statements: ‘Soomro paid rich tributes to the religious and social services of the great 
saint and said that the world could be peaceful if people chose to follow in the footsteps of 
Sufis such as Hazrat Bari Imam’ and ‘Our religion is the most tolerant religion in the world 
and we need to project it as a moderate religion to the international community’. In this, the 
‘religious and social services’ of Bari Imam and other Sufi saints provided a useful example 
with which to ensure the ‘progress’, ‘prosperity’, and ‘solidarity’ for not only the people of 
Pakistan but also the entire Muslim ummah and the international community. 
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4.3 The formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (NCPS) 
 
In the latter half of 2006 the increased preference for Sufism was reflected in the creation of a 
council for the promotion of Sufism. In September, the Ministry of Culture announced the 
formation of the NCPS, with President Musharraf as its Patron in Chief. According to the 
Daily times, the main aim of the council was to ‘spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance 
and universal brotherhood [to] integrate regional diversity with national unity’.436 In order to 
achieve the aims set out in the terms of reference, the government worked primarily through 
the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), and the Ministry of 
Education, Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL). With an emphasis on culture and education, 
the NCPS aimed to promote and disseminate its official construction of Sufism at 
conferences, seminars, workshops, music, art and literature festivals, and through 
affiliations to educational institutions and scholars. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The NCPS held its inaugural meeting in Islamabad on October 12, 2006. The meeting was 
presided over by NCPS Chairman and PML-Q President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. 
Extracts taken from statements made by Chaudhry Hussain and other NCPS members were 
quoted in Dawn newspaper the following day: 
 
Sufism to be promoted, says Shujaat [Headline] 
 
ISLAMABAD Oct 12: Pakistan Muslim League president Chaudhry Shujaat 
Hussain has said that practical steps will be taken for disseminating the 
teachings of sufis in the country. Chaudhry Shujaat, who is chairman of the 
National Council of Sufism (NCS), was presiding over the first meeting of the 
council here on Thursday. He said mankind was united against coercion and 
“we need to adopt sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression”. 
Sufis, he pointed out, had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood 
and said steps would have to be taken towards that end. He said there was a 
need to propagate the message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, 
Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal, adding that an Iqbal festival would be held 
on Nov 9 at which an album titled Allama Iqbal’s message of courage for 
youths would be released. In December, he said, a Roomi festival would be 
held. 
 
Mr Mushahid Hussain suggested that the culture of brotherhood and tolerance 
could be promoted through sufi music. He said sufis could play an important 
role in creation of the inter-faith harmony. He said a PhD degree programme on 
teaching of sufis would be initiated in all universities of the country. He 
informed the meeting that there were 534 mazars in Punjab, 221 in Sindh, 159 in 
NWFP and 69 in Balochistan.437 
 
In the above extract, the ultimate moral force that was privileged to convince the Pakistani 
public to support government efforts to unify the nation, reconcile religious difference, and 
arrest religious violence was Sufism. This is clear in statements such as: 'we need to adopt 
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sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression', 'Sufis […] had given the message of 
peace, love and brotherhood', 'there was a need to propagate the message of Shah Abdul 
Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal', 'the culture of brotherhood 
and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music', and 'sufis could play an important 
role in creation of the inter-faith harmony'. Crucially, Sufism was positioned as the main 
source of moral authority for Pakistan at a time when Islam had become synonymous with 
intolerance, militancy, and terrorism. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
To convince the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society, 
Sufism, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain attempted to create a negative ‘Other’. His construction 
of a negative ‘Other’ relied primarily on an appeal to Sufism. This is demonstrated in the 
statements: ‘mankind was united against coercion and we need to adopt sufism in our lives 
to end oppression and suppression’, ‘Sufis […] had given the message of peace, love and 
brotherhood and […] steps would have to be taken towards that end’, and ‘the culture of 
brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music. […] Sufis could play an 
important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony’. The negative aspects of the out-group 
were emphasised through the use of pejoratives such as ‘coercion’, ‘oppression’, and 
‘suppression’. Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group were emphasised through the 
use of approbatory themes such as ‘peace’, ‘love’, ‘brotherhood’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘inter-faith 
harmony’. Moreover, by emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group, Shujaat Hussain 
aimed to create, by implication, an image of what the out-group was not. In short, the 
negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful nor tolerant. In essence, 
the negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who threatened ‘true’ Islam as practiced by 
the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
To encourage the Pakistani public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society, 
Sufism, against a negative ‘Other’, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain chose to present a utopian 
vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan. This is clear in the statements: ‘mankind was 
united against coercion and we need to adopt sufism in our lives to end oppression and 
suppression. Sufis […] had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood and said steps 
would have to be taken towards that end’, and ‘there was a need to propagate the message 
of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal’. This is also 
clear in a statement from PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS member Mushahid Hussain 
Syed who said: ‘the culture of brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi 
music. […] Sufis could play an important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony. […] A 
PhD degree programme on teaching of sufis would be initiated in all universities of the 
country’. Crucially, the construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of 
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Pakistan was dependent upon the social and moral development of Pakistani society, which 
could only be achieved through Sufism. 
 
On November 9, 2006, President Musharraf inaugurated the annual World Performing Arts 
Festival at the Alhamra Open Air Theatre in Lahore. The 10-day arts festival was organised 
by the Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop and the Lahore Arts Council. The formal launch of the 
festival by Musharraf was the president’s first official effort to foster Sufism following the 
creation of the NCPS in September. At the launch, Musharraf announced that the 
government would be donating three million rupees to the Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop to 
assist in its efforts to promote Sufism through art and culture. By way of justification, the 
president was quoted as saying ‘Sufism always gave a message of love and tolerance’.438 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The following day President Musharraf addressed the launch ceremony of the album Apna 
Muqam Paida Kar (to create an identity for oneself) at Hazuri Bagh in Lahore. Produced by 
the NCPS, the album was based upon the Sufi-inspired poetry of Muhammad Iqbal, whose 
famous tomb is located adjacent to the gardens. The Daily Times reported:  
 
Mystic poetry promotes tolerance, says Musharraf [Headline] 
 
LAHORE: Sufi poets’ teachings can help promote tolerance and peace in 
society, President Pervez Musharraf said on Friday.  
 
“These sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness 
of humanity, not for disunity or hatred,” the president told the launch 
ceremony of musical album ‘Apna muqam paida kar’ at Hazoori Bagh.  
 
The album, based on the poetry of Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal and produced 
by the National Sufi Council, includes numbers by vocalists Fareeha Pervaiz, 
Abrarul Haq, Jawwad Ahmad, Shabnam Majeed, Humaira Arshad, Masuma 
Anwer and Rahat Fateh Ali Khan.  
 
President Musharraf said that Islam emphasised the rights of the people, 
adding that people’s rights had also been the hallmark of sufi poets’ teachings. 
He said that Allama Iqbal always preached the oneness of humanity and 
tolerance. He said that it was the sufis who propagated Islam in South Asia.439 
 
In the above extract, President Musharraf again privileged Sufism as part of his efforts to 
promote it as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society. This is demonstrated in the 
statements: ‘Mystic poetry promotes tolerance’, ‘Sufi poets’ teachings can help promote 
tolerance and peace in society’, ‘these sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of 
love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred’, and ‘Islam emphasised the rights 
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of the people […] people’s rights had also been the hallmark of sufi poets’ teachings. […] 
Allama Iqbal always preached the oneness of humanity and tolerance’. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
To further legitimise his political rhetoric, President Musharraf relied upon three strategies 
found within the ‘call to arms’ genre in an attempt to rally popular support for non-violent 
action and socio-economic uplift. First, Musharraf attempted to convince the nation that 
Sufism was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. As discussed previously, there is 
a close association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical 
consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. In the above extract, Musharraf 
emphasised the important role Sufi saints played as exemplars and educators of Islam, 
morality, and human rights to positively appeal to a shared moderate and enlightened 
historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. This is clear in the statements: ‘It 
was the sufis who propagated Islam in South Asia’, ‘These sufis (saints) had always worked 
for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred’, and ‘Islam 
emphasised the rights of the people, adding that people’s rights had also been the hallmark 
of sufi poets’ teachings’. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
Second, Musharraf contrasted some of the integrative, moral, and peace-building aspects of 
Sufi tradition, such as 'tolerance', 'peace', 'love', 'oneness of humanity', and 'the rights of the 
people', with groups that caused 'disunity' and 'hatred' within Pakistani society. This 
strategy was intended to create a negative ‘Other’ in the minds of the Pakistani public and is 
clear in his statement: ‘Sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and 
oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred’. The implication was that the in-group, by 
acting in accordance with ‘true’ Islam as practiced by Sufi saints and the majority Sufi-
inspired Barelvi population, was acting in the national interest, whereas the out-group was 
not. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
Third, Musharraf presented a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan in 
order to encourage the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society. This is 
evident in his statements: 'Sufi poets’ teachings can help promote tolerance and peace in 
society' and 'Sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of 
humanity, not for disunity or hatred'. As discussed, Sufism is generally concerned with 
matters of the soul, which are conveyed by spiritual masters to their disciples. Emphasis is 
placed on correct behaviour and correct belief. Musharraf believed that the violence and 
hatred that existed within Pakistani society could only be reversed through ‘the promotion 
of love and oneness of humanity’, which is given its fullest spiritual expression in Sufi 
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poetry. Moreover, the lyrics sung by Sufi qawwals are drawn predominantly from Sufi poetry 
and are aimed at drawing listeners nearer to the divine. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
These discursive strategies were also employed by PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS 
member Mushahid Hussain Syed in his official address at a seminar on Sufism in February 
2007. The Sufi seminar, which was organised by the NCPS and the National Institute of 
Historical and Cultural Research (NIHCR), was held in Islamabad. Extracts taken from 
statements made by Mushahid Hussain Syed and other prominent commentators on Sufism 
were subsequently quoted in the Associated Press of Pakistan the following day: 
 
Love, learning provides path towards peace: Mushahid [Headline] 
 
ISLAMABAD, Feb 20 (APP): Pakistan Muslim League Secretary General 
Mushahid Hussain Syed Tuesday said there are no boundaries for love and 
learning that provide a path towards peace and harmony in the world. He was 
addressing a seminar on Sufism organised by Pakistan Sufi Council in 
collaboration with the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research 
here. 
 
Mushahid said key to change is what is in one's heart for other human beings 
because "without purifying ourselves we cannot come up as a good human 
being." Arrogance is the core of all evils and one of the basic reasons for war 
and confrontation across the world, Mushahid said, adding that concerted 
efforts are needed to promote justice and generosity globally.  
 
Mushahid said there are 800 million Muslims in South Asia and message of 
Islam was spread in this region by saints who came here from other regions. He 
said there are also a large number of non-Muslim followers of Khwaja Ajmair 
Sharif who contributed a lot to promote love and harmony in the region.440 
 
As part of the official campaign to promote a soft image of Pakistan, both domestically and 
internationally, Mushahid Hussain Syed relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral force 
within Pakistani society (religion). In the above extract, he privileged Sufism as an 
enlightened and moderate alternative to the image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism, 
extremism, and violence. At the same time, he also presented Sufism as the solution to the 
problems of conflict and discord internationally. This is clear in his statement: ‘there are no 
boundaries for love and learning that provide a path towards peace and harmony in the 
world’.  
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
To persuade the Pakistani public to support official efforts to construct an enlightened and 
moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition, 
Mushahid Hussain Syed invoked a shared historical consciousness. Syed reminded the 
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nation that Sufism was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. This is demonstrated 
in his statement: ‘There are 800 million Muslims in South Asia and [the] message of Islam 
was spread in this region by saints who came here from other regions’. Again, emphasis was 
placed on the important role Sufi saints played as exemplars and educators of Islam. The fact 
that South Asia was home to eight hundred million Muslims was presented as evidence of 
the popularity of Sufism and the success of Sufi saints in converting the Hindu and Buddhist 
population to Islam. Mushahid Hussain Syed attempted to link the popular historical 
consciousness surrounding one particular conversion theory in order to justify his appeal to 
Sufism. Again, the predominant narrative was that continuity with the nation’s valued past 
flows from devotion to Sufism. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
To further convince the public to support official efforts to promote Sufism, Syed made an 
appeal based primarily on utopian social and political rewards. This is clear in his statement: 
‘Key to change is what is in one's heart for other human beings because without purifying 
ourselves we cannot come up as a good human being. Arrogance is the core of all evils and 
one of the basic reasons for war and confrontation across the world’. Specifically, Syed 
emphasised the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Sufism such as ‘love’, 
‘peace’, and ‘harmony’. As discussed previously, the Sufi path is generally concerned with 
an individual’s spiritual growth, which combines correct behaviour and correct belief. By 
linking Sufism with social and political change, the onus for peace and national unity was 
placed firmly on the social and moral development of the individual. The reward would be a 
peaceful and harmonious society, free from religious intolerance and violence. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
One week after the seminar on Sufism the Rumi Forum held a Turkish Whirling Dervishes 
performance in honour of Jalal-ud-din Rumi, in conjunction with the NCPS, Pakistan 
National Council of the Arts, the Ministry of Culture, and the Capital Development 
Authority.441 Performances were held at the Convention Centre in Islamabad, the Alhamra 
Art Centre in Lahore, and the Art Council in Karachi. According to the Rumi Forum, more 
than 2,000 people watched the whirling dervishes perform at the Islamabad Convention 
Centre. Performances at the Alhamra Art Centre in Lahore and the Karachi Art Council 
attracted audiences of eight hundred and five hundred people respectively.442 Chief guest at 
the Islamabad performance was Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who was accompanied by his 
wife Rukhsana. Also in attendance were PML-Q President and NCPS Chairman Shujaat 
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Hussain, PML-Q Secretary-General and member of the NCPS Mushahid Hussain Syed, as 
well as various cabinet members, diplomats, and the Turkish Ambassador.443 Extracts taken 
from statements made by the prime minister of Pakistan and members of the NCPS were 
quoted in the Associated Press of Pakistan: 
 
Maulana Rumi an icon of sufism, mysticism: PM [Headline] 
 
ISLAMABAD, Feb 26 (APP): Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz describing Maulana 
Jalaluddin Rumi as an icon of sufism and mysticism said Monday sufism is 
spreading around the world and transmitting the message of love, tolerance 
and brotherhood. 
 
"Maulana Rumi is the icon of sufism and mysticism and Konya - the city of 
Turkey - is the center of sufism," the Prime Minister said. He made these 
remarks while speaking as the chief guest at a night dedicated to Rumi through 
a magical performance by the world-renowned "Turkish Whirling Dervishes: 
Sema" here at the Convention Center. 
  
Prime Minister Aziz said Pakistan is also a land of Sufis and Mystics like Data 
Gang Bakhsh, Khushhal Khan Khattak, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai and others who 
devoted their lives to spread Islam and the message of love and brotherhood in 
this region. He said Sufism is getting popular even in the West, as it carries the 
message of peace, love, harmony and brotherhood. 
  
Earlier, Mushahid Hussain Syed, member of the National Sufi Council speaking 
on the occasion said Sufism provides the essence of Islam, which promotes 
love, tolerance and harmony. He said, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, who is our 
national poet, considered himself as a student and pupil of Maulana Rumi and 
got all inspiration from Maulana Rumi. Mushahid said, the National Sufi 
Council was formed on the initiative of President General Pervez Musharraf, 
who is also patron-in-chief of the council.444 
 
In the above extract, Prime Minister Aziz clearly emphasised Sufism as the ultimate moral 
authority within Pakistani society. The essential values found within Sufism, namely ‘love’, 
‘tolerance’, and ‘universal brotherhood’ appear repeatedly in his statements: 'Sufism is 
spreading around the world and transmitting the message of love, tolerance and 
brotherhood', 'Pakistan is also a land of Sufis and Mystics like Data Gang Bakhsh, Khushhal 
Khan Khattak, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai and others who devoted their lives to spread Islam 
and the message of love and brotherhood in this region', and 'Sufism is getting popular even 
in the West, as it carries the message of peace, love, harmony and brotherhood'. These 
themes were echoed in a statement from PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS member 
Mushahid Hussain Syed, who said: ‘Sufism provides the essence of Islam, which promotes 
love, tolerance and harmony’. The dominant narrative was that Pakistan is ‘a land of Sufis’ 
who could help to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and harmonious culture both domestically and 
internationally. 
4.4 The decline of President Musharraf 
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A number of events served to overshadow the official discourses of peace in 2007. According 
to the HRCP, Pakistan’s sixtieth year as an independent nation ‘proved to be one of the 
worst years in Pakistan’s history, if not the worst’.445 Events began in early January when US 
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told the Senate Select Committee that 
leaders of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were rebuilding terrorist networks from within 
Pakistan. 
 
Al-Qa'ida is the terrorist organization that poses the greatest threat to US 
interests, including to the Homeland. […] They continue to plot attacks against 
our Homeland and other targets with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. 
And they continue to maintain active connections and relationships that radiate 
outward from their leaders' secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout 
the Middle East, northern Africa, and Europe.446 
 
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry rejected the claims, reconfirming its commitment in the ‘war on 
terror’.447 Similarly, President Musharraf was quoted as saying 'the allegation that the 
Pakistan government or the ISI may be helping the Taliban [was] preposterous’.448  
 
At the same time, tensions between the Musharraf-led administration and religious groups, 
one advocating for a progressive democratic Muslim nation and the other in favour of an 
Islamic state, were demonstrated in the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) controversy. The 
controversy began in January 2007, when the Capital Development Authority demolished a 
number of mosques in Islamabad, claiming they were built illegally. Female students from 
the Jamia Hafsa Madrassah, located in the Lal Masjid complex, occupied the children’s 
library in protest. The Lal Masjid management, headed by brothers Abdul Rashid Ghazi and 
Abdul Aziz Ghazi, which itself had ignored several government vacation notices for land 
encroachment, condemned the demolition of the mosques. Of particular concern to the 
government was the increase in religious conservatism from people with links to Lal Masjid. 
Abdul Aziz had given the government an ultimatum 'to enforce sharia in the country 
otherwise clerics will Islamise society themselves'.449 Aziz also threatened to take action 
against brothels and gabling dens in Islamabad and elsewhere, and to prosecute 
perpetrators according to Shari’a law. Some of the students attempted to forcibly impose 
their particular social and moral code. The CII, which advises the government on matters of 
Shari’a law, responded by requesting that the government move to prevent Jamia Hafsa 
students and clerics from conducting their own anti-vice campaign in Islamabad. Members 
of the CII feared the ‘growing lawlessness and religious extremism in the country’ and 
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appealed to religious leaders to denounce sectarianism, religious extremism, and 
lawlessness.450  
 
The six-month long Lal Masjid controversy ended in July, when the Pakistan military 
entered the mosque complex. Security forces took the mosque, Jamia Hafsa, and the 
children’s library by force following failed talks between a delegation of ministers and 
clerics. The operation resulted in the deaths of more than eighty people, whilst dozens more 
were injured.451 Two days later, in an address to the nation, President Musharraf announced 
the ‘Lal Mosque, Jamia Hafsa and the forced occupation of Children Library has been freed 
from the control of terrorists'.452 He also reconfirmed his commitment to 'eradicate terrorism 
and extremism from the country'.453 Two weeks later alleged Taliban-affiliated militants 
attacked the shrine of Haji Sahab Turangzi in Lakaro, Mohamand Agency (FATA), forcibly 
occupying the shrine and renaming it Lal Masjid. The leader of the militants, Umar Khalid, 
said the shrine was ‘the centre of the jihad launched by Haji Sahib Turangzai against the 
British rulers [and] we want to take forward the missions of Haji Turangzai and Lal Masjid’s 
slain khateeb Ghazi Abdul Rashid’.454 
 
In this period it became clear that President Musharraf would seek re-election for a second 
term as president of Pakistan. However, his failure to relinquish his position of chief of army 
staff drew much criticism from opposition political parties and the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan. In March, President Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammed 
Chaudhry under article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) for 
alleged abuses of office.455 The suspension triggered a nation-wide movement led by 
Pakistani lawyers in protest against the government for undermining the independence of 
the judiciary. The government responded by making mass arrests, and detaining many 
lawyers on charges of terrorism. President Musharraf also imposed curbs on electronic 
media under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Ordinance 
(2007). The implementation of the ordinance triggered further anti-government opposition 
from journalists, politicians, and lawyers across Pakistan.  
 
On October 18, Benazir Bhutto of the PPP returned to Pakistan following an eight-year self-
imposed exile in Dubai and London. President Musharraf had granted Bhutto an amnesty 
from previous corruption charges, thus enabling her to return to Pakistan to campaign in the 
2008 general election. The Daily Times quoted Bhutto as saying: 
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It’s a historic and very emotional moment for me, I am overwhelmed. […] I 
have learned a lot over the last 20 years but we are still fighting a dictatorship, 
we want to isolate extremists and build a better Pakistan.456 
 
In Karachi, the city of her birth, hundreds of thousands of people turned out to welcome the 
former prime minister home. However, as her cavalcade slowly wound its way from Jinnah 
International Airport to the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, where Bhutto was 
scheduled to address a rally, suicide bombers with suspected links to Al-Qaeda, attacked her 
procession. Ms Bhutto survived the attack, but more than one hundred and thirty people 
were killed and hundreds more were injured.457  
 
Tensions between President Musharraf and the Supreme Court of Pakistan intensified in 
October when, following his re-election as president earlier that month, the Supreme Court 
delayed ratifying the decision owing to Musharraf’s failure to relinquish his position of chief 
of army staff. The Supreme Court deemed it unconstitutional for Musharraf to hold the 
position whilst also holding the office of president. On November 3, a day known as Black 
Saturday, President Musharraf issued a Proclamation of Emergency (POE).458 Television 
channels and telephone lines in many cities were suspended. In the address to the nation, 
President Musharraf cited ‘judicial activism and interference of the judiciary’, as well as 
threats to national security by way of justification for the emergency.459  
 
As I speak to you today, Pakistan is facing a very dangerous situation. It is 
suffering from an internal crisis and whatever is happening now is related to 
the internal disturbance. During such moments for nations, a time comes when 
difficult decisions have to be taken. For Pakistan too, we will have to take 
certain important and painful decisions. And if we do not take timely action, 
then God forbid it could be dangerous to Pakistan’s sovereignty. […] I would 
like to ask the nation, as to why that happened? Why this situation developed? 
For me, it is judicial activism and interference of the judiciary, which is a pillar 
of the state with the other two pillars, the legislative and the executive pillar.460 
 
The imposition of martial law triggered widespread opposition within Pakistan. Resistance 
came from mainstream political parties, lawyers, religious leaders, civil rights groups, and 
the general public. Benazir Bhutto, leader of the PPP, was twice placed under house arrest 
by Pakistani authorities for planning to lead an anti-martial law/anti-government protest 
march from Lahore to Islamabad. Despite earlier rumours of a possible deal between the 
president and Ms Bhutto, with Musharraf to retain his position as president and Bhutto to 
take up the position of prime minister, Bhutto publicly called on the president to resign. The 
                                                            
456 ‘She came, she saw…’, Daily Times, 19 October 2007, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C10%5C19%5Cstory_19-10-2007_pg1_1, (accessed 22 
April 2012). 
457 ‘Mastermind of failed Bhutto assassination attempt arrested’, The Guardian, 27 February 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/26/benazirbhutto.pakistan, (accessed 27 May 2014). 
458 This was followed by the Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007, the Provisional Constitution 
(Amendment) Order 2007, the Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2007, and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Ordinance 
2007. 
459 ‘Address to the Nation’, Islamabad Policy Research Centre, 3 November 2007, 
http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2008/documents.pdf, (accessed 4 May 2012). 
460 Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012). 
 
 145 
imposition of martial law also triggered responses from the international community. On 
November 16, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte arrived in Islamabad to urge 
President Musharraf to end martial law and hold elections. On November 22, Pakistan was 
again suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations after President Musharraf failed to 
meet the 10-day deadline to either lift emergency rule or resign as chief of army staff. 
Towards the end of November the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared President Musharraf 
to be the winner of the presidential election. Musharraf subsequently retired his position of 
chief of army staff and was sworn in as president for a second term on November 29. 
President Musharraf lifted the Proclamation of Emergency, repealed the Provisional 
Constitution Order, revived the 1973 Constitution, and announced that a general election 
would be held in February 2008. 
 
While these moves promised some hope of respite from the political turmoil that had 
plagued Pakistan during much of 2007, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27 
put an end to those hopes. Ms Bhutto was killed during an election rally at Liaquat Bagh in 
Rawalpindi. President Musharraf condemned the attack, offering his condolences to Ms 
Bhutto's family. He went on to say, 'this is a big tragedy for the nation, which cannot be 
explained in words. I am deeply grieved and condemn it strongly'.461 Musharraf blamed 
terrorists for Ms Bhutto’s assassination. During the three-day mourning period, the province 
of Sindh experienced widespread lawlessness and violence. Karachi suffered the worst of 
the violence, forcing the Karachi Stock Exchange to suspend trading for three days. Violence 
also broke out in other parts of Pakistan, compelling President Musharraf to place the 
military on high alert only weeks after lifting the emergency. Bhutto was laid to rest beside 
her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the family mausoleum in the village of Ghari Khuda 
Baksh. Benazir Bhutto was survived by her husband Asif Ali Zardari and their three 
children Bilawal, Bakhtawar, and Asifa. 
 
In its annual report, the HRCP called 2008 a year of ‘opportunities and challenges’.462 In terms 
of opportunities, a general election was held on February 18 in order to elect members to the 
national assembly (lower house of parliament) and the four provincial assemblies. The PPP 
won the largest number of seats in the national assembly, followed by the PML-N (Pakistan 
Muslim League - Nawaz), the Musharraf-led PML-Q, the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi 
Movement), the ANP (Awami National Party), and the MMA. In the provincial assemblies, 
the PML-N was dominant in Punjab, the PPP in Sindh, the PML-Q in Balochistan, and the 
ANP in the NWFP.463 Significantly, the MMA coalition of religious parties was marginalised 
in the provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP, thus marking a dramatic reversal of the 2002 
elections. On March 24, the national assembly elected the Sufi-leaning Yousuf Raza Gillani of 
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the PPP prime minister of Pakistan. The following day, Gillani was sworn in by President 
Musharraf in an official ceremony. 
 
On August 5, the PPP and PML-N coalition met to discuss the impeachment of President 
Musharraf, as well as the reinstatement of the dismissed judges. In the meeting, Musharraf 
was accused of ‘undermining the transition to democracy’, weakening the federation, 
bringing Pakistan ‘to the brink of economic impasse’, and causing the country to experience 
the ‘worst power shortage in its history’.464 Despite the threat of impeachment charges, 
President Musharraf vowed that he would not resign from the office of president. However, 
ten days later, in a national televised address, Musharraf stood down as President of 
Pakistan after almost nine years of rule. Shortly thereafter, the PPP unanimously nominated 
the widower of the Late Benzair Bhutto, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, to represent the party in the 
upcoming presidential election. On September 6, Zardari was elected president with an 
overwhelming majority. Three days later, he was officially sworn in as president of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan in a ceremony held at the presidential palace in Islamabad. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows how President Musharraf expanded his discourses of moderation during 
the latter half of his nine-year political tenure. Between 2005 and 2008, Pakistan experienced 
a significant increase in religious conservatism. Tensions between groups advocating for an 
Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in various 
domestic and international debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state 
and society. The first of these contestations arose following the government’s decision to 
remove the religion column from passports. The second contestation occurred when the 
Hisba Bill (2005) was unanimously passed in the NWFP Provincial Assembly. The third 
contestation arose following the Danish cartoon controversy, which triggered large-scale, 
and at times violent, demonstrations across Pakistan. Each of these events were viewed by 
domestic and international observers as indicative of increased religious conservatism 
within Pakistani society, and as precursors to the establishment of an Islamic system of 
governance in Pakistan. At the same time, these events raised doubts over whether Pakistan 
really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf and his supporters contended. 
 
Within this context was an increased official preference for Sufism. This was reflected in the 
rise in the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, conferences and seminars on 
Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. At the same time, other political actors 
actively supported the official preference for Sufism. English-language newspapers 
intensified their coverage on the subject of Sufism. This included more extensive reporting 
on the urs festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, Sufi music 
and arts festivals, and on the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines. The expansion 
of these discourses of moderation was most clearly demonstrated by the establishment of the 
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National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, by the Government of Pakistan, in the latter 
half of 2006. Notably, the main aim of the council was to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and 
harmonious culture within Pakistani society. In a period of increased religious conservatism, 
President Musharraf privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani 
society in an attempt to rally popular support for non-violent action and socio-economic 
uplift. The following chapter demonstrates how President Zardari intensified the discourses 
of moderation during his political tenure. Like his predecessor, Zardari promoted Sufism as 







5 Chapter Five:  President Zardari and the reconstitution of the 
Sufi Advisory Council, 2008-2011 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter analysed the political language of President Musharraf, and his 
supporters, between 2005 and 2008. The specific focus of that chapter was to show how 
Musharraf attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. 
In that period, President Musharraf increasingly privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral 
authority within Pakistani society in order to rally support for non-violent action and socio-
economic uplift. The increased official preference for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated 
by the establishment of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, in the latter half of 
2006. The main aim of the council was to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and harmonious culture 
within Pakistani society. However, actively resisting the state-sanctioned version of Islamic 
piety were Muslims who were committed to the primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic 
system of governance in Pakistan. Tensions between religious groups and proponents of the 
state-sanctioned identity were revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the 
place of Islam in the state and society. Tensions were also demonstrated in the rise in 
targeted attacks on Sufi shrines, which was one physical example of the way in which the 
official construction of a Sufi identity was contested. All of these events served to cast 
doubts over whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation, as President Musharraf 
and his supporters contended. 
 
This chapter takes a similar approach to that of the previous chapter. It critically analyses the 
political language of President Zardari, and his supporters, between 2008 and 2011. The 
specific focus of this chapter is to show how Zardari attempted to redefine the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. Like his predecessor, Zardari promoted 
Sufism as an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and 
extremism in Pakistan. The continued official preference for Sufism is most clearly 
demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009. Like its precursor, 
the aim of the council was to create a ‘soft image’ of Pakistan by encouraging its citizens to 
form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress 
socially and economically. However, like his predecessor, President Zardari also faced 
opposition from groups that actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. 
At the same time, a number of events served to present a contradiction between his 
discourses of peace and the socio-political realities. Pakistan experienced an increase in 
terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces, and in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, as well as an increase in attacks on Sufi shrines. Most 
significantly, the assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, and the 
considerable expressions of support from the Barelvi community for the assassin, deeply 
challenged official assertions that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, unity, and non-
violent action against extremism in Pakistan. 
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5.2 Opportunities and challenges for the new administration, 2008 – 2009 
5.2.1 A return to civilian rule 
 
After almost nine years of military rule under President Pervez Musharraf, the general 
election of February 2008 returned the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to a civilian government. 
Yousuf Raza Gillani of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was sworn in as prime minister on 
March 25. On September 9, Asif Ali Zardari was sworn in as president. President Zardari 
revealed his political philosophy in his inaugural presidential address to the joint session of 
parliament on September 20. In his address, Zardari promised to eliminate terrorism and 
extremism, strengthen the federation, build provincial autonomy, revive the economy and 
restore investor confidence, uphold the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the 
press, and develop democracy.465 In short, President Zardari’s political focus during the early 
phase of his leadership was on working towards socio-economic development, national 
cohesion, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. Interestingly, those policy 
objectives were not too dissimilar from those put forward by his military predecessor, 
President Musharraf. For the HRCP the return to a democratically elected civilian 
government was viewed as an opportunity for the leaders of Pakistan to provide meaningful 
civil and political rights protections to the nation’s citizens.466  
 
Shortly after President Zardari delivered his inaugural presidential address, a suicide 
bomber detonated a truck filled with explosives in front of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. 
The explosion took place in the heart of Pakistan’s capital, less than two kilometres from 
Parliament House where Zardari had given his address. The hotel was close to the 
Secretariat, the official residences of the president and the prime minister of Pakistan, the 
Intelligence Bureau, the headquarters of the National Bank of Pakistan, and the World Bank. 
The hotel was also close to the walled diplomatic enclave, which is home to a number of 
international embassies including the US embassy and the Australian and British High 
Commissions. The explosion, which killed approximately sixty people and injured hundreds 
more, served to further reinforce domestic and international concerns regarding the need for 
stronger anti-terrorism measures in Pakistan.467  
 
Less than one week later, President Zardari addressed the 63rd session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in New York. In his address, Zardari introduced the Benazir Bhutto 
Doctrine of Reconciliation, which he stated was intended to ‘combat dictatorship and 
terrorism, while promoting social and economic reforms and justice for the people of 
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Pakistan’.468 For President Zardari, ‘economic justice’ and ‘political democracy’ were essential 
in the fight against terrorism and extremism. A consortium of foreign ministers from 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, and the United States, as well as representatives from the European Union and 
United Kingdom, who met on the margins of the UN General Assembly to form the Friends 
of Democratic Pakistan, supported these policy objectives. The Friends agreed to work 
strategically with Pakistan in the areas of stability, development, border areas, energy, and 
institution building to ‘promote peace and stability in both the country and the region’.469 
5.2.2 The PPP and Islam 
 
Like his predecessor, President Zardari faced the challenge of convincing the public to 
support his decision to continue the unpopular policy of cooperating with the United States 
in the ‘war on terror’. Zardari also undertook to encourage a culture of unity and peaceable 
interaction within Pakistani society. In order to achieve those aims, Zardari relied upon a 
combination of strategies that were directly associated with the main sources of moral 
authority in Pakistani society: the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). As discussed 
previously, most political parties in Pakistan draw on Islam to claim legitimacy from a 
Muslim-majority population. After 9/11, however, the previous government privileged 
aspects of the Sufi tradition in order to claim religious authority and political legitimacy. At 
the same time, it attempted to distance Sufism from a more narrowly conceived legalist 
Islam. The government also claimed that aspects of the Sufi tradition could assist in 
achieving religious and communal harmony, and curb religious extremism. In this, the new 
Zardari-led PPP government continued the policies of its predecessor. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The below extract from the PPP Manifesto (2008) demonstrates the party’s preference for 
Islam in general and Sufism in particular. It also demonstrates the continued reliance on 
Sufism by political parties for religious authority and political legitimacy, as well as national 
integration, and moral and peace-building purposes. 
 
The first principle of the Party is: Islam is our Faith. Islam teaches brotherhood, 
love and peace. Our Faith places a responsibility on each citizen to reach out in 
a spirit of accommodation and tolerance to all religions and sects and to treat 
people of all faiths with respect, enabling them to enjoy religious freedom and 
equality before the law. The message of Islam is the message of Peace. It is a 
message of brotherhood and tolerance. These are symbolised in the words and 
verses of Data Sahib, Shah Abdul Latif of Bhittai, Baba Farid Ganj Shakar and 
Lal Shahbaz Qalander. The Sufi saints adopted a life of simple living and high 
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thinking. It’s time we did the same. By no means did they use or preach the use 
of force.470 
 
While the manifesto clearly states that the foremost principle of the party is Islam, the PPP 
privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society. It did so by linking 
three dominant narratives. In the first narrative, Islam was presented as a religion of ‘love’, 
‘tolerance’, ‘brotherhood’, and ‘peace’. These approbatory themes appear repeatedly in the 
above extract. These themes, which are also a prominent feature of the Sufi tradition, were 
then directly linked to four of Pakistan’s most renowned Sufi saints: Data Ganj Bakhsh, 
Abdul Latif Bhittai, Baba Fariduddin Ganj Shakar, and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar. In the second 
narrative, emphasis was placed on the exemplary belief and behaviour of these Sufi saints 
who, according to the manifesto, ‘adopted a life of simple living and high thinking’. For 
Pakistan’s majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population these qualities are a distinguishing 
characteristic of many Sufis saints. In the third narrative, emphasis was placed on the 
peaceable manner in which these Sufi saints brought Islam to the subcontinent. According to 
the manifesto, ‘by no means did they use or preach the use of force’. In this way, the 
manifesto aimed to firmly link the political and philosophical ideology of the PPP-led 
government to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition. 
 
The official preference for Sufism was again demonstrated towards the end of 2008 when 
Fakhar Zaman, chairman of Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL), and prominent member of 
the Zardari-led PPP, announced the intention to reconstitute the National Sufi Council 
(NSC).471 As discussed in the previous chapter, the National Council for the Promotion of 
Sufism was first formed in 2006 under the Musharraf-led PML-Q government. The main aim 
of the council was to ‘spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood 
[to] integrate regional diversity with national unity’.472 Sufism was positioned as the main 
source of moral authority for Pakistan at a time when Islam had become synonymous with 
intolerance, militancy, and terrorism. The Musharraf-led government privileged Sufism as 
an enlightened and moderate alternative to the image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism, 
extremism, and violence. The NCPS worked primarily alongside the Ministry of Culture, 
Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), the Ministry of Education, and Pakistan 
Academy of Letters (PAL). Its objective was to promote and disseminate the official 
construction of Sufism at conferences, seminars, workshops, music, art and literature 
festivals, and through affiliations to educational institutions and scholars. According to 
Fakhar Zaman, the reconstituted NSC would follow a similar strategy.  
 
Shortly after that announcement a two-day National Literature Conference and International 
Sufism Seminar, organised by Pakistan Academy of Letters and the Allama Iqbal Open 
University, was held in Islamabad. Federal Minister for Education Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani 
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addressed the opening ceremony. In his address the minister emphasised the important role 
of literature in the ‘socio-cultural progress of society’.473 He then went on to praise the efforts 
of NSC Chairman Fakhar Zaman and PAL in promoting and disseminating Sufi literature in 
Pakistan. Significantly, Minister Bijarani said that literature ‘can play a very important role 
in today’s turbulent times, as it creates the atmosphere of dialogue and harmony in society’.474 
Adding his support to these sentiments was Fakhar Zaman, who called for ‘the revival of 
Sufi literature’ which he said was ‘essential for the promotion of tolerance and peace in the 
society’.475  
5.2.3 Mumbai bombings 
 
Renewed calls for tolerance and peace within Pakistani society followed in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, which had important ramifications for Pakistan. On 
Wednesday November 26, 2008, Mumbai experienced several attacks on the Chhatrapati 
Shivaji Railway Terminus, Nariman House, Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital, the Taj Mahal 
Palace, and the Oberoi Trident hotel, as well as explosions in two taxis. Approximately two 
hundred people were killed and more than three hundred were injured in the attacks.476 The 
attacks drew international condemnation and prompted much speculation as to the possible 
role of Pakistan-based militant groups. According to SATP, Mumbai police sources said that 
there was ‘preliminary evidence that operatives of the Pakistan-based LeT carried out the 
Fidayeen (suicide squad) attacks in Mumbai’.477 Muhammad Ajmal Amir Qasab, one of the 
gunmen captured during the attack on the Taj Mahal hotel, and a suspected LeT activist, 
said that the group had travelled to Mumbai by boat from Karachi in Pakistan. Qasab was 
said to be a resident of Faridkot, near Multan (Punjab). LeT spokesperson Abdullah 
Gaznavai condemned the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and denied the group had any 
involvement.478  
 
In his address to the Indian nation, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: 
 
The well-planned and well-orchestrated attacks, probably with external 
linkages, were intended to create a sense of panic, by choosing high profile 
targets and indiscriminately killing foreigners. […]We will take up strongly 
with our neighbours that the use of their territory for launching attacks on us 
will not be tolerated, and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not 
taken by them. We will take a number of measures to strengthen the hands of 
our police and intelligence authorities. We will curb the flow of funds to 
suspect organizations. We will restrict the entry of suspects into the country. 
We will go after these individuals and organizations and make sure that every 
perpetrator, organizer and supporter of terror, whatever his affiliation or 
                                                            
473 ‘National Literature Conference: Literature plays vital role in socio-cultural progress of society: Bijarani’, Daily 
Times, 20 December 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C20%5Cstory_20-12-
2008_pg11_7, (accessed 27 January 2012). 
474Daily Times, 20 December 2008, (accessed 27 January 2012). 
475 Daily Times, 20 December 2008, (accessed 27 January 2012). 
476 ‘India Timeline – Year 2008’, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/timeline/2008.htm, (accessed 2 June 2014). 
477 South Asia Terrorism Portal, (accessed 2 June 2014). 
478 South Asia Terrorism Portal, (accessed 2 June 2014). 
 
 153 
religion may be, pays a heavy price for these cowardly and horrific acts against 
our people.479 
 
With the Indian government placing responsibility firmly on Pakistan, the Mumbai attacks 
threatened to disrupt Indo-Pak relations and the possibility of a combined Indo-Pak anti-
terrorism strategy for the region. While the Government of Pakistan pledged to cooperate 
with India in the investigation, it found itself under considerable domestic and international 
pressure to take stronger steps to rid Pakistani society of extremism, sectarianism, and 
terrorism. Like President Musharraf in the wake of the 7/7 attacks on London, President 
Zardari was compelled to make significant domestic reforms. As part of his reform policy, 
Zardari intensified his predecessor’s campaign to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a 
unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress both 
socially and economically. He did so by appealing to a specific type of territorial 
nationalism, in conjunction with a moderate Islam. 
5.2.4 The increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities in Pakistan 
 
In 2009, the new PPP government faced a number of opportunities and challenges. 
However, accounts from human rights agencies and other commentators suggest that the 
challenges faced by the government far outweighed the opportunities. In its annual report, 
Human Rights Watch described 2009 as ‘another tumultuous year in Pakistan’.480 SATP went 
further, describing it as the ‘bloodiest year yet’.481 According to SATP, Pakistan experienced 
an increase in terrorist-related incidents and terrorist-related fatalities across all four of its 
provinces, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).482  
 
The increase in terrorist-related fatalities was particularly acute in the FATA and NWFP, as 
the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) progressively imposed its authority across the Pashtun areas of 
Pakistan. FATA was pronounced the ‘epicentre of lawlessness’ by SATP.483 In early January 
2009, the Taliban established Shari’a courts in Orakzai Agency (FATA) and demanded that 
the Sikh community pay the widely obsolete jiziya. In April, the Taliban enforced Shari’a law 
in Bajaur Agency (FATA). Barber shops were forbidden from shaving men’s beards and 
women were instructed to avoid public places unless in the company of a male relative.484 
Also in April, Shari’a law was formally introduced in parts of the Provincially Administered 
Tribal Areas (PATA), including the districts of Swat and Malakand (NWFP). 
Controversially, President Zardari signed the Shari’a Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (2009) into the 
constitution following a resolution by the national assembly in its favour. The Regulation 
was the result of an agreement made in February between the federal government, the 
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NWFP provincial government (ANP), and the TTP-backed Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammad (TNSM), which allowed for Shari’a law in the region in return for peace. The 
TNSM, the TTP, and the NWFP provincial government all welcomed the passage of the 
regulation in the national assembly. Notably, members of the national assembly (MNAs) 
from the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) abstained from voting on the Regulation. 
MNA Farooq Sattar said the MQM was opposed to any agreement made at gunpoint.485 The 
leader of the TNSM, Sufi Muhammad,486 responded by saying that ‘parliamentarians who 
opposed the promulgation of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in the National Assembly are no 
longer Muslims’.487 The debate on the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation reignited tensions over who 
is, and who is not, a Muslim in Pakistan. 
 
Similarly, the provinces of Balochistan, the Punjab, and Sindh all experienced an increase in 
terrorist-related fatalities in 2009. In Balochistan, the Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters had 
made significant inroads into parts of east and west Quetta, the provincial capital. Notably, 
Quetta had become a refuge for many leaders of the Afghan Taliban who had fled 
Afghanistan after 2001. According to SATP, the so-called Quetta Shura (executive council) 
controlled Taliban activities in Afghanistan from its base in Quetta. Parts of the city had 
subsequently become extremely dangerous for Pakistani citizens.488 At the same time, pro-
independence Baloch-nationalist groups intensified their freedom struggle, further 
destabilising the security situation in Balochistan. Similarly, the Punjab experienced 
increased suicide attacks, which brought terrorism from the Pashtun-areas of Pakistan to the 
major cities of Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi.489 The Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban 
supporters targeted the security forces, markets, religious processions, and mosques.490 The 
Pakistan Taliban, in conjunction with Al-Qaeda and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), 
threatened to attack government buildings in the province.491 The province of Sindh also 
experienced an increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities. Reports of a Taliban 
infiltration into the province sparked fears that the Pakistan Taliban, in conjunction with 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were planning terrorist activities in the nation’s financial capital, 
Karachi.492 
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5.2.5 The attack on the shrine of Rehman Baba 
 
On March 5, 2009, the shrine of Abdur Rehman Baba, located in the Hazar Khwani area on 
the eastern outskirts of Peshawar (NWFP), was badly damaged in a suspected Taliban 
attack. Rehman Baba is a popular seventeenth-century Pashtun poet-saint, often ascribed 
with ‘opposing oppression and advocating peace and tolerance’.493 The HRCP condemned the 
attack on the shrine, saying that Rehman Baba was ‘a national poet not only of the Pashtun 
people, but of the whole of Pakistan’.494 Similarly, the Daily Times stated that Rehman Baba 
was a ‘cultural symbol of the Pashtun and Afghan people’ and that the main Sufi orders of 
the subcontinent ‘have claimed him as their own, so great was his appeal among the 
masses’.495  
 
The attack on the shrine of Rehman Baba was the first of many attacks on Sufi shrines in 
Pakistan in 2009. In the two-month period between March and May of that year, the PIPS 
and Terrorism Watch reported that five shrines, including that of Rehman Baba, had been 
subject to terrorist-related attacks, primarily in the conflict-hit regions of the NWFP and 
FATA.496 This was a significant increase compared to the four-year period between 2005 and 
2008 which experienced eight terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in total. The terrorist-
related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan between 2005 and 2009 are shown in Figure 3 
below. 
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Figure 2: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2005-2009497 
 
The custodians of the Rehman baba shrine said they had received a letter only days before 
the attack warning against allowing women to visit the shrine, and against the promotion of 
‘shrine culture’.498 As previously discussed, in Pakistan the greatest number of Sufis belong to 
the majority Barelvi tradition. Many Sufi shrines welcome women devotees who go to pray 
and celebrate rituals, often singing and dancing alongside men. Adherents of the Barelvi 
School of thought are also in favour of preserving the unique forms of Islamic belief and 
practice that had developed over time in the subcontinent. For example, Barelvis place great 
importance on the many popular traditions associated with Sufism, such as the intercession 
of saints, saint worship, annual urs celebrations, and devotional music. Conversely, Deoband 
and Ahle-Hadith groups criticise ‘shrine culture’ as bidah and aim to purify Islam of 
elements considered not in conformity with their own narrow interpretation of the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah. The attacks on these shrines is one physical example of the ways in which 
‘correct’ forms of religious identity, belief, and practice, was contested in Pakistan. 
5.3 The formation of the National Sufi Council (NSC) 
 
Alongside the increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities, particularly in the major 
cities of Islamabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Karachi, President Zardari intensified his 
discourses of peace in an attempt to transform existing social, economic, and political 
conditions. On June 1, 2009, the Government of Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs 
announced the decision to reconstitute the National Sufi Council. According to Notification 
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No. 7(1)/09-DD(R&S), the Sufi Advisory Council was reconstituted with immediate effect 
and renamed the National Sufi Council (NSC).499 The function of the NSC was to: 
 
I. Bring forth the soft image of Islam through spreading the Sufi message of 
love, tolerance and universal brotherhood across the world and amongst 
the masses of the area; 
 
II. Propose steps to free religious thought from the rigidity imposed by some 
ulama; 
 
III. Emphasize in the Islamic teachings the element of God’s love and mercy 
for His creation rather than His wrath and retribution; 
 
IV. Determine the ways of practice what one professes and not merely 
indulges in slogans and soliloquist stress the essence of faith rather than 
mere observance of formalities; 
 
V. Establish Sufi Centers of excellence and patronize research activities on 
various facets of Sufism, to confer national and international scholarships 
for research work on Sufism, recommend annual awards for promotion of 
Sufiism and achievements in the related fields; 
 
VI. Glorify the revered Sufi Saints and their mausoleums not just as Centers 
of holiness but also as centers of learning and teaching; 
 
VII. Demolish the edifice of false values based on pelf and power and restore 
morality to its proper place in the niche of Muslim society; 
 
VIII. Combat the fissiparous tendencies and centrifugal forces which were 
spreading their tentacles in the Muslim world; and 
 
IX. Discourage parochial feelings and eliminate racial pride which had 
assumed primary importance in Muslim thinking relegating the ideal of 
brotherhood to a secondary place.500  
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The above terms of reference reveal the preferred state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. 
The Zardari-led government privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani 
society. Notably, the terms of reference were identical to that of its precursor, the NCPS, 
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which was formed at the behest of President Musharraf three years earlier. Like its 
predecessor, the government relied upon Sufism in order to appeal to the shared religious 
consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population in Pakistan. The main aim 
was to create a ‘soft image’ of the nation by encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to form a 
unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially 
and economically. This is demonstrated most visibly by the first term of reference, which 
states that one of the functions of the council was to ‘bring forth the soft image of Islam 
through spreading the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood across the 
world and amongst the masses of the area’. At the same time, Sufism was also ascribed with 
being able to engender tolerance ‘across the world’.501 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In order to convince the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within Pakistani 
society, the government attempted to create a negative ‘Other’. It did so by placing the batin 
aspects of Islam in direct contrast to the zahir aspects of Islam, in an attempt to distance 
Sufism from a narrowly conceived legalist Islam. The negative features of the out-group 
(opponents of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of pejorative 
concepts. For example, one term of reference suggests that the rigid Islamic teachings of 
some ulama hinder the ability or willingness for tolerance in religious thought. Another 
states that some Islamic teachings focus solely on God’s ‘wrath and retribution’. Further 
terms of reference suggest that some Islamic teachings promote ‘false values’ based on ill-
gotten gains and power, are divisive, and encourage parochial attitudes, thereby ‘relegating 
the ideal of brotherhood to a secondary place’.502  
 
Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group (the government and supporters of the state-
sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of approbatory concepts. For 
example, the first term of reference states that the Sufi message of ‘love, tolerance and 
universal brotherhood’ will present a soft image of Islam both nationally and internationally. 
Another term of reference asserts that Sufism will ‘free religious thought from the rigidity 
imposed by some ulama’. Further terms of reference state that Sufism places emphasis on 
‘God’s love and mercy for His creation rather than His wrath and retribution’, stresses ‘the 
essence of faith rather than mere observance of formalities’, and will ‘restore morality to its 
proper place in the niche of Muslim society’.503 By emphasising the positive aspects of the in-
group, the Government of Pakistan aimed to create an image of what the out-group was not. 
In short, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful nor 
tolerant. The negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who threated ‘true’ Islam as 
practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. 
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Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
In order to encourage the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society, 
President Zardari chose to present a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan 
which could only be achieved through Sufism. The NSC terms of reference reveal the official 
narrative: that Sufism was an important means by which to bring about peace, unity, and 
non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. According to the terms of reference, 
devotion to Sufism, and to certain revered Sufi saints and their shrines, would help ‘bring 
forth the soft image of Islam’, ‘free religious thought from rigidity’, ‘emphasise God’s love 
and mercy, stress the essence of faith’, ‘restore morality to its proper place in Muslim 
society’, ‘combat fissiparous tendencies in the Muslim world’, and ‘discourage parochial 
feelings’.504  
 
Less than two weeks after the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council, a suicide bomber 
killed a leading Barelvi religious scholar after Friday prayers. Dr Sarfraz Naeemi, a vocal 
Taliban critic, was the principal of the Jamia Naeemia Madrassah in the city of Lahore, 
where the attack occurred. Dr Naeemi had openly criticised the Taliban for its particular 
application of Shari’a, declared a fatwa against suicide bombings, which he considered un-
Islamic, and called for ‘Ahle Sunnat clerics [to] come forward and protect Islam and 
Pakistan’.505 According to Dawn newspaper, the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for 
the attack.506 In Lahore, hundreds of students and supporters came out in protest against his 
murder, blocking roads and chanting anti-Taliban slogans. Violence broke out in parts of 
Karachi, compelling many shops to close. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani 
condemned the attack. Governor (Punjab) Salman Taseer said that ‘Dr Naeemi promoted the 
message of love, tolerance, brotherhood and sectarian harmony but his voice was silenced.’507  
5.4 Contestations over who is (and who is not) a Muslim in Pakistan, 2010 – 2011 
5.4.1 Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality 
 
In 2010, Pakistan experienced a further increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities in 
the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA). However, there was a slight drop in terrorist-related fatalities in the Punjab 
and in the NWFP owing to the cessation of military engagement between security forces and 
militants.508 In its 2010 annual report, the HRCP stated:  
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The year was a particularly bad one for religious freedoms in Pakistan and all 
indications suggest that worse times are in store. There was a direct link 
between the rise of the Taliban and the suppression and oppression of the 
minorities and of all those whose beliefs differed with those of the extremists or 
who dared to expose hatred and violence in the name of religion.509 
 
In the twelve-month period between January and December, the PIPS and Terrorism Watch 
reported that seventeen Sufi shrines had been subject to terrorist-related attacks in Pakistan 
in 2010.510 The Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters continued to attack shrines in the 
regions of the NWFP and FATA.511 While attacks on places of worship were not uncommon, 
particularly in the conflict-hit regions of Pakistan, the attacks on Sufi shrines in 2010 marked 
a ‘watershed’ according to the PIPS.512 In this period, the Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban 
supporters brought terrorism from the Pashtun-areas of Pakistan to the major cities of 
Pakistan, attacking beloved shrines in Lahore and Karachi. The terrorist-related attacks on 
Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2010 are shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2010513 
 
On July 1, 2010, three suicide bombers attacked the shrine of Abul Hassan Ali Hajvery in 
Lahore, the capital of the Punjab, and Pakistan’s second largest city. The attack killed forty-
five people and injured more than 175.514 Thousands of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine on 
Thursday evening for the special weekly prayers when the attack occurred. The saint, 
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popularly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh or Data Sahib, is one of Pakistan's most revered Sufi 
saints and his shrine is one of the nation's most important. The Express Tribune reported: 
 
The Darbar is a landmark in Lahore. More importantly, it is a symbol of a side 
of Islam that is dear to Pakistanis, especially in these times. It is the liberal 
peace-loving faith as practised by the Sufis, the mystics and indeed, generations 
of the subcontinent. This Islam that many believe to be the true aspect of the 
religion has been and is under threat by the extremists.515 
 
The attack drew strong condemnation from President Zardari, Prime Minister Gillani, and 
the Pakistani public. In the days following the attack, thousands of people came out in 
protest across Lahore. A consortium of religious organisations led a major protest at the 
shrine after Friday prayers. The Sunni Ittehad Council also announced a nation-wide strike 
in protest against the attack.516 A red alert was declared across Lahore, with police assigned to 
sensitive buildings and installations, including minority and foreign installations, mosques, 
railway stations, bus depots, and airports.517 Despite the increased security, two people were 
injured when a bomb was detonated near the shrine of Baba Khaki Shah in the Green Town 
area of Lahore the following month. 
 
The attacks on the shrine of Lahore’s beloved saint prompted the Sindh Home Department, 
and intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the shrine-rich province of Sindh, to 
increase security at important places of worship, including eighty Sufi shrines.518 Despite this, 
on October 7, 2010, nine people were killed and seventy-five were injured in a suicide attack 
on the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Clifton (Sindh). Clifton, an affluent coastal suburb 
of Karachi, is a designated red zone owing to the presence of a number of consulates, 
educational institutions, and sites of interest including Bilawal House, which belongs to one 
of Pakistan’s most famous families, the Bhutto family. In the days that followed, political 
and religious leaders strongly condemned the attack. The Sunni Tehreek announced it 
would observe three days of mourning, and demanded the government make arrests within 
that time. As in Lahore, thousands of people staged demonstrations across Karachi, some of 
which turned violent, causing many businesses to close. 
 
Less than three weeks after the attack on the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi, a bomb, hidden 
in a milk container on the back of a parked motorbike, was detonated outside the shrine of 
Baba Fariduddin Ganj Shakar in Pakpattan (Punjab). While the shrine itself was undamaged, 
seven people were killed and twenty-five were injured in the explosion. Popularly known as 
Baba Farid, the poet-saint is another of Pakistan’s most revered saints and is frequently 
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ascribed with spreading the Sufi message of love and tolerance in the subcontinent. The 
Daily Times reported: 
 
Baba Farid was a pillar of Sufism in the subcontinent. He is revered by not just 
Muslims and Hindus but also by Sikhs. He is considered to be one of the 15 
Sikh Bhagats within Sikhism and parts of his work can be found in the sacred 
Sikh scripture, Guru Granth Sahib.519 
 
Baba Farid’s shrine, which is located in the north-east of the Punjab, is also one of the 
nation’s most popular shrines. Rozehnal wrote that the tomb of Baba Farid ‘has linked the 
local population to a wider universe of Islamic piety and Sufi spiritual hierarchy since the 
thirteenth century’.520 Every year thousands of devotees make the pilgrimage to the shrine to 
attend the annual urs celebrations. The attack on the shrine drew strong condemnation from 
President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani, as well as from the US Embassy in Pakistan.521 
5.4.2 The construction of a national Sufi identity in the Pakistani press 
 
The reconstitution of the National Sufi Council by the Zardari-led government occurred 
contemporaneously with an increased preference for Sufism, as it did in much the same way 
under President Musharraf. Government officials continued the policy of maintaining a 
presence at Sufi shrines, particularly during the urs festivals of prominent Sufi saints. 
Government officials were also present at conferences and seminars on Sufism, as well as at 
Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. At the same time, the Zardari-led government was 
supported in its endeavours by other political actors who actively reinforced and 
reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan 
and its citizens through the lens of Sufism. Similarly, alongside official efforts to promote a 
soft image of the nation, and non-official efforts to promote Sufism generally, national 
English-language newspapers in Pakistan continued to publish on the subject of Sufism. This 
included more extensive reporting on the urs festival dates of prominent Sufi saints, and on 
the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music 
and arts festivals. It also included more extensive reporting on the presence of government 
officials and their activities at Sufi shrines. The below table lists the headlines, on the subject 
of Sufism, that appeared in English-language newspapers in Pakistan in 2010. 
 
Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010. 
Date Newspaper Headline 
January 11, 2010 The News Lok Virsa Promoting ‘Sufism in unique way 
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Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010. 
Date Newspaper Headline 
January 13, 2010 The Nation Lok Virsa sets up 'Hall of Sufis and Shrines'
  
January 29, 2010 APP President Zardari to inaugurate world 
conference on Sufism for Peace in March: 
Fakhar Zaman 
January 30, 2010 The Nation Bhitai's urs to be marked with traditional 
fervour 
January 31, 2010 Dawn Sufism can tackle extremism: minister 
February 3, 2010 Daily Times Rangers to be deployed in city from 
tomorrow : Security, traffic plan for 
chehlum and Data Sahib’s urs finalised 
February 5, 2010 Pakistan Times 966th Urs of Hazrat Data Gunj Bakhsh (RA) 
Begins 
February 5, 2010 Daily Times Culture dept planning to set up Sufism 
Research Cell 
February 7, 2010 Dawn Past present: Is Sufism relevant to our time? 
February 7, 2010 APP Promotion of Sufism can help eliminate 
terror: Sumsam Bukhari 
February 26, 2010 APP Zardari to inaugurate Int'l conference on 
'Sufism and Peace' 
March 1, 2010 The Nation Islam has no room for terror: Gilani 
March 4, 2010 APP PAL to release 'In Defence of Peace, Poetry 
and Culture' on March 14 
March 7, 2010 Dawn NON-FICTION: Close connection 
March 14, 2010 Daily Times Writers' conference starts today 
March 15, 2010 APP Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter 
extremism, terrorism; Zardari 
March 15, 2010 Daily Times Writers vow to promote love and peace 
March 15, 2010 Daily Times Terrorists should not target Punjab: Shahbaz 
March 16, 2010 Daily Times Sufi teachings key to countering terror 
March 16, 2010 Dawn Sufi teachings can counter extremism: 
Zardari 
March 16, 2010 APP Sufism a better cure to terrorism, extremism: 
Assef 
March 27, 2010 Daily Times Local holiday for Madhu Lal’s urs 
March 27, 2010 Daily Times Thousands gravitate to Lahore for Mela 
Chiraghan 
March 27, 2010 Daily Times 'Promote Faiz's poetry to counter 
extremism' 
March 27, 2010 Daily Times PAL geared up to host 'Literary and 
Cultural Fest' 
March 27, 2010 Dawn To build pluralistic society: Teach Sufism in 
schools 
March 28, 2010  Dawn  The city within, and Legends of the Indus  
March 28, 2010  Dawn  A Sufi path in print  
April 8, 2010  The News  Antithesis of Sufism  




Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010. 
Date Newspaper Headline 
April 24, 2010  The News  Contra Sufism  
April 26, 2010  The Express Tribune  The widening split  
May 3, 2010  APP  Hamid Kazmi highlights mystics role in 
propagating Islamic teachings  
May 9, 2010  Pakistan Observer  Sufi poetry can improve country’s image: 
Kathia  
May 28, 2010  Daily Times  National Literary Awards 2008 distributed: 
Govt to give writers due status, says Kathia  
June 22, 2010  The Express Tribune  Militants bomb Sufi saint's shrine  
June 22, 2010  Daily Times  Shrine blown up near Peshawar  
June 22, 2010  The Express Tribune  Prayers, flowers and lots of cakes for 
Benazir's 57th  
July 2, 2010  Daily Times  Lahore | Terror-striken  
July 2, 2010  Daily Times  Triple suicide attacks kill 40 at Data Darbar  
July 2, 2010  Daily Times  Enraged people stage protest, damage 
vehicles  
July 2, 2010  Daily Times  Ispahani slams suicide attack on shrine  
July 3, 2010  The Express Tribune  Nothing is sacred anymore  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  US blamed as shrine attack toll rises to 44  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Shrines in Sindh easy prey for terrorists?  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Security beefed up at shrines  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Qureshi condemns shrine attack  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Security beefed up at shrines, worship 
places  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Chaos and shock the day after  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  City takes to roads in anger over attacks  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Markets closed, traders protest across city  
July 3, 2010  Daily Times  Red alert declared across provincial capital  
July 4, 2010  The Express Tribune  PM Convenes nation conference on 
terrorism  
July 4, 2010  Daily Times  Country shuts to mourn Data Darbar 
tragedy  
July 4, 2010  Daily Times  City shuts down as violent protests continue  
July 4, 2010  Daily Times  Lunger halts at Data Darbar for the first 
time ever  
July 5, 2010  Daily Times  Candlelight vigil for Data Darbar victims  
July 5, 2010  Daily Times  Sunni group forms 'volunteer force' to 
combat terrorism  
July 5, 2010  Daily Times  VIEW: Extremists' war on people's Islam  
July 5, 2010  The News  Rallies, shutdown in Punjab against Data 
Darbar blasts  
July 9, 2010  Daily Times  Citizens, religious leaders oppose plan to 
shut shrines at night  
July 9, 2010  APP  Country's first ever literary TV channel to be 
launched soon  
July 16, 2010  Daily Times  Blast destroys mosque, shrine in Landikotal  
July 20, 2010  APP  Govt encouraging tolerance to counter 
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Date Newspaper Headline 
sectarianism: PM Gilani  
July 20, 2010  Daily Times  International Sufi Council to be set up: PAL  
July 20, 2010  APP  Stage is set for Pakistani Sufi music show in 
New York City tonight  
July 23, 2010  Daily Times  COMMENT: The saints evil men fear - Zaair 
Hussain  
July 24, 2010  The Express Tribune  First Intl Council for Sufism and Peace  
July 24, 2010  Daily Times  PAL all set to establish International Sufi 
Council  
August 19, 2010  Pakistan Observer  PAL to publish series of ‘Sufi Sanj’  
August 26, 2010  APP  Promotion of Sufism vital to eliminate 
terrorism, extremism: Sumsam  
September 25, 2010  The Express Tribune  Targeting symbols of spirituality  
October 8, 2010  Daily Times  Eight killed in Karachi shrine suicide attacks  
October 8, 2010  Daily Times  Twin blasts at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine  
October 8, 2010  Daily Times  ST announces 3-day mourning  
October 8, 2010  Daily Times  Shrine attack suicide bombing'  
October 8, 2010  Daily Times  Religious, political leaders condemn Ghazi 
shrine blasts  
October 9, 2010  Daily Times  Aftermath of twin blasts at Abdullah Shah 
Ghazi shrine  
October 9, 2010  Daily Times  Karachi shuts down day after deadly shrine 
blasts  
October 9, 2010  The Express Tribune  Security the saints' abodes  
October 9, 2010  Daily Times  Twin blasts  
October 15, 2010  Daily Times  Shrine blown up in Landikotal  
October 25, 2010  Daily Times  Shrines at risk of terrorist attacks  
October 26, 2010  Daily Times  Seven killed in blast at Baba Farid shrine  
October 26, 2010  Daily Times  US condemns bombing at Sufi shrine  
October 26, 2010  Daily Times  Terrorists won't succeed, say president, PM  
October 26, 2010  Daily Times  Shrines under threat  
October 27, 2010  Daily Times  EDITORIAL: Barbaric attack on Sufism  
November 9, 2010  Daily Times  TTP plans to attack shrines on Eidul Azha  
November 15‚ 2010  Newsweek Pakistan  Save Our Shrines  
November 29, 2010  Daily Times  Latest issue of HU focuses on Sufis of 
Punjab  
November 29, 2010  Daily Times  Exhibition on Lal Shahbaz Qalandar 
concludes at IVSAA  
December 2, 2010  Dawn  Fearing diversity  
December 4, 2010  Daily Times  Sindh Culture Day today  
December 15, 2010  Daily Times  Taliban kill 3 custodians of shrine in 
Peshawar  
December 15, 2010  The News  Three caretakers of shrine killed in Badaber 
firing  
December 19, 2010  Dawn  Experimenting with a Sufi University  




As the above table shows, English-language newspapers in Pakistan reported extensively on 
what political actors and other commentators had to say on the subject of Sufism in 2010. In 
particular, the question was raised concerning the ability of Sufism to enable the diverse 
citizens of Pakistan to interact peaceably and, consequently, improve the nation’s tarnished 
image abroad. Sufism in this period again became an important subject of debate, 
particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, and 
reconcile religious difference without neglecting Islam. Thus, numerous and rival groups in 
Pakistan, including the Government of Pakistan, politicians, policy advisors, scholars, 
religious and community leaders, and the media, all made their varying appeals on the basis 
of Islam to support or criticise Sufi doctrine. Each group provided religious, moral, socio-
cultural, and historical claims to support their assorted positions, and each relied upon the 
construction of a positive ‘us’-presentation and a negative ‘Other’-presentation in their 
assertion of power and ideology. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
In the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, with all four of Pakistan’s 
provinces, as well as the FATA, having experienced an escalation in terrorist-related 
incidents and fatalities, what is apparent are the increased attempts by the Government of 
Pakistan to encourage its citizens to form a unified community and act peaceably. Once 
again, it did so by promoting Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within society. At the 
same time, the government also intensified its campaign to promote a ‘soft image’ of the 
nation. It was assisted in this by the media which reinforced, reproduced, and disseminated 
the official message of a shared religio-national consciousness based on the moral and peace-
building aspects found within Sufism in English-language newspapers. To the nation’s 
many citizens, the English-speaking elite, the Pakistani diaspora, and international 
observers, the official message was that socio-economic uplift and non-violent action against 
terror could come from within Islam itself. This is demonstrated in headlines such as ‘Sufism 
can tackle extremism’, ‘Promotion of Sufism can help eliminate terror’, ‘Sufi teachings of 
love, peace can counter extremism’, ‘To build pluralistic society: Teach Sufism in schools’, 
‘Sufi poetry can improve country’s image’, and ‘Promotion of Sufism is vital to eliminate 
terrorism, extremism’.522 At the same time, the themes of ‘love’, ‘tolerance’, ‘universal 
brotherhood’, and ‘peace’ reappeared repeatedly in local, national, and international news 
articles, feature articles, editorials, columns, and opinion pieces. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
In this period, a number of historical narratives were reproduced in the media in order to 
encourage people to form a unified community and act peaceably. In March 2010, Prime 
Minister Gillani addressed a collection of government ministers and sajjada nashin at the 
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closing urs ceremony of Muhammad Ismail Shah Bukhari at his shrine in Okara, 130 
kilometres from Lahore. The Nation newspaper reported: 
 
Islam has no room for terror: Gilani [Headline] 
 
Gilani said Islam had no place for terrorism and pointed to Khankahi system 
(mysticism) as a vital source to purge the country of terrorism. […] He said it 
were the saints and not the army generals, who spread Islam in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and other countries while the first ever Hadith in Hindustan was 
introduced by Sheikh Abdul Haq Mahaddith Dehlvi, who was a disciple of 
Hazrat Musa Pak (RA).523 
 
In the above extract, Prime Minister Gillani attempted establish a link between the popular 
historical consciousness and the climate of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. First, 
Gillani began by identifying Sufism as the means by which terrorism could be eliminated 
from Pakistan. Second, he went on to emphasise the successful role of Sufi saints in 
disseminating Islam to countries outside Islam’s heartland in Arabia, including South Asia, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia. The purpose of the address was two-fold. Prime Minister Gillani 
aimed to encourage the people of Pakistan to unite and interact peaceably. He also aimed to 
disassociate Islam and Pakistan from terrorists. Terrorists, Gillani said, ‘were following their 
nefarious designs to divide the people while portraying a distorted picture of Islam, which 
had no room for terrorism’.524  
 
President Zardari took up the motif of Sufism being an effective solution to terrorism in 
Pakistan two weeks later in his official address at the International Conference of Writers 
and Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace. The conference, organised by the Pakistan Academy 
of Letters, was held at the president’s official workplace and residence (Aiwan-e-Sadr) in the 
diplomatic enclave of Islamabad. Approximately eighty international delegates from more 
than thirty countries, and 250 delegates from Pakistan, attended the conference.525 The 
conference was widely reported in the print media. 
 
Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari 
[Headline] 
 
Sufism has a crucial role to play in mankind’s struggle for a peaceful world. […] 
Pakistan was home of great Sufi saints who dedicated their lives to promotion 
of peace and harmony and the vast majority of people believe in peace and 
universal brotherhood as enshrined in the teaching of Holy Prophet (Peace Be 
Upon Him) and Islam.526 
 
In his address, President Zardari placed particular emphasis on the role of the saint in the 
widespread conversion of the population throughout the subcontinent. According to 
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Zardari, Sufi saints dedicated their lives to promoting ‘peace’, ‘love’, and ‘tolerance’. The 
inference was that Sufi saints hold an esteemed place in the nation’s history because of the 
peaceable way in which they brought Islam to the region, through their message of 
philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony. For this reason, Zardari said that Sufism could 
play a valuable role in countering extremism and militancy in Pakistan, and in ‘mankind’s 
struggle for a peaceful world’. 527 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
In order to convince the public to support him in his campaign to eradicate extremism and 
terrorism from Pakistan, President Zardari attempted to construct a negative ‘Other’. In this 
strategy, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as harmful because it posed a distinct threat to 
the ultimate moral force in society (Sufism). Difference was constructed by way of a 
polarising strategy of negative ‘Other’-presentation and positive ‘us’-presentation. Once 
again, the batin aspects of Islam was placed in direct contrast to the zahir aspects of Islam. 
The negative aspects of the out-group (opponents of the state-sanctioned discourse) were 
emphasised through the use of pejoratives such as ‘extremism’, ‘militancy’, ‘terrorism’, 
‘hatred’, and ‘violence’. Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group (the government 
and supporters of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of 
approbatory words such as ‘peace’, ‘tolerance’, ‘harmony’, ‘universal brotherhood’, and 
‘love’. The implication was that the in-group was acting in the national interest whereas the 
out-group was acting against the national interest. By emphasising the positive aspects of 
the in-group, the Government of Pakistan aimed to create an image of what the out-group 
was not. In short, the negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful 
nor tolerant. The negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who threated ‘true’ Islam as 
practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
 
President Zardari relied upon the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam) in his 
appeal to the Pakistani public for unification. Like his predecessor, Zardari envisioned 
Pakistan as a progressive, moderate, and democratic Muslim nation, as opposed to an 
Islamic state. Moreover, like other Muslim nationalist leaders before him, President Zardari 
relied upon religion in his political discourse to legitimise his exhortations. He did this, 
primarily, by appealing to the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam to 
present a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan. This is demonstrated in 
the below extract from his official address at the International Conference of Writers and 
Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace, held in March 2010. 
 
Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari 
[Headline] 
                                                            




ISLAMABAD, Mar 15 (APP): President Asif Ali Zardari Monday called for 
focussing attention on teachings of peace, love and tolerance of the Sufi saints 
so as to counter extremism and the militant mindset. 
 
Addressing an International Conference on Sufism and Peace arranged by 
Pakistan Academy of Letters here at the Aiwan-e-Sadr, President Zardari said 
Sufism has a crucial role to play in mankind’s struggle for a peaceful world. 
The President urged the gathering to play its part in making the world a better 
place to live. 
 
“May we all live in peace throughout the world. The world needs the touch and 
care and the deep thought of sufism.” 
 
He said the conference shows Pakistan’s commitment to the cause of peace and 
the deep bond of its people to the forces of love, harmony and brotherhood, 
which is the soul message of sufis.528 
 
According to a press briefing by Fakhar Zaman, Chairman of Pakistan Academy of Letters 
(PAL), the Sufism and Peace conference successfully presented Pakistan as a ‘citadel of 
Sufism’ and highlighted the nation’s commitment to ‘universal peace’ to an international 
audience. A decision was subsequently taken to form a permanent council in Islamabad. The 
International Sufi Council (ISC) was intended to provide international and domestic scholars 
and intellectuals with a permanent forum in which to exchange and debate ideas on the 
topic of Sufism and peace.529 Notably, Zaman stated that the main aim of the council was to 
‘help re-define the image of Pakistan as a land of the Sufis committed to peace and universal 
brotherhood, instead of wrongly perceived as a terrorist country’.530 At the same time, Sufism 
was presented as a comprehensive strategy for universal peaceful co-existence and as a 
solution to societal problems, such as religious extremism. To this end, PAL proposed to 
promote Sufism at conferences and seminars, as well as through the publication of research 
papers, books, and documentaries in all six of the recognised United Nations languages. 
5.4.3 The increased threat to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
 
In 2011, the Zardari-led government continued to face a number of opportunities and 
challenges. Once again, accounts from human rights agencies and other commentators 
suggest that the challenges faced by the government far outweighed the opportunities. 
According to Human Rights Watch, Pakistan ‘had a disastrous year in 2011’.531 Alongside 
increases in the price of food and fuel, and the floods in Sindh province which displaced 
hundreds of thousands of people, Pakistan experienced an overall deterioration in the law 
and order situation, which included an increase in the persecution of religious minorities 
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and militant attacks on civilians. At the same time, SATP stated that ‘Pakistan’s continuing 
engagement with the production and export of Islamist extremism and terrorism continued 
to produce a bloody blowback at home’.532 Pakistan continued to experience terrorist-related 
incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces, as well as in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with 6,142 civilians, security force personnel, and 
militants killed in 2011.533 The HRCP reported: 
 
Threats to religious minority communities grew more potent and attacks 
occurred in places long considered to be much more tolerant of diversity of all 
shades. Anyone who believed in liberal Islam in Pakistan had to stay quiet or 
seek refuge abroad. […] Lawlessness and political, ethnic and sectarian tensions 
were striking at the very heart of society as efforts to promote harmony and 
cohesion fail to gather steam.534 
5.4.4 Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality 
 
In the twelve-month period between January and December 2011, the PIPS and Terrorism 
Watch reported that twelve Sufi shrines had been subject to terrorist-related attacks in 
Pakistan.535 In total, approximately sixty-five people were killed and 165 people were injured 
in attacks on Sufi shrines in this period.536 The Pakistan Taliban, and pro-Taliban supporters, 
continued to attack shrines in the conflict-hit regions of the NWFP and FATA, as well as 
attacking renowned shrines in the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab. The terrorist-related 
attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2011 are shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2011537 
 
Of those twelve Sufi shrines, three prominent shrines suffered a large number of casualties. 
On February 3, 2011, three people were killed and thirty were injured when a bomb was 
remotely detonated at the shrine of Haider Sayeen, popularly known as Haider Saint. 
Thousands of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine, which is located in the Larri Adda area of 
Lahore, for the first day of the annual urs celebrations. According to the Daily Times, the 
explosion occurred as food was being distributed to the devotees.538  
 
The following month, the shrine of Abdul Wahab, popularly known as Akhwand Panju 
Baba, was attacked. Ten people were killed and thirty were injured when a bomb was 
exploded at the shrine. Hundreds of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine, which is located in 
the Nowshera district of the North West Frontier Province, for Friday prayers. As in the 
attack on the shrine of Haider Saint, the bomb was detonated just as the evening meal was 
being distributed to the devotees. President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani ‘strongly 
condemned’ the attack, calling it an ‘abhorrent act’.539  
 
One month after the attack on the shrine of Akhwand Panju Baba, the shrine of thirteenth-
century Sufi saint Ahmad Sultan, popularly known as Sakhi Sarwar, was attacked. Fifty 
people were killed and one hundred people were injured in the twin suicide attack at the 
main entrance to the shrine. The shrine is located in the foothills of the Sulaiman Mountains 
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in the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab, and is a prominent feature of the region. 
Moreover, Sakhi Sarwar is a renowned Sufi saint who was ‘given the title “Sakhi” (generous) 
for his philanthropy and affection towards Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims alike’.540 Thousands of 
pilgrims had gathered at the shrine to celebrate the annual urs festival. Prime Minister 
Gillani condemned the attack, saying that ‘cowardly acts of terror clearly demonstrate that 
the culprits involved neither have any faith nor any belief in human values’.541  
 
According to The Nation newspaper, the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack. 
Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesperson for the Taliban, told Reuters news agency by telephone, 
‘our men carried out these attacks and we will carry out more in retaliation for government 
operations against our people in the northwest’.542 SATP reported that one of the suicide 
bombers arrested for his role in the attack on the shrine of Sakhi Sarwar, Umar Fidayee (age 
14), revealed that more than four hundred suicide bombers were being trained in North 
Waziristan Agency (FATA).543 Residents of Dera Ghazi Khan described seeing pro-Taliban 
and pro-Al Qaeda slogans written in chalk appearing on walls, fences, and roadside barriers 
in the district, including graffiti supporting the attack on the shrine of Sakhi Sarwar, which 
they said reflected the ‘Talibanisation’ of the province.544  
5.4.5 The blasphemy law controversy 
 
In 2011, the most compelling debate concerning the place of Islam in the state and society 
was revealed in the blasphemy law controversy, which dominated the headlines in the 
Pakistani print media. The debate began in late 2010 when a Pakistani Christian woman was 
convicted of making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. Asia Noreen, or 
Asia Bibi as she is widely known, was sentenced to death by hanging under section 295-C of 
the Pakistan Penal Code by a trial court in the Nankana district of the Punjab. The so-called 
blasphemy law, under which Asia Bibi was convicted, is a set of rules in the penal code that 
deal specifically with offences relating to religion. The penal code was first drafted by the 
British government in the late nineteenth century and was intended to safeguard India’s 
diverse religious groups from religious vilification. Pakistan inherited the penal code when 
it was formed in 1947. Sections 295 and 295-A are comprehensive and designed to protect 
‘the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Pakistan’.545 However, General Zia-ul- 
made two significant additions to the penal code as part of his Islamisation project. These 
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two additions were designed specifically to protect the religious feelings of the Muslims of 
Pakistan. First, he introduced section 295-B to provide protection for the Holy Qur’an:  
 
Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur'an or 
of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful 
purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.546  
 
Second, he introduced section 295-C to provide protection for the reputation of the Prophet 
Muhammad: 
 
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by 
any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the 
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be 
punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.547 
 
Leading the movement to amend the blasphemy law were politicians, human rights 
agencies, minority groups, and other commentators. These sections of society comprised the 
most vocal critics of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. They argued that the laws were 
frequently used to wrongfully accuse someone of a crime based on personal, political, or 
economic reasons. They also argued that the laws tended to be unfairly applied, particularly 
in the lower courts in Pakistan. Ali Dayan Hasan from Human Rights Watch said, ’not only 
do those charged under the blasphemy law suffer persecution, it is evident the ill effects of 
discriminatory laws are compounded by unsympathetic courts’.548 Also of this opinion were a 
number of prominent politicians, including Sherry Rehman (MNA) who submitted a private 
member’s bill to the national assembly calling for an amendment to the blasphemy law. The 
bill sought to abolish the death penalty from section 295-C. The Zardari-led government also 
intimated that it planned to amend the controversial law.  
 
In the case of Asia Bibi, her conviction was strongly condemned by Pakistani citizens, 
human rights agencies, and the Christian community, including Pope Benedict XVI who 
appealed for her release during his weekly public audience at the Vatican.549 Prominent 
politicians from the Zardari-led government, Salman Taseer (Governor of the Punjab), 
Shahbaz Bhatti (the Federal Minister for Minorities), and Sherry Rehman (MNA) all voiced 
their strong opposition to the blasphemy laws, and actively worked to secure Asia Bibi’s 
release. This prompted President Zardari to request that the Ministry for Minority Affairs 
conduct a review of the Asia Bibi case. The ministerial review ultimately determined that the 
blasphemy verdict was ‘legally unsound’.550 In spite of that, the Lahore High Court 
prohibited President Zardari from exercising his constitutional right to grant Asia Bibi a 
pardon. The court also prohibited Governor Salman Taseer and all other government 
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officials from conducting any activity aimed at securing her release. Moreover, Chief Justice 
Khawaja Muhammad Sharif said that Salman Taseer had ‘undermined the sanctity of courts 
and […] should be declared disqualified to hold the office of governor’.551  
 
Predictably, for a Muslim nation whose majority population holds the Qur’an and the 
Prophet Muhammad in great esteem, there was much opposition within Pakistan to 
government proposals to have the blasphemy laws reformed, and to pardon Asia Bibi. In an 
interview with Ali Dayan Hasan from Human Rights Watch, Farieha Aziz from Newsline 
said that it was not common knowledge that those sections of the law that deal with 
blasphemy were codified by General Zia-ul-Haq.552 Many Pakistanis are of the understanding 
that the blasphemy law is the word of God, derived directly from the Qur’an, and therefore 
should not be touched. Pakistan’s vocal religious lobby have consistently promoted this 
view to encourage collective action against reforms to the law. This was true in the case of 
Asia Bibi, where the calls for her release were heard alongside warnings from religious 
groups against amending the blasphemy laws, or pardoning her.  
 
Leading the pro-blasphemy law movement were a number of religious parties and groups, 
including the JI, JUI-F, and JUI-S. Protest rallies were held across Pakistan in the major cities 
of Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. The general response from the 
Pakistani public suggests that a large number of people not only support the law, but also 
believe that blasphemers should be harshly punished. In her memoirs, Asia Bibi wrote that 
‘ten million Pakistanis would be willing to kill me with their own hands. A mullah in 
Peshawar has even promised a fortune – 500,000 rupees – to anyone who takes my life’.553 
Dawn newspaper reported that Maulana Yousef Qureshi, from the Deobandi Mahabat Khan 
Masjid in Peshwar (NWFP), offered Rs 500,000 ‘to the person who kills Asia Bibi’.554 Salman 
Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti, and Sherry Rehman all received death threats for their opposition to 
the laws, and for their support of Asia Bibi. 
 
Also voicing their condemnation of government proposals to reform the blasphemy laws 
and pardon Asia Bibi was a collection of prominent religious scholars and groups, including 
the SIC, and ST, both of which represent the interests of Barelvi Muslims. As discussed 
previously, in Pakistan Barelvi Muslims have a reputation for being moderate, peaceful, and 
tolerant owing to their preference for Sufism. The Government of Pakistan had been actively 
promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects within Sufism to present a utopian vision 
of peace and unity for the nation. However, alongside the Sufi message of philosophical, 
spiritual, and social harmony is an intense desire to protect the reputation of the Prophet 
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Muhammad. Predictably, many Barelvi Muslims support laws that punish those who 
blaspheme against the Prophet. Sahibzada Fazal Kareem, the head of one of Pakistan’s 
largest Barelvi organisations, the SIC, was reported to have said that the council would 
protest against any move by the government to pardon Asia Bibi. He said, ‘the pardon 
would lead to anarchy in the country’.555 He also said the SIC would not allow the 
government to amend the blasphemy law. The remarks were made at a SIC-organised 
protest march against the government’s failure to legislate against terrorism and against 
attacks on Sufi shrines. SIC supporters had gathered at the Bari Imam shrine in Islamabad to 
participate in the ‘Long March’ to Data Dabar in Lahore.556 However, the Government of 
Punjab refused to allow the march to proceed. SIC Secretary-General and NSC Chairman 
Haji Hanif Tayyab criticised the Punjab Government saying, ‘they were organizing a 
peaceful long march for elimination of terrorism’.557 
5.4.6 The assassination of Governor Salman Taseer 
 
On January 4, 2011, Governor Salman Taseer was killed by his Barelvi bodyguard as he 
returned from lunch in the exclusive Kohsar Market area of Islamabad.558 Mr Taseer was a 
vocal critic of the Taliban, which was progressively imposing its ideology and authority in 
the FATA, NWFP, and parts of the Punjab. Taseer was also in favour of making 
amendments to the blasphemy law, and worked to secure the release of the convicted 
blasphemer Asia Bibi. Interior Minister Abdul Rehman Malik reportedly said Malik Mumtaz 
Hussain Qadri had ‘confessed that he killed the governor because he had called the 
blasphemy law a black law’.559 Qadri allegedly admitted to planning to assassinate Governor 
Taseer after hearing sermons by Mufti Hanif Qureshi and Qari Ishtiaq Shah at a religious 
assembly in Rawalpindi on December 31, 2010, which was held in protest against 
amendments to the blasphemy law. The Rawalpindi protest was part of a broader, nation-
wide campaign by religious groups to show their opposition to government proposals to 
change the blasphemy law. On that day, mass protests took place across all four of 
Pakistan’s provinces in the cities of Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi (Punjab), Hyderabad 
and Karachi (Sindh), Quetta (Balochistan), and Peshawar (NWFP). Qadri purportedly said, 
‘the clerics had compelled him to stand up against those (elements) who were demanding 
changes in the blasphemy laws’.560  
 
                                                            
555 ‘Sunni Ittehad Council warns of anarchy if Aasia pardoned’, Dawn, 26 November 2010, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/585859/sunni-ittehad-council-warns-of-anarchy-if-asia-pardoned, (accessed 13 
September 2014). 
556 ‘We won’t allow change in blasphemy laws: Sahibzada Karim’, The Nation, 27 November 2010, 
http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/27-Nov-2010/SICs-Pakistan-Bachao-long-march-kicks-off-hundreds-of-activists-
arrested, (accessed 13 September 2014). 
557 ‘Punjab govt bans SIC long march’, The News, 26 November 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-5929-
Punjab-govt-bans-SIC-long-march, (accessed 13 September 2014). 
558 ‘Punjab Governor martyred’, Daily Times, 5 January 2011, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C05%5Cstory_5-1-2011_pg1_1, (accessed 28 April 
2012). 
559 Daily Times, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012). 
560 ‘Taseer assassination: Self-confessed killer insists he was ‘not influenced’’, The Express Tribune, 11 January 2011, 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/102103/taseer-assassination-self-confessed-killer-insists-he-was-not-influenced, 
(accessed 16 September 2014). 
 
 176 
In an official press release, President Zardari strongly condemned the assassination of 
Governor Taseer and ordered an urgent high-level inquiry to be carried out under the 
supervision of Interior Minister Rehman Malik. 
 
Describing the assassination as a 'most ghastly' crime the President said that no 
words were strong enough to condemn it. The perpetrators of this heinous 
crime must be punished, he said. Paying tributes the President said that Salman 
Taseer was endowed with great courage and energy who employed his gifted 
qualities in the service of the province and the country. He faced the 
vicissitudes of life with composure, resilience and courage, the President said.561 
 
The following day a state funeral was held for Governor Taseer at his official residence in 
Lahore. PPP Secretary-General (Ulema Wing) Muhammad Afzal Chishti led the prayers. In 
attendance were the family and friends of Governor Taseer, as well as President Zardari, 
Prime Minister Gillani, leading politicians from Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, and 
a large number of PPP supporters. Governor Taseer was buried, with full state honours, in 
the Cavalry Ground graveyard, close to his family home in an exclusive part of Lahore. 
 
The assassination of Governor Taseer, like the blasphemy law controversy itself, divided the 
nation. While many voices came out in condemnation of the assassination, there were a large 
number of voices that not only supported the actions of Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri but 
regarded him as a hero. In this, the two largest Sunni groups in Pakistan, the Barelvis and 
the Deobandis, were united. Some religious scholars in Pakistan openly condemned the 
assassination of Governor Taseer. Professor Sajid Mir, president of the JA, and Dr Fareed 
Ahmed Paracha, deputy secretary-general of the JI, said that ‘Islam forbids people to punish 
even the criminals by taking the law into their hands’.562 Most religious scholars, however, 
avoided any outright condemnation of Governor Taseer’s assassination. Abdul Khair 
Muhammad Zubair of the JUP stated that, while Islam does not condone murder, Salman 
Taseer showed an ‘utter disregard for the religious sentiments of the entire nation’.563 
Similarly, leaders of the TNRN issued a statement saying that Governor Taseer had broken 
the law by supporting convicted blasphemer Asia Bibi. Mujahid Abdul Rasool, the leader of 
ST (Lahore division), agreed that Muslims should not attend the funeral of Governor Taseer 
due to his lack of respect for the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad.564 Prominent leaders 
of the SIC, Sahibzada Fazal Kareem and Haji Hanif Tayyab, were noticeable for their initial 
silence. However, SIC Secretary-General and NSC Chairman Haji Hanif Tayyab said 
religious scholars had ‘urged the president, prime minister and Governor Taseer himself 
                                                            
561 ‘Press Releases and Communiqués’, Government of Pakistan, 4 January 2011, 
http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=3&sel=2&pId=241&pressReleaseYear=2011&pr
essReleaseMonth=01, (accessed 21 May 2012). 
562 ‘Ulema press not to offer Taseer’s funeral prayers’, The News, 5 January 2011, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=3126&Cat=13, (accessed 28 April 2012). 
563 The News, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012). 
564 The News, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012). 
 
 177 
that if their knowledge about the blasphemy law are limited, they should consult them and 
avoid debating over the issue’.565  
 
Paradoxically, the responses from Barelvi religious scholars were particularly extreme. In a 
joint statement, the Barelvi-leaning JASP, together with five hundred religious scholars, 
asked Muslims not to conduct funeral prayers for Governor Taseer, nor express any 
sympathy for him. The Muslim cleric who led the funeral prayers received death threats, as 
did some of his family members, forcing him to flee the country, and his family to seek 
police protection.566 Moreover, according to JASP and its affiliates, Governor Taseer was 
deemed a blasphemer for his support of Asia Bibi. They stated that ‘those favouring the 
person indulged in blasphemy are themselves blasphemous’.567 At the same time, Barelvi 
religious scholars praised Qadri as a champion of Islam. The JASP statement said, ‘we pay 
rich tributes and salute the bravery, valour and faith of Mumtaz Qadri’.568 Notably, Qadri was 
thought to have links to Dawat-e-Islami, a non-political, non-violent Barelvi proselytising 
organisation.569 Muhammad Ilyas Attar Qadri, then-President of the Barelvi-leaning JUP 
(youth wing), founded Dawat-e-Islami in Karachi in the 1980s.  
 
The widespread and at times violent expressions of public opposition to attempts by human 
rights agencies, minority groups, and politicians to have the blasphemy law amended, and 
Asia Bibi pardoned, served to contradict government claims that Pakistan was a moderate 
Muslim nation. At the same time, the substantial endorsement of the assassination of 
Governor Taseer, and the considerable support for his assassin Malik Mumtaz Hussain 
Qadri by the Barelvi community, raised the question regarding the extent to which followers 
of the Barelvi tradition were essentially non-violent. These events also challenged the notion, 
held by domestic and international observers, that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, 
unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. 
5.4.7 Promoting love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood 
 
Against the background of heated, and at times violent, protests against changes to the 
blasphemy law, and the wide endorsement of the assassination of Governor Taseer, the 
campaign to promote a soft image of the nation by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition 
continued in much the same way as it had the previous year. Government representatives 
continued to maintain an official presence at prominent Sufi shrines, particularly during urs 
festivals. Government representatives were also visible at conferences and seminars on 
Sufism, as well as at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. The promotion of Sufism as a 
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vehicle for peaceful Islam also received considerable bipartisan support. Other political 
actors actively reinforced and reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and 
moderate identity for the nation through the lens of Sufism. At the same time, English-
language newspapers continued the practice of reporting on the subject of Sufism, thus 
reinforcing and reproducing official efforts to foster a soft image of Pakistan. Again, 
newspapers actively published articles on the presence of government officials and their 
activities at Sufi shrines. Newspapers also continued to report on the urs festival dates of 
prominent Sufi saints, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and 
arts festivals. 
 
On January 8, 2011, an International Sufi Conference was held at the Sindh Museum in 
Hyderabad (Sindh). The conference was jointly organised by the International Sufi 
Foundation (ISF) and Bazm-e-Bahu. The stated aim of these foundations was to disseminate 
and promote Sufi values within Pakistani society.570 The conference, which was attended by 
prominent writers and poets from the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab, was held to 
commemorate the seventeenth-century Sufi poet-saint Sultan Bahu. Sultan Bahu is 
considered one of Pakistan’s most important Sufi poet-saints. His shrine is located in Garh 
Maharaja, approximately one hundred kilometres north of Multan (the City of Saints), in the 
Punjab. His annual urs festival attracts thousands of pilgrims from the Punjab and across 
Pakistan. Sultan Bahu wrote numerous literary works on Sufism, including Sufi poems that 
are repeatedly sung across Pakistan and India. Notably, Mahmood Jamal states that Sultan 
Bahu ‘constantly questions orthodoxy and literal, legalistic interpretations of Islam’ in his 
poetry.571 The concept of Sufism being an effective solution to terrorism in Pakistan was taken 
up at the conference. This is demonstrated in the below extract from Dawn newspaper. 
 
Teachings of great Sufiis can eliminate extremism [Headline] 
 
HYDERABAD, Jan 9: Prominent writers and poets of Sindh and Punjab have 
stressed the need for promoting Sufiism to curb growth of extremism and 
fundamentalism. Sufiism is above the barriers of language, religion, colour and 
race and promotes peace, love and harmony among humans. 
 
Renowned scholar and historian Dr. Nabi Bux Khan Baloch said that Shah 
Abdul Latif Bhitai in Sindh and Sultan Baahoo in Punjab were great exponents 
of Sufiism. Secretary of Sindhi Language Authority and noted writer Taj Joyo 
said that Sultan Baahoo, Bullhay Shah and Shah Latif were eminent Sufiis and 
poets of subcontinent who preached peace, love, harmony and unity. Dr. 
Anwar Figar Hakro said that Baahoo devoted his life to preaching Sufiism. 
Right from his childhood, Baahoo lived the simple life of a Faqir. Poetess Ms 
Aasia Aslam form Lahore said that Baahoo and all other Sufiis preached love, 
peace and human values. 
 
Prof. Tehmina Mufti of Sindh University said that Sufi poets of the 
subcontinent preached love for humanity and their teachings could curb 
extremism and fundamentalism. Dr Sultan Altaf Ali, Prof. Qalandar Shah 
Lakhyari, Dr. Mohammad Ali Manjhi and Dr. Sagar said that Baahoo was a Sufi 
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poet and also a great philosopher. He was strongly opposed to 
fundamentalism, religious extremism and racism.572 
 
The conference passed a number of resolutions in line with the stated aim of the ISF and 
Bazm-e-Bahu, which was to disseminate Sufi values throughout Pakistani society. It was 
contended that Sufi philosophy, which does not make unjust distinctions in its treatment of 
people on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, gender, or language, would engender peace and 
tolerance within society in direct opposition to terrorism and extremism. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Minister for Culture (Sindh) Sassui Palijo was in Karachi to review the 
official arrangements for the 267th urs festival of the seventeenth-century Sufi poet-saint 
Abdul Latif Bhittai. Shah Latif is another of Pakistan’s renowned Sufi saints. He is 
particularly celebrated in Sindh, where he is regarded as ‘one of the greatest poets in the 
Sindhi language’.573 His most popular work, Shah Jo Risalo, a compendium of Sindhi verses, 
was said to have had universal appeal to both the Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent.574 
The shrine of Abdul Latif Bhittai is located in the village of Bhit Shah, approximately two 
hundred kilometres north of Karachi. The annual urs festival, which is held there, attracts 
thousands of pilgrims from Sindh and across Pakistan. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source 
 
The arrangements for the urs of Abdul Latif Bhittai, and the urs festivities themselves, were 
widely reported in English-language newspapers in Pakistan. On January 17, 2011, the Daily 
Times reported: 
 
KARACHI: Sindh Culture Minister Sassui Palijo said on Sunday that the 
message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai is a true source against the extremism and 
terrorism through which we could succeed to promote and project peace, love, 
brotherhood, unity and equality in the society.575 
 
In the above extract, the Government of Pakistan again privileged aspects of Sufism as the 
ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. A number of Sufi-inspired narratives were 
reproduced to create a shared religio-national consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. 
First, Sufism and the message of Latif Bhittai were promoted as an effective means by which 
to unify the nation. Second, Sufism and the message of Latif Bhittai were presented as a 
panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.  
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Minister Palijo went on to say that ‘Sindh had always been leading role in lesson of love, 
peace, harmony and it was due to PPP and President Zardari’s approach’.576 In the 
contemporaneous context of the blasphemy law controversy, the government was frequently 
challenged about its knowledge of the blasphemy law and its respect for Islam in general. 
Thus, an important underlying theme in her political discourse, alongside the need to define 
the ideology of the state, was the need to claim political legitimacy and religious authority in 
terms of Islam. As previously discussed, the relevance of Sufism in the creation of a shared 
religio-national consciousness was particularly evident in the increased official presence at 
Sufi shrines. This official presence was extensively reported in the print media in this period. 
The urs festival of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai is a typical example. The first day of the three-
day urs festivities was declared a public holiday by the chief justice of the Sindh High 
Court.577 Auqaf Minister (Sindh) Abdul Haseeb officially opened the urs by laying a floral 
wreath on the shrine.578 
 
On the opening day of the annual urs festival of Abdul Latif Bhittai, Minister for Culture 
Sassui Palijo addressed a press conference at the Shah Latif Research Cell. The centre was 
established by the Culture Department, Government of Sindh, to conduct research into 
Sufism and the poetry of Shah Latif.579 At the press conference, Minister Palijo relied upon 
three additional strategies namely in an attempt to further convince the nation that Sufism 
was an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and 
extremism in Pakistan. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal to history 
 
Minister Sassui Palijo invoked a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of 
Pakistan in order to promote Sufism as an effective means by which to unify the nation, and 
as a panacea for terrorism and extremism.  
 
Sindh Minister for Culture Sassui Palijo has said that Sindh has remained 
relatively calm and peaceful for decades because of the overwhelming influence 
of Sufi teachings spread by great Sufi saints and poets. Addressing a press 
conference at the Shah Abdul Latif Research Cell in Bhit Shah on Wednesday, 
she said that Sufi teachings had produced a rich tradition of tolerance and 
respect for different cultures and religions.580 
 
In order to positively invoke a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of 
Pakistan, Minister Palijo used the province of Sindh as a national exemplar. Two familiar 
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official narratives are apparent in the above extract: firstly, that Sufism was an intrinsic part 
of the culture of Sindh and, secondly, that Sufi saints were instrumental in disseminating 
moderate and enlightened values amongst the people of Sindh. According to the minister, 
Sufism and Sufi saints were responsible for producing the ‘rich tradition of tolerance and 
respect’ that had kept Sindh ‘relatively calm and peaceful for decades’.581 By drawing on the 
history of Sufism and the Sufi saints in Sindh, Minister Palijo attempted to rally popular 
support for non-violent action against ‘religious extremism’ and ‘street terrorism’, both in 
the province of Sindh and nationally. 
 
Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative ‘Other’ 
 
To further legitimise her exhortations, Minister Sassui Palijo attempted to construct a 
negative ‘Other’ in the minds of the Pakistani people. Like the construction of a shared 
historical consciousness, the construction of a negative ‘Other’ is closely tied to and, 
crucially, poses a distinct threat to the ultimate moral force in society (Sufism). Minister 
Palijo presented the negative ‘Other’ as anyone who posed a threat to Islam as practiced by 
the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. The following extract illustrates the dominant 
narrative used by the minister to create a negative ‘Other’. 
 
Ms Palijo said people were bearing the brunt of street terrorism in Karachi. 
Everyone must condemn this menace and whoever was behind it must be taken 
to task, she added. […] She said the country was facing several kinds of 
terrorism and extremism, including religious extremism and street terrorism 
but the people of Sindh had always been against religious extremism because of 
the influence of Sufism. She said that Sindh being a land of liberal values its 
people had traditionally kept religion separate from politics.582 
 
In the above extract, an inclusive Sufism was once again placed in direct contrast to 
exclusive interpretations of Islam. The negative aspects of the out-group were emphasised 
through the use of pejorative concepts. For example, the minister blamed the ‘menace’ of 
‘street terrorism in Karachi’ on religious extremists. Conversely, the positive aspects of the 
in-group (inclusive Sufism) were emphasised through approbatory concepts. For example, 
the minister stated that Sindh was ‘a land of liberal values’ and that the ‘people of Sindh had 
always been against religious extremism because of the influence of Sufism’. By emphasising 
the positive aspects of the in-group, Minister Palijo was attempting to create an image of 
what the out-group was not. In short, the negative ‘Other’ was not liberal, peaceful, or 
tolerant. The negative ‘Other’ was presented as anyone who threated Islam as practiced by 
the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community in Sindh and in Pakistan. 
 
Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source 
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In order to encourage people to unite behind the ultimate moral authority in society, against 
a negative ‘Other’, Minister Palijo chose to present a utopian vision of peace and tolerance. 
 
Followers of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai must spread his message of love and 
affection, she said. […] Ms Palijo said people were bearing the brunt of street 
terrorism in Karachi. Everyone must condemn this menace and whoever was 
behind it must be taken to task, she added.583 
 
In the above extract, in order to encourage people to unite behind the ultimate moral force 
within society (Sufism) Minister Palijo adopted a hybrid appeal to temporal and spiritual 
rewards. Palijo claimed that the social and moral development of Pakistani society was 
dependent upon the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Sufism. This is 
demonstrated in her statement: ‘Followers of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai must spread his 
message of love and affection’. Once again, Sufism was being drawn upon to rally popular 
support for non-violent action against terrorism. The reward would be the creation of a 
unified and peaceful province and, in turn, a unified and peaceful nation. 
 
On the second day of the annual urs festival of Abdul Latif Bhittai, the Government of 
Pakistan reiterated its commitment to the construction of an enlightened and moderate 
identity for Pakistan and its citizens by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. The Pakistan 
National Council of the Arts, in conjunction with the Ministry of Culture, screened 
documentaries on the lives of three prominent Sufi poet-saints: Shah Hussain (Madhu Lal), 
Abdullah Shah (Bullah Shah), and Mian Muhammad Bakhsh. The documentaries were 
shown in the PNCA building, which is located in the heart of Islamabad close to the 
Secretariat and the official residences of the president and the prime minister of Pakistan. 
Those attending the function included ‘art lovers, educationists, intellectuals, poets, writers 
and a number of students’.584 According to an official press release: 
 
The objective of the production of the documentaries is to promote the Sufi 
Poets’ message of humanity, love and peace in the society which is facing 
conflicting and trouble time and needs such spiritual and moral guidance.585 
 
PAL first announced its decision to produce a series of Sufi documentaries in 2010 following 
the International Conference of Writers and Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace, which was 
held at Aiwan-e-Sadr, the official residence of the president. The documentaries were to be 
produced in English and subtitled in all six of the recognised United Nations languages for 
an international audience, and in Urdu for a domestic audience.586 Members of the 
International Sufi Council (ISC) had agreed to broadcast and market the documentaries 
                                                            
583 Dawn, 20 January 2011, (accessed 13 March 2011). 
584 ‘Documentaries on Sufi poets screened at PNCA’, Daily Times, 21 January 2011, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C21%5Cstory_21-1-2011_pg11_11, (accessed 1 
May 2012). 
585 ‘Press Release’, Pakistan Academy of Letters, 20 January 2011, http://pal.gov.pk/home/literary-activities/press-
conferences/reports.html, (accessed 13 March 2011). 
586 ‘Press release’, Pakistan Academy of Letters, 22 July 2010, http://pal.gov.pk/home/literary-activities/press-
conferences/reports.html, (accessed 15 June 2011). 
 
 183 
internationally.587 Addressing the function, Fakhar Zaman, PAL Chairman and prominent 
member of the Zardari-led PPP, said: 
 
We have a heritage of tolerance, fraternity and love and that’s what we want to 
tell the world. […] Pakistan is not a failed state. We are a liberal, forward 
looking and progressive people.588 
 
5.4.8 Negative perceptions of Pakistan increase 
 
In 2011, a number of events served to present a contradiction between government 
discourses of peace and the socio-political realities in Pakistan. The events also served to 
undermine Pakistan’s legitimacy in the international arena. In the wake of the blasphemy 
law controversy, and the assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, 
Pakistan faced its first ‘open confrontation’ with the United States.589 On January 27, 2011, 
Raymond Davis, a US official, shot and killed two Pakistani youths in Lahore. Davis claimed 
that he acted in self-defence when the men attempted to rob him. A third man, a pedestrian, 
was run over and killed by a car carrying Davis’ colleagues when they tried to assist him. 
The United States requested that Raymond Davis be allowed to return to the US, claiming 
diplomatic status and citing the Vienna Convention (1961). The Pakistan Taliban warned of 
reprisals should the government release Davis.590 President Zardari and Prime Minister 
Gillani both refused to accede to US pressure to release Davis.591 The incident reignited anti-
US sentiment in Pakistan and had a negative impact on US-Pak relations. 
 
On March 2, 2011, Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti was killed within the bounds of 
the Industrial Area Police Station in Islamabad. His assassination came only two months 
after the assassination of Governor Salman Taseer. Bhatti and Taseer were senior members 
of the Zardari-led PPP government, both had voiced their strong opposition to the misuse of 
the blasphemy law, and both had actively worked to secure the release of the convicted 
blasphemer Asia Bibi. Minister Bhatti had received a number of death threats over his stance 
on the blasphemy law. As in the case of Governor Taseer, Bhatti was deemed a blasphemer 
for his call to reform the blasphemy law, and for his support of Asia Bibi. According to the 
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BBC, the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for his assassination. TTP spokesperson 
Ehsanullah Ehsan said: 
 
This man was a known blasphemer of the Prophet [Muhammad]. We will 
continue to target all those who speak against the law which punishes those 
who insult the prophet. Their fate will be the same.592 
 
The Christian community in Pakistan, human rights agencies, and politicians, including 
President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani, all voiced their condemnation of the 
assassination. Presidential Aide Farahnaz Isphani said, ‘this is [a] concerted campaign to 
slaughter every liberal, progressive and humanist voice in Pakistan’.593 Prime Minister Gillani 
said, ‘such acts will not deter the government's resolve to fight terrorism and extremism’.594 
US President Barack Obama, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and US Ambassador to 
Pakistan Cameron Munter all denounced the assassination. President Obama was quoted as 
saying, ‘Bhatti had most courageously challenged the blasphemy laws of Pakistan under 
which individuals have been prosecuted for speaking their minds or practicing their own 
faiths’.595 Two days later, a funeral mass was held at Fatima Church in Islamabad. Prime 
Minister Gillani, other ministers and officials, including US Ambassador to Pakistan 
Cameron Munter, and members of the Christian community attended the service. President 
Zardari did not attend the funeral service or the burial of Shahbaz Bhatti which was held in 
a cemetery in his home village of Khushpur, Faisalabad.596 
 
Five days after the assassination of Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, the BBC Press Office 
released their annual Country Rating Poll. GlobeScan, a research consultancy with offices in 
London, San Francisco, and Toronto, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA) at the University of Maryland, first conducted the poll in 2005. The poll was based on 
the opinions of people from twenty-seven different countries. The Country Rating Poll 
revealed that Pakistan was one of three most negatively viewed countries, along with Iran 
and North Korea. 
 
The worsening in views of Pakistan is particularly apparent in some key 
Western countries. Negative views of Pakistan jumped from 44 to 68 per cent in 
the United Kingdom, 58 to 75 per cent in the USA, 54 to 74 per cent in Australia, 
and 49 to 67 per cent in Canada.597 
 
Negative perceptions of Pakistan increased, and the already-strained US-Pak relations 
deteriorated, further in April 2011. A leaked US document listing the Government of 
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Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a ‘terrorist organisation’ was 
published on the Wikileaks website.598 According to Dawn newspaper, US officials 
considered ISI to be a threat ‘alongside groups like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’.599 
 
US-Pak relations deteriorated even further on May 2, 2011, when Osama bin Laden was 
killed by US forces in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden, founder of Al-Qaeda, the group 
responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was killed in Abbottabad, a garrison town 
approximately fifty kilometres northwest of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. In a televised 
address to the American public, US President Obama declared, ‘on nights like this one, we 
can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been 
done’.600 Prime Minister Gillani endorsed the assassination saying, ‘the elimination of Osama, 
a foreigner who had declared war against Pakistan and was responsible for killing over 
30,000 Pakistani citizens and 5,000 security personnel, was a great victory of the alliance 
against terrorism’.601 In an official press release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged 
that the assassination of Osama Bin Laden was ‘an important milestone in [the] fight against 
terrorism’.602 At the same time, the government expressed concerns about the way in which 
the US carried out the unilateral and unauthorised operation, and strongly denounced the 
violation of sovereignty: 
 
The Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on 
the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this 
operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of 
Pakistan. This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. 
The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve 
as a future precedent for any state, including the US. Such actions undermine 
cooperation and may also sometime constitute threat to international peace and 
security.603 
 
Less than two weeks later, two suicide bombers attacked a Frontier Constabulary training 
centre in Shabqadar, approximately thirty kilometres north of Peshawar (NWFP). The attack 
killed eighty people and injured more than 140. Of the deceased, sixty-nine were 
paramilitary police and eleven were civilians.604 According to a SATP report, the Pakistan 
Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan warned, 
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This chapter demonstrates how President Zardari, and his supporters, attempted to redefine 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism between 2008 and 2011. Like his 
predecessor, Zardari promoted aspects of Sufism as an important force for peace and unity, 
as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. The official preference for 
Sufism continued in much the same way as it did under President Musharraf. Government 
representatives maintained a presence at prominent Sufi shrines, particularly during urs 
festivals. Government representatives were also visible at conferences and seminars on 
Sufism, as well as at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. Supporters of the official 
discourse actively reinforced and reproduced the government narrative that Sufism was an 
important vehicle for peaceful Islam. At the same time, English-language newspapers 
intensified their coverage on the subject of Sufism, thus reinforcing and reproducing official 
efforts to foster a soft image of Pakistan. The print media published articles on the urs 
festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, Sufi music and arts 
festivals, and on the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines. The official preference 
for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council 
in 2009. Like its precursor, the aim of the council was to create a ‘soft image’ of Pakistan by 
encouraging its citizens to form a unified community under a single national identity, 
interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. 
 
However, like his predecessor, President Zardari faced opposition from groups that actively 
resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. In this period, tensions between groups 
advocating for an Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were 
revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and 
society. The most compelling debate was the blasphemy law, which began in late 2010 when 
a Pakistani Christian woman was convicted of making derogatory remarks about the 
Prophet Muhammad. Asia Noreen, or Asia Bibi as she is widely know, was sentenced to 
death by hanging under a section of the Pakistan Penal code introduced by General Zia-ul-
Haq to provide protection for the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad. Politicians, human 
rights agencies, minority groups, and other commentators called for a reform of the 
blasphemy law. Leading the movement to amend the law, and secure the release of Asia 
Bibi, was Governor Salman Taseer and Minister Shahbaz Bhatti. Governor Taseer was killed 
by his Barelvi bodyguard, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, in early January 2011. Minister 
Bhatti was killed two months later. The considerable support from the Sufi-inspired Barelvi 
community for Qadri deeply challenged the notion that Sufism was a reliable force for 
peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, a BBC 
Country Rating Poll, based on the opinions of people from twenty-seven different countries, 
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revealed that Pakistan was one of three most negatively viewed countries in the world. 
Negative opinions of Pakistan increased when a leaked US document identified Pakistan’s 
Inter Services Intelligence Agency to be a threat, alongside Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Negative opinions of Pakistan increased further when Osama bin 
Laden was killed by US forces in Abbottabad, a garrison town approximately fifty 
kilometres northwest of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. These events, together with the 
increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities, presented a contradiction between the 








The preceding chapters demonstrate that in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 a new 
type of discourse began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan. In 2001, the 
military administration of President Musharraf began its attempt to construct an enlightened 
and moderate identity for Pakistan by promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects 
found within Islam. Then in 2006 it established the National Council for the Promotion of 
Sufism. Three years later the civilian administration of President Zardari reconstituted the 
council and renamed it the National Sufi Council. Both administrations attempted to 
redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism. With its ostensible 
message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, both governments posited Sufism 
as the first and foremost symbol of national identity for Pakistan and a global panacea to 
terrorism. From this point onward a space was created in which Sufism became an 
important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest 
religious violence, and reconcile religious difference. A space was also created in which 
opposing discourses attempted to counter the state-sanctioned discourse concerning Islam in 
Pakistan and the role it should play in the state and society. 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to analyse and interpret the political discourse of President 
Musharraf (PML-Q) and his successor President Zardari (PPP) on the subject of Sufism over 
a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in 
which the official construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and 
resisted by political actors, political recipients, and the media. This two-fold approach was 
intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and 
foremost symbol of national ideology and of belonging for Pakistani society despite the 
many sectarian differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. What follows in this 
chapter is a discussion of the empirical findings of each of the preceding chapters, the 
implications of the findings, the limitations of the research, and recommendations for further 
work. 
 
In order to understand contemporary politics and Islam in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis 
employed Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-
political analysis. As discussed in Chapter One, the principle assumption of CDA scholars is 
that discourse and power are not only linked, but that power or social struggles are reflected 
in discourse. CDA scholars, therefore, critically analyse discourse within a specific socio-
political context in order to reveal discursive strategies of dominance and control of those in 
power on the one hand, and those of the marginalised on the other. This method of analysis 
was fundamental to revealing the complex and competing identity narratives that exist in 
Pakistan. This thesis also employed the Discourse-Historical approach, which was essential 
in firmly situating those competing identity narratives within the wider historical socio-
political context. This combined approach provided a particularly useful foundation upon 
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which to examine the reproduction of, and resistance to, power and ideology in Pakistan 
after 9/11. 
 
Of particular importance to this work was the Discourse-Historical approach of Phil 
Graham. In his article entitled “A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical 
Analysis of George W. Bush’s Declaration of War on Terror”, Graham argues that 
throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies to successfully 
persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater good, such 
as risking their lives at war, and that these strategies are particularly apparent in societies 
that have experienced a profound crisis of political legitimacy.606 As the preceding chapters 
demonstrate, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent decision to join 'war on terror', 
triggered a deep crisis of political legitimacy in Pakistan. Moreover, they proved a major 
catalyst for the new discourse that emanated from the political leadership in Pakistan. 
However, in in the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, the government relied 
on four generic strategies, not to encourage people to go to war, as in Graham’s model, but 
rather to encourage them to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress 
socially and economically. This theory resonates with Gramsci’s hegemony paradigm, 
whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies within society in order to 
establish ideological control over that society by means of acquiescence rather than physical 
force. This then allows for effective revenue extraction, and economic development, which 
ultimately results in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. 
 
As discussed, the main aim of this thesis was to analyse and interpret government discourse 
on the subject of Sufism after 9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in which the 
official construction of a Sufi identity was reproduced and resisted by other political actors. 
This thesis also sought to situate those narratives within the wider historical socio-political 
context. Thus, Chapter Two provided an important historical overview of some of the 
dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent 
and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its creation in 1947. It demonstrated the unique ways in 
which Islamic belief and practice developed over a period of approximately twelve hundred 
years. Historically, South Asian Muslims have never been a monolithic homogenous group 
united under a single consciousness. Culturally and socially, the Muslims of South Asia 
have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, and class interests. Religiously, Islam is a 
diverse tradition with various schisms having occurred since its inception. This is reflected 
in the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslims of 
Pakistan.  
 
Chapter Two also demonstrated that Muslim diversity in the Indian subcontinent became 
problematic when the question of Muslim nationalism was raised. The idea of a territorial 
homeland to safeguard the political, economic, and cultural interests of South Asian 
Muslims was first put forward in the late nineteenth century by Syed Ahmed Khan. The so-
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called two-nation theory was based on the supposition that South Asian Muslims 
constituted a nation, distinct and separate from the Hindus, due to their common religious 
affiliation (Islam). This theory gradually crystallised into a demand for a separate Muslim 
nation, in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. For the most part, a monolithic homogeneous 
Islam provided an important source of identity and legitimacy for the Pakistan Movement. 
At the same time, there were Muslims who fervently opposed the movement for Pakistan. A 
number of Muslim politicians, scholars, and clerics worked toward attaining security, equal 
rights, and equal opportunities within a united and free India. Moreover, theologians such 
as Maulana Syed Abu a’la Maududi and Syed Husain Ahmad Madani argued that territorial 
nationalism based on religion was the antithesis of universal Islam and, thus, contradictory 
to the idea of a universal Islamic brotherhood. The ulama in particular were focussed on a 
strict adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam, which they believed could best be 
achieved under their direction in a united India. 
 
Chapter Two also demonstrated that, whilst Islam has always been the dominant tradition 
in Pakistan, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a 
theological level has had a significant impact on the nation’s ability to establish a coherent 
national identity upon which to base a viable political system. Ultimately, the two-nation 
theory was translated into a political reality with the creation of Pakistan in 1947. However, 
the complex and competing interpretations of Islam that existed in the subcontinent 
remained and had the potential to divide the new nation as much as Islam had to unify it. At 
one end of the vast religio-political spectrum were Muslims who were committed to the 
ideal of Islam as the official national identity in a unified and broadly democratic Muslim 
Pakistan. At the other end of the religio-political spectrum were Muslims who were 
committed to the primacy of Islam in Pakistani state and society. The first violent rupture 
concerning the question of the role of Islam in the state, and what it means to be a Muslim in 
society, was the sectarian riots of 1953. The resultant Report of the Court of Inquiry (1954) 
demonstrated the complete lack of doctrinal agreement amongst the ulama themselves 
regarding Islam and the role it should play in the Pakistani state and society, and provided 
an ominous forewarning of the problems associated with combining religion and the state in 
Pakistan.  
 
Attempts by the Government of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 were a continuation of a wider, largely incomplete, and 
problematic struggle to build national unity. Chapter Three critically examined the early 
political discourse of President Musharraf between 2001 and 2004. As discussed, the military 
coup of 1999, followed by the decision to join the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’ after 
9/11, constituted a major historical turning point for Pakistan which prompted a series of 
responses from the government. Fundamentally, President Musharraf acknowledged that, 
militarily, economically, and politically, Pakistan could not risk having the United States as 
an adversary. He also recognised that Pakistan lacked ‘the homogeneity to galvanize the 
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entire nation into an active confrontation’.607 Consequently, a new type of discourse began to 
emanate from the government aimed at the transformation of existing social, economic, and 
political conditions. In his struggle to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, President 
Musharraf relied on four generic strategies. Crucially, those strategies were intended not to 
encourage people to go to war but, rather, to encourage them to form a unified community, 
interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. Thus, four months after the 9/11 
attacks, Musharraf began to make specific references to the moral and peace-building 
aspects found within Islam in order to urge the nation to support the decision to join the 
‘war on terror’, persuade the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism, 
and rally the nation to non-violent and socio-economic uplift. 
 
First, President Musharraf privileged the moral force of ‘true’ Islam as it was revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad by God, and practiced by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi 
saints. He repeatedly stated that the people of Pakistan, and indeed Pakistan itself, 
personified the essential values found within Islam, namely: ‘love’, ‘tolerance’, ‘universal 
brotherhood’, and ‘peace’.608 Second, he relied on a number of narratives in an attempt to 
create a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. Musharraf invoked 
the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who is regarded by Pakistan’s majority Sufi-
inspired Barelvi community as the epitome of ethical and spiritual virtue, the ultimate 
source of divine wisdom, and the first Sufi or friend of God. He also invoked the example of 
prominent Sufi saints, who are known for their peaceable dissemination of Islam in South 
Asia. They are also widely known for their love of humanity, tolerance, exemplary character, 
and superior intellect. Third, in his ideological construction of national identity, the Barelvi 
population were portrayed as acting in accordance with ‘true’ Islam. Approbatory words 
such as ‘tolerance’, ‘universal brotherhood’, ‘peace’, and ‘non-violence’ were used to identify 
and exalt this group. Whereas the negative ‘Other’ was anyone who posed a threat to ‘true’ 
Islam. The use of pejorative words such as ‘extremism’, ‘sectarianism’, ‘terrorism’, and 
‘violence’ were used to identify and demonise this group. Finally, in his construction of a 
collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan, President Musharraf promoted a 
utopian vision of peace and national unity that he claimed could only be achieved through 
the devotion to Sufism, and to certain revered Sufi saints and their shrines. Societal change, 
he argued, could only be achieved through huquq al-ibad (obligations towards fellow beings). 
Fundamental to that concept was not only a basic notion of human rights but also love for 
humanity, which is a central aspect of the Sufi-inspired Barelvi tradition, and which allows 
for cooperation and respect beyond narrow religious or sectarian boundaries. 
 
Chapter Four critically examined the political discourse of President Musharraf during the 
latter half of his nine-year political tenure. Notably, the official preference for Sufism 
increased in the period between 2005 and 2008. This was demonstrated by the rise in the 
presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, particularly during the urs festivals of 
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prominent Sufi saints. There was also a rise in the presence of government officials at 
conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. 
However, the increased official preference for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated by the 
formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006, with President 
Musharraf as its Patron in Chief. The main aim of the council was to ‘spread the Sufi 
message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood [to] integrate regional diversity with 
national unity’.609 In this period, President Musharraf continued his earlier practice of 
privileging Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. Moreover, he 
increasingly drew upon, co-opted, and controlled Sufism in the construction of a shared 
historical consciousness, a negative ‘Other’, and a shared collective present and future for 
the people of Pakistan. Alongside official efforts to promote Sufism, national English-
language newspapers in Pakistan increased their coverage on the subject of Sufism. This 
included reporting on the presence of government officials, and their activities, at Sufi 
shrines. It also included more extensive reporting on the urs festival dates of prominent Sufi 
saints, and on the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, 
and Sufi music and arts festivals. 
 
Amidst the increased official preference for Sufism were those who actively resisted the 
state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. These oppositional groups were committed to the 
primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. The most critical 
opponents of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan came from within 
the minority Sunni Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions. Unlike the Barelvis, who consider 
Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition and an essential feature of Pakistan’s heritage 
and culture, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions vehemently oppose 
certain aspects of Barelvi Sufi belief and tradition. To counter the official discourse, 
oppositional groups privileged a self-styled orthodox version of Islam, which placed greater 
emphasis on adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, alongside a more systematic 
application of Shari’a law, as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. The 
dominant narrative was that Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam and any 
opposition to this was both an attack on Pakistan and an attack on Islam. Their construction 
of a negative ‘Other’ included anyone who aimed to secularise Pakistan, namely the 
Musharraf-led government and its ideological supporters. This group saw themselves as 
working for the good of the nation by trying to implement an Islamic system of governance 
in Pakistan in-line with its identity as an Islamic state.  
 
Chapter Five critically examined the political discourse of President Zardari between 2008 
and 2011. Notably, the new civilian administration that came to power not only continued 
the policies of the previous administration with regards to Sufism but also intensified the 
campaign to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. 
Government representatives maintained a visible presence at prominent Sufi shrines, at 
conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. As in the 
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Musharraf era, the increased official preference for Sufism in this period was most clearly 
demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council. Like its precursor, the aim 
of the council was to create a ‘soft image’ of Islam by disseminating the Sufi message of 
‘love’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘universal brotherhood’. The Zardari-led administration was 
supported in its endeavours by other political actors who actively reinforced and 
reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan 
through the lens of Sufism. In particular, national English-language newspapers extensively 
reported on the urs festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, 
Sufi music and arts festivals, and the presence of government officials and their activities at 
Sufi shrines. 
 
Like his predecessor, President Zardari relied on four generic strategies in an attempt to 
redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. First, Zardari 
privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. Second, he 
invoked a number of narratives in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness 
amongst the people of Pakistan. Emphasis was again placed on the historical role of the saint 
in the successful, and peaceful, dissemination of moderate and enlightened Islamic values in 
South Asia. The main narrative was that continuity with the nation’s valued past flowed 
from devotion to the Sufi saints and their shrines. Third, in his ideological construction of 
national identity, Sufism was distanced from a narrowly conceived legalist Islam by placing 
emphasis on the batin aspects of Islam in direct contrast to the zahir aspects of Islam. The 
inner and outer aspects of Islam characterise the achievement of a greater awareness of God 
on the one hand, and the adherence to Islamic legal obligations and norms on the other. The 
negative ‘Other’ was anyone who promoted rigid Islamic teachings, hindered tolerance in 
religious thought, and focussed on God’s wrath and retribution. Finally, in his construction 
of a collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan, President Zardari also 
promoted a utopian vision of peace and national unity. He ascribed Sufism as being an 
important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in 
Pakistan. 
 
In this period, as in the Musharraf era, President Zardari faced opposition from groups that 
were critical of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan. These groups 
actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety, insisting that Pakistan had 
been created in the name of Islam and should therefore have an Islamic system of 
governance in line with its identity as an Islamic state. Tensions between groups advocating 
for an Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in a 
number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. By far 
the most compelling debate was the blasphemy law controversy, which culminated in the 
assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard. The assassination of Governor 
Taseer, together with the widespread and at times violent expressions of public opposition 
to attempts by human rights agencies, minority groups, and politicians to have the 
blasphemy law amended, served to contradict official assertions that Pakistan was a 
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moderate Muslim nation. At the same time, the substantial endorsement of the assassination 
of Governor Taseer, and the considerable support for his assassin Malik Mumtaz Hussain 
Qadri by the Barelvi community, raised the question regarding the extent to which followers 
of the Barelvi tradition were essentially non-violent. These events also challenged the notion, 
held by domestic and international observers, that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, 
unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. 
 
As the preceding chapters demonstrate, the Government of Pakistan, under the leadership of 
President Musharraf and President Zardari, ultimately failed to redefine the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 9/11. Both governments were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to encourage the diverse people of Pakistan to form a unified 
community and interact peaceably. This failure was demonstrated by the increase in 
terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four provinces, and in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, as well as the increase in attacks on Sufi shrines. Both 
governments also failed to promote a ‘soft image’ of the nation to the international 
community. This failure was demonstrated by a 2011 study that revealed that Pakistan was 
the second most negatively viewed country in the world. Nevertheless, the Discourse-
Historical approach provided a useful framework with which to critically analyse the 
discursive strategies used by the Government of Pakistan in the construction of a Sufi 
national identity. It also provided a useful framework with which to critically analyse the 
discursive strategies used by other political actors to reproduce or resist the government 
discourse. At the same time, the framework enabled a critical analysis of the social, political, 
and historical context within which the discursive construction of a Sufi national identity 
took place in order to reveal factors that influenced and delimited the discourse. 
 
Despite the benefits of employing the Discourse-Historical approach as both a theoretical 
framework and as a method for analysing the source material, this study encountered a 
number of limitations. First, the empirical findings in this study emerged as a direct result of 
the application of a set of preconceived theories to the source material. Further studies might 
benefit from taking a multi-layered approach, which would allow for more interaction 
between the source material and the theory in order to provide room for unexpected 
findings. Moreover, these preconceived theories had only previously been applied to ‘call to 
arms’ speeches from western societies. Allowing for more fluid interaction between the 
source material and the theoretical framework might also provide a space in which to 
understand how non-western nations attempt to construct political sameness and difference. 
It might also provide a space in which to re-think non-western methods of enquiry and 
analysis, as well as challenge normative conceptions of nation and national identity. 
 
Second, the source material selected for analysis limited the empirical findings in this study. 
Material comprised predominantly of English-language sources such as government 
speeches and debates, laws, regulations, and legislation, and propaganda, and newspaper 
articles and editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers in 
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Pakistan. English language sources were selected because English is regarded as the official 
language of Pakistan and the lingua franca of the government. At the same time, English-
language newspapers played a particularly important role in disseminating the official 
construction of a Sufi national identity to an elite domestic audience, who might be regarded 
as having cultural and political influence, as well as to an international audience. However, 
only forty-nine per cent of the population of Pakistan over the age of 15 years can read and 
write: thirty-seven per cent of men and sixty-four per cent of women cannot read and write. 
Further studies might benefit from the use of non-English-language sources in order to 
provide a space in which to analyse if, and how, the official construction of national identity 
was reproduced and resisted by subaltern political actors. 
 
Third, the empirical findings in this study were limited to a certain extent by the lack of 
available source material on detractors of the official discourse. As discussed, this study 
attempted to analyse the political discourse of the government, other political actors, and the 
media in order to investigate the ways in which the official construction of a national Sufi 
identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted. This approach was intended to allow a more 
nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of 
national identity, and of belonging, for Pakistani society despite the many theological 
differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. Further studies might benefit from a 
more comprehensive and critical analysis of oppositional discourses in order to fully explore 
the ways in which political actors attempted to not only counter the state-sanctioned 
construction of a national Sufi identity, but also construct a competing yet parallel discourse. 
 
Finally, Nawaz Sharif was elected prime minister of Pakistan in June 2013. Three months 
later, Mamnoon Hussain was elected President of Pakistan. This was the first time in the 
history of Pakistan that political authority was transferred from one democratically elected 
civilian government to another. Despite this major success for the democratic process in 
Pakistan, the challenges outlined in this thesis remain largely unresolved. The main concern 
for Pakistan is the continued failure of Islam to act as a coherent unifying principle with 
which to bind Muslims from different regional, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Whilst 
Islam is the dominant tradition in Pakistan, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus 
with regard to Islam at a theological level continues to have a significant impact on the 
nation’s ability to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political 
system. Further work could extend this study by examining the political discourse of the 
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This glossary is by no means a comprehensive list of non-English language words or phrases 
and their definitions contained herein. The range of Arabic, Persian, and Urdu words, with 
their vast array of different spellings and variants, is a major challenge for South Asia 
scholars. For the most part, Arabic, Persian, and Urdu words have been transliterated into 
English and simplified. With a few exceptions, common spellings found in recent English-
language scholarship have been used. Plurals have occasionally been formed using the 
English 's' and adjectives have occasionally been formed using the English 'i'. Diacritical 
marks have been used infrequently. 
 
Adab (Proper conduct, etiquette, moral behaviour) 
Ahl-e Sunnat wal Jamaat or Ahl-e Sunnat (Followers of the Prophet Muhammad, his 
companions, and the majority community) 
Ahle-Hadith (Eighteenth-century Sunni Islamic reform movement; People of the Hadith) 
Ajlaf (Low-born class) 
Al-Insan al-Kamil (The perfect being) 
Alim (Religious scholar) 
Ashiq-e-rasul (Lover of the Prophet) 
Ashraf (High-born class) 
Barelvi (Eighteenth-century Sunni Sufi-oriented Islamic movement) 
Batin (Inner aspect of Islam) 
Bidah (Innovation) 
Chador (Sheet, veil; garment worn by women) 
Dar al-harb (Abode of unbelievers, non-Islamic region) 
Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) 
Dastar-bandi (Turban-tying ceremony) 
Deoband (Eighteenth-century Sunni Islamic reform movement) 
Dhikr (See Zikr: Remembrance) 
Din (Religion; way of life) 
Eid Milad un-Nabi (The Prophet Muhammad's birthday) 
Fatwa (Religious edict) 
Fidayeen (Suicide squad) 
Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
Hadith (Accounts of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) 
Hajj (Annual pilgrimage to Mecca) 
Halal (Permitted) 
Haram (Prohibited) 
Hijrah (Migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina; The beginning of the 
Muslim era in history.) 
Hikmat (Wisdom) 
Huquq al-ibad (Obligations towards fellow beings) 
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Huquq Allah (Obligation to God) 
Ijma-i-ummat (Agreement of the ulama and mujtahids) 
Ijmah (Consensus of the community) 
Ijtihad (Independent interpretation) 
Ilm (Knowledge) 
Imam (Muslim religious scholar or leader) 
Ishq-e-Haqiqi (Love for God) 
Ishq-e-Majazi (Love for humanity) 
Islam (Submission to the will of God) 
Islamiat (Islamic religious studies) 
Jagir (Land grant) 
Jiziya (Tax on non-Muslims) 
Kafir (un-Islamic, infidel, unbeliever) 
Khanqah (Sufi religious institution or retreat) 
Madaris (plural of Madrassah: Islamic educational institution) 
Madrassah (Islamic educational institution) 
Maulana (Honorific title for a Muslim religious scholar or leader) 
Mohtasib (Ombudsman) 
Mughal (Muslims of Turkish or Central Asian origin) 
Mujtahid (Interpreter of religious law; person who practices ijtihad)  
Mullah (Honorific title for a Muslim religious scholar or leader) 
Murid (Sufi disciple) 
Murshid (Sufi master, pir) 
Muslim (Person who submits to the will of God) 
Naat (Devotional poetry in veneration of the Prophet) 
Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet)  
Pashtun (Pashto-speaking Muslims from Afghanistan) 
Pir (Sufi master) 
Qawwal (Sufi devotional singers) 
Qawwali (Sufi devotional music) 
Quetta Shura (Afghan Taliban executive council based in Quetta, Balochistan) 
Qur'an (Religious text of Islam; sacred word of God) 
Sajjada Nashin (Hereditary successor of a pir; guardian of a shrine) 
Salwar Kameez (Tunic and trousers) 
Sama (Listening) 
Sayyid (Syed) (Honorific title for descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, from Fatimah 
and Ali ibn Abi Talib) 
Shaikh (shaykh) (Honorific title for prominent men and descendants of Arab and Persian 
émigrés; Sufi spiritual master) 
Shari’a (Islamic law) 
Silsila (Sufi spiritual lineage or order) 
Sufi (Person who aims to achieve a direct experience with the divine; follower of Sufism) 
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Sufism (Path to achieve a direct experience with the divine) 
Sunnah (Established custom based on the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) 
Talib (Student) 
Tariqah (Sufi spiritual lineage or order) 
Tawhid (Oneness of God) 
Ulama (plural of Alim: religious scholar) 
Ummah (Universal Islamic brotherhood) 
Urs (Death anniversaries of Sufi saints) 
Wahdat al-wujud (Unity of Being) 
Wali (Friend of God; Sufi saint) 
Zahir (Outer aspect of Islam) 
Zamindar (Landowner) 
Zikr (See Dikhr: Remembrance) 
  
 
